389. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 2, 1960, 5:45 p.m.1
SUBJECT
- Call by Pakistan Foreign Minister Qadir on the Secretary: Pakistan’s Military Aid Requirements and the Problem of Neutralism
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- H. E. Manzur Qadir, Foreign Minister of Pakistan
- H. E. Aziz Ahmed, Ambassador of Pakistan
- Mr. M. Ikramullah, Foreign Secretary of Pakistan
- Mr. Parker T. Hart, NEA
Following a discussion of the U–2 incident,2 Foreign Minister Qadir stated that it was necessary to consider how to meet renewed Soviet pressures. He felt that they were sure to increase, much as Pakistan preferred to see a détente. The people of Pakistan were not too worried about these pressures and Ayub had answered a press question regarding them by asking in return, “Do I look like a frightened man?” Nevertheless, it seemed prudent to consider ways and means of meeting them. The United States would certainly come to Pakistan’s aid in case of attack. However, it took time to bring effective help and it was always possible that help might arrive too late. He thought it would be worth while to increase Pakistan’s military preparedness in her own territory.
The Secretary interjected that the two governments had already discussed the F–104s. Qadir agreed and said that he did not wish to get into military specifics which in any case would be discussed between specialists of the armed forces of the two countries. Perhaps a replacement of F–86s by the 104s was the appropriate solution. What he had in mind was that the military leaders of the two countries should sit down together and go over requirements and project a program which might take one or two years to fulfill.
Later in the conversation Qadir referred to the problem of neutralism. The Government of Pakistan and other governments cooperating in defense of the Free World, he said, understood that it was better not to be neutralists. However, the populace of Pakistan was asking why their country should take the “extra odium” of being in a Pact when there were so many advantages in a neutralist posture. While China (meaning Red China) by its recent actions had dampened the value of neutralism somewhat, there was need for us all to reappraise the problem which neutralism presented. The uncommitted peoples needed some kind of demonstration why neutralism was less preferable than a positive position in world affairs. The Secretary commented that this was indeed one of the most difficult questions which he faced in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations.