Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

59. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, December 5, 1958—noon.

1236. Following is joint message from Ambassadors Langley and Bunker.

“Current talks in Washington on canal waters under Bank’s auspices are clearly of more than usual significance.² Gap between the two estimates has narrowed appreciably. Bank considers this to be time for a final effort. Both sides seem on whole anxious to reach a settlement. GOP now in better position to make agreement which GOI would consider firm.

“Purpose of this message is to suggest it is vitally important that we should be in a position to move into this matter rapidly and with a substantial contribution if the course of negotiations should make such action necessary. It seems clear that with best of good will there will be a substantial gap between the cost of any agreed solution and the contributions from the two parties plus the Bank. It may well be that the capacity of US to intervene rapidly and decisively with the means to complete the financing of a settlement which seems to us acceptable might make the difference between success or failure of these crucial negotiations. Part of US assistance could be in form of PL–480 rupees.

“It is unlikely that there will ever be a reduction of the basic tensions in the subcontinent until there has been a firm agreement between India and Pakistan on some major problem. Conversely, if accord could be reached on a matter of such fundamental importance as Indus waters dispute, a bridge would have been built between the two countries which might well make easier progressive settlement of other problems. So far there is nothing solid in the way of agreement to which either side can point and this vacuum supports the skepticism of those on each side who urge that the other does not really wish to reach agreement.

“It seems clear that present talks provide a unique opportunity for progress in restoration of more stable conditions on this subcontinent and that their failure would be exceptionally unfortunate. This is an opportunity which may not come again for some time.

“We would urge therefore that the administration promptly do the necessary interdepartmental preparatory work and make necessary policy decisions to be in a position to intervene with help if it should be necessary to success of the negotiations”.³

Bunker

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91322/12–558. Secret. Repeated to Karachi.
2. These talks between the Indian and Pakistani delegations and the IBRD opened on December 3.

3. In airgram G–459 to London, December 12, also sent to Karachi and New Delhi, the Department reported that based on long conversations with Iliff and the Pakistani and Indian chairmen of the Indus Waters delegations it believed that the present series of Indus Waters negotiations at the IBRD “will not lead to agreement.” (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91321/12–1258)

   A meeting held in Bartlett’s office on December 15 to discuss what action the United States could take to improve the chances of a solution to the Indus Waters problem reached the same conclusion. (Memorandum from Clarence S. Gulick (ICA) to John O. Bell; ibid., 690D.91322/12–1658)