63. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State 1

2075. Indian High Commissioner Dayal called on me March 6. Dayal asked probing questions re bilateral.2 I assured him bilateral merely reaffirmation promises previously made to GOP by US, including MDA bilaterals, joint resolution on ME 3 and the UN Charter. I explained bilateral merely an executive agreement which precluded inclusion of anything not previously authorized by US Congress. Dayal finally asked $64 question, did bilateral mean GOP would be more aggressive toward India. I told Dayal I felt the opposite might be true, in that bilateral was first new agreement between new GOP regime and US, and thus reassuring to new regime as to prior expressions by USG for its success.

Dayal mentioned his pending trip to East Pakistan and concern he felt over border skirmishes. Again, after numerous questions Dayal asked me key one, “Would the USG consider such skirmishes as acts of aggression?” I told Dayal USG had concluded as result of our own inquiries, including visitations by Embassy personnel to “front lines” in Patharia forest area, both sides were at fault, that skirmishes were between local constabularies and cease fire arrangements of convenience by local commissioners on either side, rather than a situation in which central governments were policing areas in dispute to assure peace and order.

Dayal also brought up matter his disappointment Baig–Desai talks re East Pakistan headwaters disputes. Dayal said he had felt Desai came to Karachi inclined to be reasonable. I replied only that we had ascertained both GOPGOI versions of discussions and wired them to USG.

Altogether our talk lasted one hour during which Dayal subtly sought to sell me GOI point of view as well as to elicit my own and that of USG. Believe talk may have been effective in quieting Dayal’s worst suspicions, especially as to convictions held by high officials GOP as to bilateral. I took occasion to point out to Dayal from quotations Foreign Secretary Baig’s interview with press fact that Pakistan Foreign Office knew exactly meaning of joint resolution on ME and other authority for bilateral, including limitation under joint resolution [Page 159] to defense Baghdad Pact countries against Communist aggression only.4

Langley
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5/3–659. Confidential. Repeated to New Delhi, Dacca, Lahore, and Calcutta.
  2. Reference is to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Pakistan which was signed on March 5; see Document 346.
  3. Reference is to House Joint Resolution 117, approved by Congress on March 7, 1957, and signed into law by the President on March 9 as P.L. 85–7. (71 Stat. 5)
  4. On March 6, Nehru commented on the new U.S.-Pakistani bilateral agreement before both houses of the Indian Parliament. Copies of his statements were transmitted to the Department as an enclosure to despatch 1044 from New Delhi, March 12. (Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5/3–1259)

    Documentation on India’s reaction to the bilateral agreement is ibid., 790D.5.