Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

58. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and the Indian Ambassador (Chagla), Department of State, Washington, November 25, 1958¹

Washington, November 25, 1958

SUBJECT

• U.S. Military Aid to Pakistan

During his first (courtesy) call upon the Secretary, the Indian Appointed Ambassador, Mr. Chagla, after discussing India’s belief in democracy and its economic race with China, noted that there seemed to be only one disturbing factor confronting American-Indian relations. This was United States military aid to Pakistan. This military assistance had compelled India in its own defense to spend constantly more and more upon its military forces.

The Secretary replied that it was his own feeling that India was spending really more than was justified by the actual amount of United States military aid to Pakistan. The Secretary noted, as an example, that Indian representatives had alleged that the reason why the Government of India had had to procure Canberra bombers was because bombers were being given to Pakistan. In fact, this was not the case.

The Indian Ambassador asked whether the Secretary believed that the Government of India should take risks with its national security when President Ayub as military dictator of Pakistan was threatening the ultimate use of force in the settlement of Indo-Pakistan disputes. The Secretary said he had simply meant to stress that India’s increased military expenditures could not really be justified by the extent of United States military aid to Pakistan.

The Ambassador repeated that in his opinion United States military aid to Pakistan was increasing the latter’s military capabilities to an extent which required India in turn to expand its own forces. This might represent the Indian point of view, the Secretary replied, but in his opinion India was spending more than was required by aid actually being given to Pakistan.

The Ambassador reiterated that the Government of India simply could not take risks with its national security in view of the nature of Pakistan’s feelings and declared intentions toward India. The Secretary asked whether this required that India be three times stronger militarily than Pakistan. The Ambassador replied that it was not just quantity that counted, but also the quality of armaments, such as modern bombers. One problem was, the Ambassador maintained, that the United States could not inform India just what armaments were being given to Pakistan. To this the Secretary replied that he could inform the Government of India that the United States Government had given no bombers to Pakistan. There had been no reason given by the United States to the Indians to spend vast sums in acquiring Canberra bombers from the United Kingdom. The Ambassador said that this was very welcome news and that he would immediately inform Prime Minister Nehru of it.

The United States, the Secretary continued, in associating itself with SEATO, had alone among the signatories and out of deference to India made it clear that so far as the United States was concerned, SEATO arrangements regarding aggression were concerned only with armed attack by international communism. The Secretary noted that he had also in New Delhi indicated that, if India should be attacked by Pakistan, the United States would support India. The Secretary believed that India’s great fear of Pakistan was unwarranted.

The Ambassador asked again whether the Secretary would wish India to disarm in the face of Pakistan’s bellicose statements. The Secretary replied that, as he had said, he did not wish to imply that India should disarm, but only that it should not spend too much on increasing its armaments. In this connection he noted that the United States had given Pakistan “defensive not offensive” weapons and certainly not special or advanced weapons.

As he was leaving the meeting, Ambassador Chagla said that he hoped the Secretary did not object to his having been frank. The Secretary replied that, contrariwise, he felt that frank exchange of views among friends was useful and noted that he too had been completely frank with the Ambassador.²

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/11–2558. Secret. Drafted by Bartlett.
2. In telegram 1283 to New Delhi, November 28, the Department summarized this conversation for the Embassy. It noted that the Secretary stated to Ambassador Chagla that the United States had given no bombers to Pakistan. The telegram then continued:

   “Department officer present during conversation gained impression what Secretary said re bombers to Pakistan related not only to past but to future. Although in commenting to Indian Ambassador Secretary had in mind existing commitment to provide bombers in future, with delivery of five scheduled for early 1959, fact that Departmental officer misunderstood gives rise to possibility Indian Ambassador also misunderstood and will report to GOI to effect Secretary said US will not in future supply bombers to Pakistan.

   “Ambassador should be aware of foregoing and in event question arises and suitable opportunity presents itself indicate to Nehru or appropriate GOI official that statement related to past and not to future, to which Secretary did not allude.” (Ibid., 790D.5–MSP/11–2858)