129. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State1
1038. Reference Karachi’s 2516,2 repeated Kabul 243. Am concerned that question of personalities and personal prejudices may kill off a project that seems sound in itself and of great importance to us at this particular time.
Am afraid we face losing battle here with Soviets unless Pushtunistan problem can be solved. While we are in process of attempting thorough reassessment of situation here, believe following, while obviously incomplete, is accurate summary of situation here as far as this problem is concerned. This country, realizing its weakness and feeling need of outside support has turned to Russia for such support, not only to gain assistance for development but also out of sense of frustration and isolation. We have lent our economic support, but we are far away and in power sense have not taken up type of role British used to play. Sense of isolation heightened by fact Afghanistan’s neighbors have managed ally themselves with others. All in all, attitude here is one of fear and frustration, producing fatalistic complex leading to acceptance risks turning to Russia. Although this attitude may seem unreal from outside Afghanistan, it is factor to be reckoned with here. Regardless of who has been to blame in past it seems almost imperative that real effort be made to improve Afghan-Pakistani relations to take away some of this sense of frustration and isolation.
Qadir’s remark re Khattak’s “scheming” seems confirm other reports we had received that Khattak not trusted by GOP leaders. In view this distrust, Khattak was probably poor instrument for seeking gain acceptance his plan for settlement Pushtunistan issue. In circumstances, believe it would be useful for me visit Karachi for consultation on Pushtunistan issue and prospects for settlement. I continue believe RGA would not take lightly its commitment to me to accept statement by Pakistan Pushtunistan leaders as basis for considering issue settled, and that if adroitly handled preparation and publication such statement need not commit prestige of GOP nor constitute official recognition by GOP of existence of a Pushtunistan problem. In other words, it [Page 273] appears from here that GOP has nothing to lose from making the effort, and even should RGA be proved to have been acting in bad faith this in a sense would be a gain, since both Pakistan and US would henceforth have sounder basis for making policy decisions on this issue.
Request Department’s and Langley’s comments. In view coming Moslem holidays would appear best I visit Karachi sometime during week of June 22 if idea accepted.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.90D/6–1259. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Karachi.↩
- Reference should be to telegram 2716 from Karachi, June 8, in which Ambassador Langley reported on a conversation which he had that day with Foreign Minister Qadir. Qadir criticized the Khattak plan and referred to Khattak’s “scheming.” “Qadir knew of no better way to improve relations with Afghanistan,” Langley commented, “than for US to compete with USSR for Afghan affections, and win.” (Ibid., 689.90D/6–859)↩
- In telegram 2756 from Karachi, June 15, Ambassador Langley informed the Department that he believed “there might be benefit in Byroade visiting Karachi, especially if joint meeting with Ayub and Qadir is arranged, and think it can be.” He suggested that, if the Department concurred, he would try to arrange a joint meeting and would notify the Embassy in Kabul of the date. (Ibid., 689.90D/6–1559)↩