Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

149. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan¹

Washington, November 25, 1959—4:52 p.m.

390. For Ambassador Byroade. Kabul 435² repeated Tehran 46 and Deptel 236 to Kabul³ repeated Tehran 980. After thorough discussion among Department and other interested agencies of Daud’s request for US assistance in development lower Helmand, following points developed and conclusion reached:

A) Adverse to US Participation

1) Present evidence would indicate project would be costly and, from strictly economic view, would probably never pay for itself.

2) In absence Afghan-Iranian agreement unilateral action by USG (which in effect would result in giving RGA power adversely control flow of water into Iran) would both further complicate Iranian-Afghan relations and cause strong resentment in Iran against US.

3) It could be argued that, if Daud asked for and received Soviet assistance in carrying out project, it would tend further alienate Iran from USSR and would involve Russians in uneconomic project of low political visibility in remote area.

4) In general USG has avoided extending economic aid to projects involving international riparian problems unless agreement as to division of waters, etc., is first reached between countries involved. This has been case for instance in Indus valley.

5) Involvement of RGA’s limited trained personnel and other resources in lower Helmand development might tend distract RGA from need to complete development of upper Helmand in which both USG and RGA heavy investment.

B) In Favor of US Participation

1) It would limit possibilities relatively massive Soviet presence becoming established in extreme southwest corner of Afghanistan.

2) Perhaps more importantly, if US aid could be used in such way as bring about Helmand settlement between Iran and Afghanistan, it would tend improve basic Iranian-Afghanistan relations.

C) Conclusion—In spite weight of above adverse factors USG would not wish neglect any opportunity improve Afghanistan’s relations with Iran and thus with free world. Accordingly you are authorized at appropriate level inform government to which accredited that USG prepared consider sympathetically assistance both to Afghanistan and to Iran in surveying development needs of lower Helmand and subsequently in examining possibilities of furthering those projects which might be indicated as desirable by such surveys, but only if two governments first reach at least provisional agreement regarding use of Helmand waters. You also authorized state that USG assistance under these circumstances would be determined by needs and priorities for other projects in both countries as well, of course as by availability of funds.

For Kabul—In event above reply proves unacceptable to RGA, employment Afghan Construction Unit forces suggested in penultimate paragraph Deptel 236 might usefully be studied to meet problem of discontented farmers.

Ambassador may wish use this occasion to urge RGA move forward on upper Helmand development for which funds made available by US almost year and half ago remain unutilized due RGA’s not having negotiated necessary construction contracts.⁴

Herter

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 889.2614–Helmand/11–1959. Secret. Drafted by Bartlett and approved by Dillon. Also sent to Tehran for Ambassador Edward T. Wailes.
2. In telegram 435, November 19, Byroade pointed out that it had been 8 weeks since he had received a formal and “urgent” request from Prime Minister Daud for U.S. assistance in the construction of a diversion dam and related projects in the lower Helmand Valley. (Ibid., 889.2614–Helmand/11–1959)
3. In telegram 236, October 5, the Department reviewed the history of the Helmand Valley project and suggested that, in view of the Indus Waters precedent, the most effective approach for settling the Helmand problem might be to utilize the IBRD. (Ibid., 889.2614–Helmand/9–3059)
4. Byroade met with Daud on December 4 and presented to him the Department of State position on the Helmand Valley project as outlined in telegram 390. He reported on this conversation in telegram 498 from Kabul, December 5. Daud responded that he considered Byroade’s answer “a negative one” and expressed his disappointment. “He felt our experts knew that position of Afghanistan had been throughout more reasonable than that of Iran,” the Ambassador reported. “He wished say quite frankly and as a friend that by failing help on this project we were making his position much more difficult. He has so much wished this help from Americans.” The Prime Minister, at the end of the conversation, asked Byroade if the United States could reconsider its position, (Ibid., 889.2614–Helmand/12–559)