Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

56. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Embassy in India¹

Karachi, October 21, 1958—4 p.m.

169. Subject: Package deal. Fundamentally new Pakistani Government should prove more satisfactory to deal with in that Pak army realistically recognizes it not equal to Indian military might.² This of course salutary in that it should have dampening effect on past tendency political extremist to war-monger. However, above positive effect counter-balanced by weight which Pakistani military place on Kashmir from strategic viewpoint and by surprising degree sentimental feeling obtaining in military circles re “Kashmiri Muslim brothers”. Other major restraining factor at this time is need for popular support on part of any regime, however authoritarian, and resulting practical impossibility for Mirza–Ayub to take any precipitous step which people might view as indication of unpatriotic weakness to India’s benefit.

From long range viewpoint present internal set up in Pakistan provides us with mild encouragement re relations HIP with India and settlement outstanding issues even though we believe any US approach to Pak Government should be postponed for enough time to let dust settle a little more.

With view developing our thoughts as to where we go from here, would be most useful to have your assessment as to how recent Pak development may have affected Nehru’s and GOI’s basic opposition to any substantive negotiations with Pak “until after elections” and Pak internal situation stabilizes somewhat.

Langley

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/10-2158. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to the Department of State. The source text is the Department of State copy.

2. On October 7, President Mirza issued a proclamation which abrogated the Pakistani Constitution and proclaimed martial law. On October 27, Mirza resigned and was replaced as President by General Ayub Khan.

   In telegram 1096 from Karachi, November 1, the Embassy offered its preliminary assessment of the new Pakistani Government’s attitude toward Pakistani-Indian relations, especially the Kashmir problem. It suggested, in part, that for some time to come Ayub Khan and his colleagues would be deeply involved with martial law administration and overwhelmed with the complications of internal affairs, and Pakistani-Indian relations would accordingly be “more or less shelved, except for specific negotiations scheduled prior take-over such as canal waters meeting.” (Ibid., 790D.00/11–158)