20. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
2353. Department pass USUN. Deptel 2201, information Karachi 2315.2 Re Kashmir. We agree it best that Graham not submit recommendations reported in reference telegram. They will harden Pakistanis’ and Indians’ contrary attitudes, for different reasons; if they come to table, discussion stage will force US into positions which will gravely impair US effectiveness as mediator; will result in no UN action since USSR will undoubtedly veto. Argument which should be advanced to Graham is that recommendations would gravely prejudice possibility of any overall settlement of Indo-Pakistan problems, on which we have been working. “Package” is answer to “what might be done otherwise” and if successful would achieve objective Graham and rest of us are seeking.
If Graham insists on incorporating recommendations in question we think it probably best that he submit report as soon as ready since it would have disrupting effect on package negotiations if submitted middle thereof. We do not see how Graham could delay final report until settlement reached.
Difficult to foretell what effect on Nehru’s receptivity to package approach publication of report would have, but on balance we believe it would be better from viewpoint here to try approach as soon as possible after publication and in any case before brickbats start flying at SC table and US forced to take positions there. Approach would thus be pegged to dangers of situation created by further SC go-around. Nehru’s reactions always unpredictable but he might, upon seeing solid rebuff from Graham and foreseeing damaging SC and possibly GA support for Graham, welcome package mediation offer as best hope and refrain from provocation if Pakistanis will cooperate. We await with interest Embassy Karachi’s estimate GOP reactions.
Our views on timing set forth in agreed message being sent Karachi today are modified by above.3