128. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1
2649. Kabul’s 896, 903, 908.2 Recognizing USG policy encourage rapprochement between Pakistan and Afghanistan and need for joint Afghan-Pak approach implementation any realistic plan improve security and economic situation tribal areas suggest at your discretion you:
- 1.
- Inform Ayub and Qadir prior scheduled Khattak appointment thirteenth gist of Byroade conversation with Naim (Kabul’s 908) re proposal settlement Pushtunistan dispute.
- 2.
- Emphasize informally Department favors proposal in principle and express hope that GOP will consider it practicable and desirable to explore it fully.
- 3.
- Reiterate our conviction that settlement Pushtun issue essential full Afghan-Pak rapprochement which offers best free-world hope reducing Afghanistan’s dependence on Soviet bloc.
- [4.]
- Elicit and report to Department GOP’s preliminary reaction to Khattak’s proposal.
Begin FYI. In view (1) long record Pak-Afghan recriminations and misunderstandings revolving around Pushtunistan issue, (2) surprising alacrity with which RGA apparently reacted favorably to Khattak’s latest proposal, and (3) unknown attitude of absent Afghan PriMin, Department has misgivings re motives and objectives each side may harbor which not presently apparent. Nevertheless, for present at least, Department believes we should treat proposal for Pushtunistan settlement at face value and consider lending support its achievement. End FYI.
To permit realistic assessment this development it essential that Department be provided all possible additional information and interpretation on specific plan of action proposed by Khattak. While Department considers consultation with Khattak prior his reporting to own government inappropriate and desires it be avoided if possible, suggest Ambassador discreetly elicit from Khattak at appropriate time details on such essential points as method and criteria contemplated for selection tribal leaders, whether leaders would represent tribal areas both sides Durand Line or only Pak side (i.e., so-called “Occupied Pushtunistan”), and whether their terms of reference intended to be limited to statement to be used by RGA as face-saving justification for ceasing Pushtunistan campaign. Also, whether these points already accepted both countries or subject later negotiation.
While Department recognizes desirability take calculated risks in any reasonable effort achieve Pak-Afghan rapprochement, extent to which USG would be willing engage its prestige in full backing Khattak plan depends on clear and specific understanding what it entails and estimates by Embassies Kabul and Karachi of its chances of success.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/5–659. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Bolen and approved by Hart. Repeated to Kabul.↩
- Telegram 908 is printed supra. Regarding telegrams 896 and 903, see footnotes 2 and 3 thereto.↩
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In telegram 2527 from Karachi, May 11, Ambassador Langley reported that he met with Foreign Minister Qadir and Interior Minister Shaikh that day to discuss Khattak’s plan and explain the Department’s position, as outlined in telegram 2649. “Foreign Minister concluded proposal still interested him and it must be explored,” the telegram reads in part. “He said that if Khattak could follow through further on matter he would return to Kabul temporarily. All agreed attitude of Daud on proposal must first be known, however.” (Ibid., 689.90D/5–1159)
The Embassy in Kabul offered its assessment of the Khattak plan in telegram 926, May 8. It reads in part as follows: “Although we realize RGA capable of double play on this subject above all, Embassy inclined accept its position at face value and to entertain cautious optimism, as we unable to conceive of any motives or objectives which either Pakistanis or Afghans might harbor, however ulterior, which might result in damage to our interests.” (Ibid., 689.90D/5–859)
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