Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

65. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rountree) and the Indian Ambassador (Chagla), Department of State, Washington, April 13, 1959¹

Washington, April 13, 1959

SUBJECT

• Loss of Indian Air Force Canberra, forced down in Pakistan April 10

Mr. Chagla called to see Mr. Rountree at his own request to convey to him the serious view taken by the Government of India of, as Mr. Chagla termed it, “the shooting down” of an Indian Air Force Canberra jet bomber by the Pakistan Air Force on April 10.²

Mr. Chagla based his presentation of the facts on the statement made to the Indian Parliament April 11 by Defense Minister V. K. Krishna Menon.³ Mr. Chagla left a copy of this statement, which is reproduced as an attachment to this memorandum.⁴

Mr. Chagla began his presentation by stating that India, too, had experience of wrongful overflights from neighboring territories, both from Pakistan and Goa, but that its answer had always been to give warnings, not to shoot down the planes. This was the case even when there were as many as seventeen violations of India’s airspace across the ceasefire line in Kashmir in three months.

He then related the salient points brought out by Mr. Menon’s statement. He said that the plane was unarmed, a fact which he claimed must have been known to the Pakistanis. He said it was on a routine operational flight, to photograph Indian territory in Himachal Pradesh and Kashmir. It must have strayed over Pakistan due to navigational error, which was easy to do at a height of fifty thousand feet. The Canberra was, Mr. Chagla said, only three minutes’ flight from Indian territory when it was shot down by a Sabrejet fighter. He implied that his information was that no warning was given, but did not press this point when Mr. Rountree stated that Pakistan had reported that the pilot had been warned both by hand-signals and warning shots in front of the plane.

Mr. Chagla went on to state that the incident proves that the arms which the U.S. gives to Pakistan for use against international communism can be used against India; in this case, arms which the U.S. had hardly finished turning over to Pakistan. Mr. Rountree interposed that Pakistan had possessed Sabrejets for some years. Mr. Chagla then asked, “What is going to happen? Peaceful countries don’t shoot down planes.”

Mr. Rountree noted that an incident of this sort detracts from the improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations which the United States desires and which Mr. Chagla himself seeks. Mr. Rountree expressed the hope that the incident will not impair the improved atmosphere between the two countries which we have noted recently.

Mr. Chagla wished to know whether the United States proposed to do anything about the incident.

Mr. Rountree pointed out that that would depend on all the facts in the case. He said that it was a very unfortunate incident. He added that it did not appear from the facts presently available that India had a particularly strong case in the light of the duty of Pakistan’s Air Force to defend its own airspace. Mr. Chagla persisted in his view that the shooting was unjustified in time of peace, and referred to Mr. Menon’s statement that it was contrary to international law. He stated that he felt that the U.S. must do something, as a friend of India. He said that the common people in India felt unsafe, and that the more arms the U.S. gave to Pakistan, the more unsafe they felt. There had been requests in Parliament for action by the Indian Government, which Mr. Nehru had put off by saying that he was pursuing the matter through diplomatic channels. Mr. Chagla said that it would be helpful if he could report to his government that the U.S. would warn the Government of Pakistan concerning its actions. Mr. Chagla said that the U.S. has a right to do so, since the arms that the U.S. has given are a “trust”.

Mr. Rountree then said that he was taking notice of Mr. Chagla’s question as to whether the U.S. was going to take any action. He said he could not give an immediate answer, but rather that we must have an opportunity to consider the matter in the light of all the information available.

Mr. Chagla, with Mr. Rountree’s agreement, then said that he would report to his government that they had discussed the incident, and that Mr. Rountree had stated that he considered the incident most unfortunate, particularly because he felt that better relations had recently been in evidence between India and Pakistan.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5491/4–1359. Confidential. Drafted by Rogers B. Horgan.
2. This aircraft was shot down over Pakistan, approximately 25 miles southeast of Rawalpindi. The Embassy reported this incident to the Department in telegram 2287 from Karachi, April 10. (Ibid., 790D.5491/4–1059)
3. In his statement, Menon characterized the Pakistani action as “unwarranted and contrary to international case and custom.” (Telegram 2432 from New Delhi, April 12;(Ibid., 790D.5491/4–1259)
4. Not printed
5. On April 28, Bunker had an hour-long conversation with Krishna Menon, during which Menon gave him India’s version of the Canberra incident. In telegram 2624 from New Delhi, April 28, Bunker commented on their talk as follows: “My feeling is that GOI does not want to blow up incident unduly, realizing it is not blameless in situation, but strongly resents Pakistani shooting in view its own practice of not arming planes, and feels it must react to public sentiment and communist attacks.” (Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5491/4–2859)