Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

127. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, May 4, 1959—3 p.m.

908. Re Embtel 896² and 903³ repeated information Karachi 235 and 237. Saw Naim yesterday. Told him I had come on one matter alone in view its importance. In my short time here had come to feel subject of Afghan-Pakistan relations of paramount importance. He and I had years ago worked on problem but it seemed to me of far more importance today. On subject of Pushtunistan issue felt he knew our general position. We have never taken partisan approach to matter and have not attempted inject ourselves into details of situation or commit ourselves to any particular solution. What we were interested in was that parties concerned arrived at mutually acceptable solution. This remained our position and our hope remained that we could be of assistance under such terms of reference.

Told Naim Khattak and I had had recent discussions this subject and Khattak had told me he was encouraged by his recent talk with His Royal Highness. I asked for Naim’s current appraisal of situation and opinion as to whether I could be of assistance.

Naim went back through history of dispute with story so familiar that will not list details. He concluded with his recent discussion with Khattak, saying RGA would consider problem solved if Pakistan would merely follow sample proposed by Khattak. He said this had been their position while Mirza was in power and they would stick to it. There had been no recent Cabinet discussions but he was positive this represented views of Daud and majority in their government.

Meeting of Pushtun leaders proposed by Khattak must however be composed of responsible leaders.

He said Khattak had proposed that I be brought into matter and that he had not only agreed but welcomed the idea as he thought our good offices probably essential if final agreement to be reached. Naim emphasized again that RGA as a whole would stand by his assurances to Khattak and myself and concluded that better relations between two countries were now badly needed.

As Naim had mentioned selection of responsible Pushtun leaders, I asked if he thought disagreement over persons selected might cause difficulty. He replied he thought not. I asked if he had given any thought to action that might be taken by RGA if Pakistan proceeded in suggested fashion and statement from Pushtun leaders was made. Would he visualize statement by his government of perhaps high level meeting. He said “why not.” It was his position that if such statement could be obtained, Pushtunistan problem would be settled and they would have no reluctance in so stating. For first time however he mentioned Daud’s absence so did not press further on this aspect.

I asked if looking toward future it would not be best both governments to attempt extend their administration more effectively over tribal area and provide such development as would be practicable so as to give them feeling of progress and alternate means of livelihood. He said this by all means the case. Above all, however, he felt it important in future that Pakistan take steps to stop creating disturbances by having relations across border with tribes. He went through the history of British and later Pakistan manipulations in this regard and said this must be stopped. We talked briefly of what increase economic and political cooperation could mean in practical terms and he stated that if political problem could be solved he would hope that groups from both countries could plan practical measures to make cooperation beneficial to both.

I suggested to him that if we are to go ahead with this venture most favorable possible atmosphere should be created, and this called for cessation of anti-Pakistan propaganda. Naim replied that this actually had been cut down materially recently.

This all seems very encouraging and it would seem that Ayub would have little to lose by giving Khattak go ahead arrange meeting of Pushtun leaders. Also I think we should do everything we can to help Khattak sell his project to Ayub, even to point of appealing letter from President Eisenhower to him should this be necessary. We should also consider now how we can best help exploit favorable situation which would present itself if Pushtunistan settlement reached. Do not believe full potentialities can be realized unless Ayub can be persuaded to submerge disdain and contempt which he evidently feels for Kabul regime and to accept feeling of responsibility for improving Afghan-Pakistan relations. In this connection have been wondering whether Ayub’s nature is not such that, at some juncture, a letter from the President, appealing to him as friend, ally and responsible statesman, and stronger party in dispute, may be in order (should this suggestion meet with favor we would be glad provide preliminary draft at appropriate time).

Saw Khattak over weekend and told him of my conversation with Naim. He is leaving Kabul 6th but at my suggestion will not arrive Karachi to see Ayub until 13th. He will contact Langley upon arrival.⁴

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 789.00/5–459. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Karachi, Peshawar, and Lahore.
2. In telegram 896, April 28, Byroade reported that Khattak had recently informed Elwood that he wanted to make one last effort to solve the Pushtunistan problem and wanted to know if U.S. support would be forthcoming. Khattak’s plan, the Ambassador explained, was that all Afghan and Pakistani propaganda would be stopped and a meeting would be arranged between various Pushtun leaders, the final outcome of which would be a statement recognizing that a Pushtunistan problem no longer existed. Afghanistan, according to Byrode, “was to use this statement as face-saving justification for ceasing its Pushtoonistan campaign.” Khattak believed that U.S. help would be needed with Ayub Khan and inquired whether Byroade would be willing to go to Karachi if something specific would be developed in regard to his plan. “While have been somewhat suspicious of Khattak,” Byroade commented, “believe he does wish make serious effort on this problem before leaving and that he should be encouraged take advantage of his long experience here. If Khattak efforts successful and if RGA drops Pushtoonistan agitation this would be major achievement. If his effort unsuccessful nothing will have been lost.” (Ibid., 789.00/4–2859)
3. In telegram 903, April 30, Byroade reported that Khattak had given him an account of the lengthy meeting which he had with Naim on April 28. Naim had been surprisingly positive, according to Khattak, indicating that he and Daud would be firm in backing Khattak’s plan. Byroade also reported that he was scheduled to meet with Naim on May 2, and suggested that “if Naim is as positive with me as Khattak reports, it seems to me we must study most effective way USG can attempt to push what admittedly still seems a bit of a myth into reality.” (Ibid., 789.00/4–3059)
4. In telegram 2497 from Karachi, May 6, Ambassador Langley stated that the reports from Kabul regarding the Khattak plan were “most encouraging” and noted that if Afghanistan was as sincere as Naim indicated then he believed that Pakistan could be induced to go along with the proposal. (Ibid., 689.90D/5–659)