Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

57. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, November 5, 1958—9 p.m.

1046. Reference: Embtel 1021.² Latest coup by Ayub seems setback to hopes we have had for some slow improvement Indo-Pakistan relations. GOI surprised by sudden expulsion Mirza (Desai had just informed Nehru he believed Pakistan political situation had become stabilized) and by Ayub’s strong statements re Kashmir and canal waters. Prime Minister told Ambassador October 31 (G–183)³ he hoped Ayub’s recent statements were not indication his considered policy toward India. Nevertheless, despite uneasiness re future relations with Ayub government, GOI has been restrained in comment, has not raised issue recognition, and is planning go ahead with Desai–Baig border talks and forthcoming canal waters discussions.

Following is Embassy’s tentative assessment implications Pakistan coup re Indo-Pakistan-US relations:

1. GOI reactions (thus far cautious, tentative, restrained) probably best that could be expected. From Nehru down officials here have refrained from provocative statements which might affect Indo-Pakistan relations. Press was advised by MEA to act accordingly. This in accordance with conscious GOI policy which Nehru described to Ambassador (G–183) and which MEA followed after October 7 coup (Embtel 862).⁴GOI restraint illustrated by fact that although Nehru has discussed Pakistan affairs in public at least twice since Ayub’s October 30 press conference, thus far he has not replied to what Indians consider Ayub’s belligerent threats of war.

2. Nehru and other government leaders, however, have been critical of Pakistan for its failure to make success of parliamentary democracy (Embtel 885).⁵ This criticism has probably resulted not only from genuine concern about a neighbor’s abandonment of democratic institutions but also from desire to demonstrate why similar failure can’t happen here. Nehru comment that military dictatorship not capable of achieving economic growth also probably intended to discourage those who might think it suitable for India. In future it likely that in order to defend their parliamentary system, Indian political leaders may feel obliged to make further invidious comparisons between political systems of India and Pakistan, with unfortunate effect on Indo-Pakistan relations. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] report that Ayub has urged press to play up instability in India (Karachi telegram 1096 to Department)⁶ suggests Pakistan may similarly attempt to justify political system.

3. While there was brief period immediately after Mirza coup during which Indians cautiously hoped removal internal political pressures from GOP might facilitate settlement Indo-Pakistan dispute, this feeling seems to be giving way no [to?] renewed doubts. GOI, surprised by sudden ouster Mirza, is most concerned over Ayub’s October 30 statement which widely read here as threat of war over Kashmir and canal waters dispute. Threat considered particularly disturbing because made by military dictator not subject to internal political pressures as were previous spokesmen for Pakistan policies. Considering unfortunate Indian tendency to exaggerate military threat of Pakistan, Ayub’s comments have set back temporarily at least hopes for improving Indo-Pakistan relations. In view of fact Pakistan position on Kashmir is unchanged (Karachi telegram 1096 to Department) and GOI not likely make concessions at this time, we see little prospect for settlement Kashmir. GOI will probably ridicule demand for “democratic” plebiscite by authoritarian Pakistan Government. Prospect for solution canal waters dispute continues to seem much better than that for Kashmir, but GOI obviously does not consider that Ayub’s October 30 statement on subject sets good stage for negotiations.

4. There is sizeable group here which believes that US and Pakistan military so closely related that US must have had foreknowledge of Pakistan coup and very likely conspired to bring it about. Some people believe if US would not stimulate Pakistan attack on India, we would at least condone it. Fact that Nehru thought these allegations sufficiently important to mention in conversation with Ambassador October 31 (Embtel 1021) indicates his concern about it. (According to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] even Nehru believed US involved).

Long-range implications of Indian suspicions this regard agree discouraging. Embassy fears story of US involvement in Pakistan coup may become part of Indian legend re US-Pakistan “complicity”. Future arms aid to Pakistan may be considered “pay off” of bribe to Pakistan military for subservience to US. Indians may accuse US of maintaining unpopular Pakistan Government (and one which disagrees with India) in power by strengthening Pakistan Army under guise of protecting nation from foreign communism. Because of myth that US-Pakistan military cooperation carries with it US control of Pakistan Army, prospect is that US influence will be seen behind most Pakistan foreign policies and US will share blame in India for purely Indo-Pakistan disputes. This nothing new, but condition may become intensified because of new circumstances.

5. Indians with whom we have discussed Ayub consider him religious man and a nationalist, but not a fanatic. He is considered to have drive and energy, but little brains, has ambitions exceeding his capacity. Indian General, who knew Ayub in pre-partition army, commented that Ayub inclined take precipitate action without thinking of consequences. If this corresponds to GOI evaluation Ayub, it undoubtedly enhances uneasiness re Ayub’s future politics. Both Foreign Minister Qadir and new Army Chief Musa enjoy good reputations here. (Aziz Ahmed considered very able but “bitterly” anti-Indian.)

Above comments tentative and based upon limited evidence (particularly upon local reaction to single press conference by Ayub). With GOI sitting back and watching, much depends upon behavior of Ayub and his new government.

Bunker

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5–MSP/11–558. Secret.
2. In telegram 1021, November 3, Bunker reported on a conversation he had with Nehru on October 31. During their talk, the Prime Minister stated that India was very concerned with recent events in Pakistan. He added that Bunker should know that there was a feeling in some quarters in India that the United States must have known in advance of the October 7 coup. “I, of course, categorically denied any prior knowledge by US of October 7 events and any connivance therein,” Bunker noted. “That Nehru himself should have taken it seriously enough to speak to me about it, however, underscores the warnings as to consequence here of any implication of increased military aid to Pakistan in the near future contained my reftels.” (Ibid., 790D.5–MSP/11–358)
3. Airgram G–183, November 3, contained a memorandum of Bunker’s October 31 conversation with Nehru, which was reported in telegram 1021. (Ibid., 790D.5–MSP/11–358)
4. In telegram 862, October 10, the Embassy reported that an official in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs recently indicated that India was following a “wait and see” policy toward the new Pakistani Government. (Ibid., 790D.00/10–1058)
5. In telegram 885, October 13, the Embassy summarized remarks made by Nehru during a press conference on October 12 with regard to recent developments in Pakistan. (Ibid., 790D.00/10–1358)
6. See footnote 2, supra.