17. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State1

1011. Re Kashmir.

I saw Graham this morning at his request. He gave me substantially same information as reported yesterday USUN 1007.2 Additional points as follows:
India–Pakistan PriMins’ conference would be under UN auspices.
He had also recommended both parties reiterate their adherence to cease-fire line and intention to respect it. He believes this would reassure Pakistanis that Indians would not take over rest of Kashmir if they withdrew in accordance with resolution.
He observed tribes in Northern Territories had been subsidized and supplied by British for hundred years and that Pakistanis were doing so now. He told Menon study would have to be made of methods of continuing supplies if Pakistanis withdrew in preparation for plebiscite.
Graham said he felt strongly Kashmir problem could not be swept under rug as some people seemed to think. He believes Pakistanis suspicious U.S. and UK may let them down in UN on Kashmir because of India’s importance and if they became convinced this was case, people would take matters in own hands.
I assured him we shared his concerns and greatly appreciated contribution he was making in seeking solution to problem. I said we had hopes substantial progress might be made in near future on quiet basis. We felt SC session might prevent this and would certainly block type of India–Pakistan meeting he had in mind. We therefore hoped report would not be of such nature as to compel SC session. Graham replied this was up to SC members. I pointed out approach he used in report would have great deal to do with whether SC would believe meeting necessary.
Also assured him any recommendations which person of his stature and integrity made would receive most earnest study by U.S. I asked him if it would be possible to see copy his draft report in advance, commenting that we would like to study it and possibly talk to him about it again before it was released. He agreed to do this. (Anticipate receiving it early next week. He is still working on certain aspects of it.)
In departing he indicated he had made himself available to UK but doubted whether they would want to see him. We have not spoken UKDel.
While it not desirable make firm decisions until report available, believe on basis information he has given us we should encourage him lay emphasis on PriMins’ conference idea, putting it in most hopeful and businesslike manner, and to play down UN force with idea of keeping it out of his recommendations if possible. Recommendation stressing value of conference should fit in well with our own plans.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/3–1358. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.
  2. Supra.