Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

148. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, November 18, 1959—6 p.m.

432. Depcirtel 149.² Regret delay in furnishing this reply to Depcirtel 149. This post omitted in original distribution that message and it arrived here some weeks late. Delay since that time at least partially due to continuing search by senior officials of all agencies at this post for new measures that might be effective in situation we face. We apologize in advance for length this message but hope Department will find it timely and generally useful over and beyond budgetary purposes.

In any objective analysis adequacy our national policy and its effectiveness as regards Afghanistan, we must admit we are not doing as well as we would like and that in some respects trend has been to advantage USSR and disadvantage US. This is true so far fortunately only in things practical and material and not to any dangerous extent in ideological thinking. There is almost no tendency here to incline toward a choice of Soviet way of life over Western systems and culture. Afghans retain a devout passion for their religion, are dignified individualists, and retain a friendly hospitality towards Americans and things Western.

I believe we are confronted however with a developing situation inimical to US interests and one which demands attention at high levels of our government.

The alternatives we face are simple. One would be to try to outbid the Soviets here at every turn regardless of cost or effort. This would be a policy of reaction, i.e., matching or aping each Soviet initiative and is unbecoming to the leader of the free world. This can most certainly be disregarded [discarded?] without serious consideration. Another would be to cut our losses and leave this country standing alone with Russia. This might be cheaper in short run but certainly most costly in the end. Furthermore I think it not befitting the posture of United States that we admit defeat and go home, and in this case is not warranted in any event. Remaining alternative is to follow our present policy and strive to compete effectively with USSR in seeking influence in Afghanistan but on timetable of our making and on ground of our choosing. This course will leave us with sufficient position to be in a posture to capitalize on such developments in future as may come our way. This so clearly the course we should follow that I feel argumentation in support thereof need not be included in any cable message.

Under present circumstances, do not feel we should be openly critical of RGA for accepting Soviet assistance. I believe any other government faced with all factors bearing on situation as it exists here today would accept Soviet assistance. Our concern and criticism can only be that they have accepted too much too fast. There is some hope, however, that if we can continue assistance (and attention!) at our present or slightly increased level over the next few years a more even balance will be achieved. The capability of Afghan personnel involved in national planning is markedly superior than it was even two years ago. There is realization now I believe of the limitations of local resources and skilled labor which in last analysis will determine how fast this country can develop. As this realization grows the tendency to attempt to accept all they can get from both sides will diminish, and RGA will realize it can be more selective in choosing source of assistance. I believe that probability is that their choice would remain with West and particularly with US.

[2½ lines of source text not declassified] The dangers here inimical to US interests involve not primarily Afghanistan as a nation, nor the once militarily strategic space it occupies, but possibilities of Soviet exploitation this area for purposes (1) convincing other under-developed areas of the benefits of close association with the USSR in contrast to friendship with the US; (2) wreaking severe subversive damage to our ally Pakistan through instrumentality Pushtunistan issue, driving wedge between CENTO allies, shaking Pakistan and Iranian leadership, and seriously jeopardizing stability entire sub-continent. The leaders of this country are determined to cast aside, with sense of urgency that prompts rashness, any remnants its historic role as underdeveloped buffer state. There is deep bitterness on this subject as they feel they were deliberately kept underdeveloped by British because of this policy concept. They feel, even in face of our considerable assistance here, that we would really like to retain this traditional British policy if that were possible. In other words we help them reluctantly and only because we feel we must to counterbalance Russian assistance. They see our interest therefore as being not their country per se or its people but in their country as pawn in East-West relations. There is, we must admit to ourselves, some truth in their analysis.

In past four years, notably last year, USSR has materially improved its position through attraction Afghan trade and transit and through economic and military aid programs now totalling nearly $300 million. Year and a half ago USSR also began cultural offensive which quickening in tempo. Starting with step-up in cultural programming and exchanges high and middle officials and cultural leaders, USSR now believed putting increasing pressure on RGA to gain entrance education field heretofore reserved to US. Soviets recently inaugurated with fanfare [of?] news Soviet friendship and cultural relations society in USSR and sent “team” tourists to Afghanistan, apparently a cultural survey party.

Soviet behavior so far ingratiating, flattering, correct, effective. They clearly giving their Afghan program high priority as evidenced by quantity funds and personnel devoted to it, especially by per capita comparison with programs in other Asian countries. They have initiated vigorous struggle for influence in Afghanistan, which being waged in context “peaceful co-existence”.

We must face fact that West is not well organized for type of competition we face here. Khrushchev has stated plainly that the primary importance of trade is political rather than economic. The USSR is able to manipulate the flow of trade effectively by giving government direction as to items to be bought and sold, the prices therefor, and the cost of shipment. (It is not a rash prediction that if present trend continues, as much as 90 percent of the external trade of this country will be to or through Russia in a period of two years rather than to the West through Pakistan.) Western countries, with uncontrolled economies, are obviously unable to compete with a competitor using these rules of the game. Whether we can do more than we are now doing to even up this balance without harm to principles very basic to our systems of government I do not know. Am inclined to think, however, that if as much importance could be given in the West to this subject on global basis as was given to the impetus which led to creation of NATO and Western military organization, that considerably more could be done in cooperation with our allies than is now being done.

RGA so far inclined accept Soviet favors because of (1) compulsion toward progress and development, (2) feeling US and West unable or unwilling provide either sufficient aid for Afghan development or adequate politico-military commitments to Afghan security, (3) some confusion, and doubt, as to whether US, which far away, or USSR, which menacingly near, will in end win cold war or possible real war, and (4) fear and animus vis-à-vis Pakistan revolving primarily around Pushtunistan issue.

Since we unwilling make economic political and military commitments necessary to win decisively kind of competition Soviets have initiated, US objectives are and must be cast in minimal or defensive terms. Overall US objective here is, therefore, preservation Afghanistan’s independence but, in view its vulnerability to Soviets and in view US disinclination underwrite its security, most we ask is policy genuine neutrality. We assume that, despite its recklessness, present Afghan regime does not desire become totally dependent on USSR, that it is stable and relatively competent and that it has responsibility to determine at what point Soviet penetration threatens country’s political integrity and to undertake policies to restrain such penetration. At same time, US, as leader free world, has responsibility determine at what point increasing Soviet influence in Afghanistan threatens interests of US and free world; to ensure that Afghanistan is not lost by default; and to provide an alternative to Soviet satellization which would be practically available if and when it is determined by RGA or US that critical point has been reached.

Therefore, we seek demonstrate to Afghans our genuine interest in their development and independence, and show them that US and free world could be effective source support against future Soviet pressure and a logical means reducing Afghans [garble].

Apart from inherent geographical disadvantages, principal limitations and hindrances to achievement these objectives in prevailing circumstances are: (1) Our disinclination, based on our essentially defensive strategy, to pay more than minimal costs—in terms money, commitment and risk—in pursuit these objectives; e.g., our consistent rejection over period of years following World War II of Afghan requests for military assistance and defensive commitments, and our decision not attempt outbid Soviets in economic war here. (2) Apparent divergence between US assessment and policies and those of allies Pakistan and Iran, who tend espouse “tough line” toward Afghanistan. Latter factor, particularly as it bears on Pakistan-Afghan relations, is core of local problem. Afghans, with euphoric self-confidence in their ability play great powers off against one another, and with a feeling that they too small to be any factor in final East-West struggle, clearly feel themselves to be [on] sidelines and much less threatened by great powers than by regional and internal forces, and Pakistan is in their eyes their major present threat. This feeling is genuine and is inspired by Pakistan [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] activities and occasional sabre-rattling. Other hand, Pakistanis have certainly been provoked by Afghans, particularly by latter’s reckless intemperate pursuit of Pushtunistan campaign. As result Afghan-Pakistan frictions drive former toward USSR and keep alive explosive issues that may one day be used by Soviets with disastrous effect on Pakistan and regional security.

Accordingly, primary objective our policy here is to eliminate or at least assuage these frictions and tensions. This is primarily a political venture which deserves more attention. It also has economic aspects as in case transit agreement and project, which should continue have priority status. Another effort which might conduce to Pakistan-Afghan détente would be encouragement of joint Pakistan-Afghan approach to problem of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] developing and bringing under administration tribes on both sides frontier since until stable administrative control substituted for volatile irresponsible tribal disorder, Durand Line will remain an unstable frontier and the tribal areas will remain undeveloped liabilities to both countries. Advance promise of US aid to such joint venture might enhance prospects it would be undertaken and encourage political détente.

Although Pakistan and US fundamental interests in Afghan problem appear to coincide I cannot say we have succeeded in establishing common purpose and approach [with?] GOP (similar but less acute problem exists between Afghanistan and Iran and similar divergence prevails between US and Iranian approaches). I believe it most urgent that we undertake energetic efforts to bring Pakistan and Iranian policies into line with ours, and jointly undertake efforts eliminate Afghan fears and frictions with free world Moslem neighbors. If this can be done then priority considerations should be given to linking Afghanistan into regional communications, trade and similar projects as well as to joint development projects in tribal areas suggested above and perhaps in lower Helmand Valley.

Apart from this essentially regional operation, our principal tool of policy is our aid program. Under present conditions I cannot conscientiously recommend that we attempt to reverse the trend here by undertaking new, large scale projects involving greatly increased expenditure on our part. Believe such projects should be considered only in connection with regional development which would become possible if current disputes between this country and its Moslem neighbors were settled. In that event I believe we should be prepared to consider carefully every project that would tend to further interdependence between them. We should also be prepared to consider the interjection of our assistance on regional development projects if at any time it appears that such a move could serve as a catalyst to bring the parties to final agreement.

[Here follow the remaining seven pages of this cable, in which Byroade offered his specific and detailed recommendations for continued U.S. assistance programs in Afghanistan.]

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 120.171/11–1859. Secret. Pouched to Karachi, Tehran, Moscow, London, and Ankara.
2. In circular telegram 149, August 19, the Department requested succinct, overall analyses of U.S. objectives and the role of U.S. programs in achieving them in various countries. (Ibid., 120.171/8–1959)