16. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1

1007. Re Kashmir.

We spoke to Graham and SYG separately today about Dept’s concern Graham report not elicit SC meeting (Deptel 651).2 Lodge also seeing Graham at 10:30 Thursday.
SYG emphatically of same opinion and clearly intends do all he can to persuade Graham not to make recommendations listed below. SYG encouraged Graham to consult with UK and US Dels, in response his request, in hopes we can persuade him drop his recommendations. SYG feels this can only be done by strong line from all three. He thinks Graham’s approach “headline making” heroics which dangerous because it would put issue on tack not conducive to solution. SYG expects Jarring3 (Sweden) when he returns will also help with Graham.
Graham plans make two recommendations:
That UN force be stationed on Pak soil along Pak-Kashmir border in connection with withdrawal Azad Kashmir and [of?] Pak forces and withdrawal bulk Indian forces from Kashmir.
That there be meeting of PriMins, or other appropriate level, between India and Pakistan to reach agreement on solution (which will in his opinion have to include plebiscite in Vale). SYG said Graham had third recommendation which unclear to him. He did not mention any to us.
Graham proposed both these ideas in aide-mémoire to India and Pakistan while in area. Pak agreed to UN force on its territory and to meeting. India said introduction “foreign forces” on Pak border [Page 63] would be “unfriendly act”. India also replied re meeting that idea put India and Pakistan on same footing re Kashmir, which was position they did not agree with.
Graham felt Indians could not say no to UN force in Pak because it out of India’s jurisdiction. Also believed difficult for India to reject “summit” meeting when suggestion made publicly. He pointed out UN force idea met India’s position on augmentation of forces, because it would provide India with protection, and also would destroy India’s argument against Western supply of arms to Pak. He also observed Nehru had talked very little about US–USSR summit meeting since he had proposed Pak–India meeting.
Graham had also proposed both India and Pakistan make statements against war propaganda in accordance Part I E of 1948 UNCIP res. Pak agreed but India refused.
He described discussions with Paks as cordial and open, although he had some blunt words with Khan Noon. He believes Pak will do almost anything that could bring about plebiscite. He does not believe any division of Kashmir possible without plebiscite in Vale. No Pak govt could agree to it, or if it did govt would fall. He thought there was strong public opinion feeling in Pak which might take law into own hands if something not done. He also said that attempt to solve issue without at least partial plebiscite would result in denunciation of UN by Sheikh Abdullah4 and strong reactions in area.
He described Indian attitude as: “We stand behind our engagements but Kashmir is already part of India, in our constitution, and issue is settled.” Menon did most of negotiating and Nehru backed him up. He felt all of Menon’s arguments were specious and report would reveal this.
Graham obviously feels great sense of responsibility to say what he thinks is “right” on issue. [1½ lines of source text not declassified] he said he believes great powers have to stand up to situation on honest basis and not equivocate because of importance of India, even if this means Soviet veto and referral of case to GA. He believes straightforward stand only effective one for UN in long run, citing his experience in Indonesia as example.5
He said pressures were already beginning to develop on him to produce type of report Jarring submitted, which would say in effect he had not been successful and that he had no suggestions as to how [Page 64] to proceed. He appreciated our desire to avoid early SC session if we had any ideas as to what might be done otherwise, but he could not change his report, which would be along lines he had indicated.
Main value of report of this nature according Graham would be that it would open up situation that has been tightly circumscribed for several years. Whether it would produce concrete results would depend on degree to which big powers would bring pressure to bear on both, but India in particular. (SYG said Graham told him UN force idea would not bring about plebiscite. Aside from practical difficulties which would make such force near impossibility, SYG felt net result would therefore be zero and recommendation was “dead before it was born”. SYG saw utility in “summit” meeting to sign agreement worked out beforehand but thought it would do great damage if not thoroughly prepared in advance.)
Expects report to be finished in week or 10 days.
At 10:30 meeting in morning we plan unless instructed otherwise to concentrate (A) urging Graham to write report in such manner or with such approach as to avoid precipitating meeting, (B) express personal doubts about feasibility UN force idea from UN political and financial point of view and about its efficacy in bringing plebiscite any closer, suggesting it might be best to leave this question in report proper as record of what he proposed rather than include it as future recommendation, and (C) make no comment about idea of PriMins meeting except that we would of course be delighted if they could work something out between themselves. Meeting can be postponed until later in day if Dept wishes.
Graham is quite sensitive about any attempts influence his report. He referred to efforts he felt were made by Dept at time he was handling Indonesian case. If Dept wishes us to make further efforts believe it may be necessary give him some idea of our own plans to show basis our concern. We may have recommendations about this after seeing him tomorrow.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.913–1258. Secret; Priority.
  2. Dated March 10. (Ibid., 690D.91/3–1058)
  3. Gunnar Jarring, Swedish Representative at the United Nations.
  4. Prime Minister of Kashmir, 1947–1953.
  5. Graham served as U.S. representative on the three-nation Good Offices Committee between 1947 and 1948. The committee had been set up by the Security Council in August 1947 to help settle the dispute between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia.