387. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1

3441. In accordance with Deptel 38392 and following receipt Ambassador Rountree’s message (Murree 4 to Department)3 I saw Commonwealth Secretary M.J. Desai Tuesday afternoon, April 12. I began by recalling to him President’s statement re desirability continued improvement Indo-Pakistan relations and assuring Nehru that US arms would not be used against India. In line with our desire to foster [Page 810] mutual understanding I told him I had come to tell him frankly that US planned to provide Sidewinders to Pakistan for their present planes in order to modernize already existing equipment. I emphasized that these were defensive, inexpensive weapons needed to enhance Pakistan aircraft efficiency. I mentioned that US was not only country producing these weapons, as UK and others were producing similar type.

Stressing modernization needs of Pakistan in face of such developments as January–February over-flight of Pakistan territory by Soviet planes having high ceiling capabilities, I also informed Desai US providing ten F–104’s.

Desai heard me through without comment. When I finished he replied that he felt reaction in India will be very strong, not because of any question re US motives or even about improved status of Pakistan military strength vis-à-vis India. Rather he thought Prime Minister Nehru’s reaction would be same as his, which was that this move will make Pakistanis more difficult to deal with. He recalled that he had told Bartlett (Embtel 3319)4 as well as me that he had noted signs of hardening Pakistani attitude in past few weeks. He then detailed to me specific examples of this in Canal waters negotiation which will be reported separately. He expressed the view that this development might well have resulted from our action. This added to the anxiety he had, and was sure Nehru would share, about our action.5

Bunker
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790D.5612/4-1360. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Karachi.
  2. Printed as telegram 2378 to Karachi, Document 385.
  3. See footnote 5, Document 385.
  4. Dated April 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/4–460)
  5. On April 22, Merchant informed Irwin that the Indian Government had been informed of the U.S. decision and it was therefore “appropriate for the Department of Defense to proceed with programming, in the normal classified fashion, the military items which have been offered to Pakistan.” (Ibid., 790D.5622/4–2260)