Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

388. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 2, 1960, 5:45 p.m.¹

Washington, June 2, 1960, 5:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Call by Pakistan Foreign Minister Qadir on the Secretary: The U–2 Incident and Soviet Pressures on Pakistan

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• H. E. Manzur Qadir, Foreign Minister of Pakistan
• H. E. Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan
• Mr. M. Ikramullah, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan
• Mr. Parker T. Hart, NEA

Foreign Minister Qadir opened the conversation by congratulating the Secretary on his skillful guidance of the SEATO proceedings. He remarked that today’s meeting had been very good and most interesting. The Secretary agreed. Qadir remarked that the Philippine delegate had made some excellent points. He did not think that Nash² had meant to be offensive. The Secretary emphatically concurred. Both agreed that Thanat³ had overdone his reply to Nash’s comments.

Minister Qadir said that he had a list of topics which he had wished to raise with the Secretary. The first, of course, was the U–2 incident.⁴ At the time of the occurrence he was in London and felt that for security reasons it would be best not to say too much in his instructions to Ambassador Ahmed. Ciphers could be so easily compromised. When he had received Ambassador Ahmed’s report of his meeting with the Secretary of May 11 (actual meeting day was May 12)⁵ in which he understood that the Ambassador emphasized to the Secretary the U.S. obligation of giving notice to Pakistan under Mutual Security arrangements, he feared that the Ambassador had “over-reached himself” a little. He hoped that the Secretary would understand. The Secretary indicated that he understood perfectly and reminded Qadir that he had informed the Ambassador that the Department had already been in touch with President Ayub in London, and that he had told the Ambassador that any results of the investigation which Ayub had announced would take place with respect to the over-flight would be backed up by the U.S. Government. (Note: There was no mention made of the misunderstanding between the GOP and the USG as to whether the aide-mémoire of May 14 by the Embassy of Pakistan to the Department constituted a “protest”.)⁶

Remarking that the U.S. Government had its own “cover story” and that he did not wish to go into that subject, Qadir stated that he desired to discuss Soviet pressures and the form they were taking against Pakistan. The USSR for some time had been charging that Pakistan had afforded bases to the U.S. military. Initially the USSR alleged that these were rocket bases and this accusation was maintained throughout 1959. Soviet Ambassador Kapitsa had sought an interview with Qadir for the purpose of expressing the USSR’s disbelief in Qadir’s denial that rocket bases had been given by Pakistan to the U.S. Government. His remarks were rather undiplomatic and Qadir found it necessary to respond that he could see little purpose for Kapitsa’s call. If what Kapitsa was trying to say was that the USSR believed Qadir was lying, he could hardly expect Qadir to reverse himself at the Soviet request. If, on the other hand, he actually believed that Qadir was telling the truth, it served little purpose for Kapitsa to ask Qadir to change his story to serve the interest of the USSR.

Following the U–2 incident, the USSR adopted the line that Pakistan had afforded U–2 bases to the United States. Qadir recalled that at the recent Czech National Day reception in Moscow, Khrushchev had sought out the Pakistan Ambassador and taking him aside with the Afghan Ambassador had asked him, “Where is this place Peshawar? We have circled it in red on our maps”. The Pakistan Ambassador had replied that it was in northern Pakistan. Addressing the same question to the Afghan Ambassador, the latter replied that it was in “occupied Pakhtunistan”. Khrushchev said, “So, it is in occupied Pakhtunistan. You (Pakistan Ambassador) should report this back to your Government.”

Qadir then recalled that earlier the Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Pushkin, had called at Karachi and in a meeting with Qadir had urged that Pakistan draw closer to the USSR. Qadir had replied that this was quite possible as far as trade was concerned and even cooperation (on Pakistan’s terms) in the exploitation of Pakistani oil or minerals was possible. However, Pakistan was not prepared to accept the Russian proposals of “cultural cooperation”, since Soviet offers in this sphere were a cover for other purposes. When pressed by Pushkin to say why he was opposed to cultural cooperation, Qadir referred to the USSR stand on Pushtunistan expressed recently by Khrushchev in Kabul and Moscow,⁷ and the USSR stand on Kashmir. He asked why the Soviet Union took these partisan positions without examining the merits of either case. Pushkin replied that Qadir could reckon for himself the dates on which the USSR took these positions and would see that they were taken “after Pakistan joined the Pact”.

With reference to Soviet allegations of U.S. bases, Qadir wished to draw the Secretary’s attention to the irresponsible support given to them by the American press. A Newsweek article in 1959 had referred to an American base in Pakistan. A very recent issue of Newsweek had included a large map purporting to show the base situation between the USSR and the Free World and had included Pakistan as providing a U–2 base to the United States.⁸ Ambassador Ahmed interjected that a recent “News of the Week” section of the New York Times had similarly portrayed Pakistan as a supplier of bases to the United States.⁹ Qadir emphasized that he, of course, fully understood the freedom of the U.S. press. This was altogether desirable particularly from the standpoint of U.S. internal affairs. However, freedom of the press had certain restrictions even in the United States; for example, against defamation and sedition. He had no suggestions to make but wished to draw the Secretary’s attention to the problems which irresponsible articles raised in the realm of foreign affairs. (Note: Qadir carried out here the pledge which he made during his press conference of May 24 in Karachi, i.e., to draw the attention of the American authorities to the Newsweek article; Karachi’s G–347.)¹⁰

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.90D11/6–260. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Hart on June 7. The source text indicates that the conversation took place in the Secretary’s office. Qadir was in Washington for the sixth Ministerial Meeting of the SEATO Council, May 31–June 2. Four separate memoranda of Herter’s conversations with Qadir were prepared by Hart. The second memorandum, which covered Pakistan’s military aid requirements and the problem of neutralism, is infra. The other two memoranda, which covered Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan’s relations with India, are in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot D 199. Herter was briefed for this meeting in memoranda from G. Lewis Jones and James M. Wilson, Jr., both dated June 2. (Ibid., 790D.5–MSP/6–260)
2. Walter Nash, New Zealand Foreign Minister.
3. Thanat Khoman, Thai Foreign Minister.
4. The Soviet note of May 10 regarding the May 3 shooting down of the U–2 airplane piloted by Gary Francis Powers alleged that the airplane was “sent through Pakistan into the Soviet Union with hostile purposes.” The full text of the Soviet note is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 30, 1960, pp. 852–854.
5. A briefing paper for Secretary Herter from Hart, May 12, is in Department of State, SOA Files: Lot 63 D 110, U–2 Incident.
6. A copy of the May 14 aide-mémoire is in the Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series.
7. See Document 159.
8. Newsweek, May 23, 1960, p. 35.
9. New York Times, May 8, 1960, p. 1.
10. Airgram G–347, June 2, summarized the remarks made by Qadir during his press conference. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/6–260)