Office of the Historian

64. Memorandum of a Conversation, Wellington, April 8, 1959, 6 p.m.1

Wellington, April 8, 1959, 6 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • The United States
    • Under Secretary C. Douglas Dillon
    • The Honorable J. Graham Parsons
  • Pakistan
    • Manzur Qadir, Minister of Foreign Affairs

SUBJECT

  • Indian-Pakistan Relations, Afghanistan

The Foreign Minister called un-announced at Ambassador Russell’s Residence after the afternoon session. He expressed surprise at Prime Minister Nash’s2 mention during that session that while he had the greatest admiration for Secretary Dulles, he did not always agree with him. Mr. Dillon indicated the difference of viewpoint was of long standing and was mainly one of theory rather than of practice but they understood each other well and Mr. Nash was not likely to act hastily.

Mr. Dillon expressed surprise at the Minister’s rather strong remarks about Pushtoonistan and Afghanistan. The latter replied that at the time of the Baghdad Pact Conference3 he had surmised that Afghanistan had moved far towards the Communist Bloc. He now had positive confirmation of this.

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The balance of the conversation related to Pakistan relations with India, principally the Kashmir and the canal waters disputes. He said Pakistan badly wanted agreement and was ready to settle on almost any basis particularly if third party initiative facilitated serious negotiations. He mentioned Pakistan’s willingness to agree in advance to a solution of the canal waters dispute but that India was holding back wanting to have a look see first. It was clear that the Minister looked forward to the International Bank’s proposal.

During this part of the talk he underlined the necessity for assuring to Pakistan the waters of the Chenab and he and Mr. Dillon both noted as politically unfeasible an Indian proposal to divert Chenab water against other compensatory water which would have the effect of giving India control of all the head waters of the various rivers.

On Kashmir the Minister inveighed against Indian procrastination and finally repudiation of its agreement to a plebiscite. He related the USSR’s support of this unilateral repudiation of an international agreement to the USSR’s unilateral repudiation of the Berlin Agreements, implying Indian support of the USSR was thus being procured. Here again he insisted that Pakistan would go far to accept a solution, almost any solution provided there could be “independence in the (Kashmir) Valley”. He pointed out in this context that the present Government of Pakistan, as contrasted with former governments, was in a strong position and thus could effect agreements which from the domestic viewpoint might not have been possible before. It was thus important to seize this opportunity for settlements as it might not recur.

The Foreign Minister in the course of his remarks about India made a point of saying that Nehru did not want Communism in India but that he traded on the fears of others that India would go Communist. The Minister was sure that if the United States took a firm line with Nehru there was no danger he would turn to the Communists as he was too much afraid of them.

  1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1253. Confidential. No drafting officer is indicated on the source text. The source text indicates that the conversation took place at the residence of Ambassador Francis H. Russell. Dillon and Qadir were in Wellington for the fifth meeting of the SEATO Council, April 8–10.↩
  2. Walter Nash, Prime Minister of New Zealand.↩
  3. Reference is to the sixth session of the Baghdad Pact Ministerial Council, held at Karachi, January 26–28.↩