Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

126. Airgram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

G-36

Kabul, April 14, 1959.

For what they may be worth, this message transmits some of my thoughts after being at this post for thirty days. It will at least give Department some idea of coming Embassy activity and what may be expected later on in more specific form.²

In competition with the Soviets here we are faced with many inherent disadvantages. Nevertheless I am not as discouraged at the prospects as when I left the Department. We still retain several basic assets. First of all do not believe that the fundamental desire to retain their full independence and traditional neutrality has been eroded due to increased relations of last few years with Russia. On the contrary, one gets impression that many high level personalities here are more apprehensive over danger of excessive dependence on Russia than was the case say a year ago. Most of the staff here support this view but a few are undecided. I myself would not venture as yet as to whether this is true as far as Daud himself is concerned.

My personal feelings may be influenced a bit by my reception in about fifteen calls on high officials. Although have become accustomed to Oriental courtesy and kindness, could not help being impressed by my reception, which in many cases practically amounted to a plea to help them help themselves on the question of retaining an East-West balance. One would expect this as well, but there must be some real concern on their part over having become too dependent upon the Soviets for them to have over-extended themselves as they have at my reception.

Certainly the immediate danger as yet is not of ideological infiltration of communism. (The single most encouraging thing is continued Afghan firmness to keep Soviets out of education field—and their continued pleas to us for more help in this field.) The danger lies in becoming economically and militarily dependent upon Russia as a State. When I left Washington I was more concerned over Afghan dependence on USSR in military field but feel now that economic dependence contains the greater danger. In this connection a more complete analysis here of trends and practices of the Soviets in the trade field is necessary and have already [been] informed Department will give this priority.

The question that confronts us is what more within practical limits can we do in this situation. Certainly our past policy of assisting where we can in the relations between Afghanistan and her non-Soviet bloc neighbors is correct and of utmost importance. I cannot as yet recommend any additional specific thing that we might do but we must at very least certainly see that Afghanistan is not again for a period blockaded off from access to the West. Certainly every feasible thing that can be done by Pakistan to facilitate the flow of goods and people to and from the West must be worked for. Important as this is, however, one gets the feeling that the political and psychological stumbling blocks in Afghan-Pak relations are at least equally important. The Pushtoonistan issue is indeed an illusive thing as after many conversations here feel as yet unable to accurately define the problem. One wonders at times if there really is a problem in spite of the emotional and apparently intense feelings of people here on this subject. We are gratified here to know that Embassy Karachi is continuing to be helpful on all aspects of Afghan-Pak relationships and can only say at this time that we continue to study problem.

As regards other nations in the area, feel we should make a high level attempt to obtain greater effectiveness here on part of the Turks. There has long been a feeling in Ankara of sympathy and understanding as regards Afghanistan, yet the Turks are not represented well here and at the moment have no Ambassador at all. They perhaps can be more effective than we on the subject of Afghanistan’s relations with its Moslem neighbors and on certain aspects of East-West situation. For instance, I believe it is too late for us to consider direct competition with Russians in the military field, even if Afghanistan would accept it, which seems unlikely. More military equipment, except perhaps for gendarmérie, would be merely a liability to this country. We should, however, do everything possible to offset Soviet influence within the military. We should, as well, attempt to broaden our knowledge as to what is going on within the military itself as our intelligence capability there is extremely limited.

In this connection I understand that the Turks were approached here some time ago for assistance in setting up and running a general staff college. Can think of nothing better than to have Turks send a competent faculty here for such a school. Facilities are lacking as well and perhaps we should build the buildings at our expense if the Turks could adequately staff it. Whether or not we should tell the Afghans that we are backing the Turks in such a project is a question but am inclined to think we should not. Certain specific suggestions to increase Turk effectiveness here were submitted by the Embassy some time ago (Embassy despatch 306, February 2, 1959)² and Embassy Ankara seems favorable to general idea (Ankara’s despatch 592, March 25, 1959).³ Would hope Department would feel enough material now on hand for an initial high level approach both in Washington and Ankara for greater Turkish effort here and that the military staff college idea might be used as first specific project. Should the need arise, would be glad to send officer from here to Ankara to discuss details.

It seems significant that King (Embtel 797),⁴ Daud (Embtel 835)⁵ and Naim (Embdesp 380)⁶ stressed need for help in achieving social and cultural, as well as economic, reform, Daud adding need also for political reform. It will be recalled Daud and Naim expressed great interest this field to Ambassador Mills last Fall (Embdesp 151, Sept 16, 1958),⁷ though other political developments prevented follow-up at time. It not entirely clear what Afghans have in mind. Community development program could be projected to these ends. It may also be that Afghans have in mind proposals made by Dr. Donald Wilbur to Daud in September 1957 on the possibility of formulating a political philosophy that would facilitate democratization and economic progress, yet have roots in the native Pushtun culture. They may also have in mind the model of the Turkish experiment, which was discussed in Mills conversation mentioned above. Under any circumstances feel it would be unwise for us to ignore these rather pointed overtures; the Communist claims of success have been persuasive to the Afghan intellectual, and it is almost inevitable that unless some alternative political philosophy is presented the internal political orientation of Afghanistan will be leftist in one degree or another. I propose to explore further, as appropriate opportunity arises, ways and means whereby we might render effective assistance in this field.

Our primary instrument here has been ICA and a study of their work has taken greatest part of my time. As Washington well aware, there have been inexcusable delays in some of our projects for a variety of procedural reasons in which there is no desire on my part to attempt to fix responsibility and blame. Fortunately stage has now been reached however whereby more physical activity will be apparent to the Afghans. While basic motivitation on our part may have been political, fortunately projects are either economically sound or at least approach that state, and will in the end, if properly managed, have important effects upon this country. Unfortunately, however, from viewpoint of quick impact here vis-à-vis the Russians, they are somewhat isolated and long drawn out. We have attempted very little of a quick impact nature on projects designed to make the common man feel that something is being done for him. This seems to be the crying need in this country, both from a humanitarian point of view, and to offset in eyes of the ordinary person the benefits that they hear of reaching others through progress being made in surrounding countries—and particularly north of the Oxus. Also would like if at all possible see the US broaden appreciation for its efforts here to more people, and thereby offset the basis for any charge that we are interested primarily in projects to support desires of Royal Family.

In one form or another US Government investment in this country amounts to nearly $125 million. This is a relatively high figure and I have no desire, at least for time being, to recommend committing us to further long and very costly projects. However, I find complete unanimity among staff here (as well as other Americans associated with UN, Asia Foundation, etc), that we should be able to double our impact upon the country as a whole over a period of the next few years by proceeding with various impact projects which would probably not total more than five to ten million dollars. If continued study supports this thesis, then it would seem to be a sensible investment. I am normally against a proliferation of projects, and feel that a few big projects are better in the long run than a scattering of effort. This is an unusual situation, however, and if we can double our effect here by new things with a bit of flair, then it seems we should do so. The new Minister of Agriculture⁸ stated we were putting too many eggs in one basket in the Helmand Valley and that there was a feeling that too many of our subsequent projects had been designed simply to make that successful. He even requested that my first trip in the country be to the northern area, where even the most simple things have not been done for the people, rather than to the Helmand Valley and thus belie the impression that that was all we were interested in.

I am certainly not ready as yet to recommend specific projects and when we do they will be submitted in appropriate detail. Have in mind, however, such things as closed circuit television for education purposes, the re-initiation of a rural development program which I feel certain we should have been into long ago, perhaps taking over at RGA request Russian paving job here in city which under criticism as being faulty, minor but effective public health improvements, etc. etc.

Do not, however, wish to take this approach unless we can have support to do quickly what we set out to do and that we be given the utmost authority allowed by law here in the field to select and implement the projects. I would rather assume full responsibility for mistakes which we may well make than to follow our past approach of arousing Afghan enthusiams and cooperation on new ventures on which no progress may be seen for some years. In the important field of education, for instance, after commitment of our assistance some two years ago, to assist in construction Kabul University, as of now we are still waiting for engineering blueprints.

If Department strongly opposed to any ideas contained herein, would of course like to be notified. Otherwise we shall proceed along this fashion, hoping that later detailed recommendations will be sympathetically considered. In making these decisions it seems important to remember that we are hopeful that this may be a period of some fluidity here. We do not know whole story as yet of Daud’s absence but we do feel that area developments (particularly Nasser and Iraq, Tibet, and recent trends in India) are having a psychological effect here and that this may be propitious time to try to increase our effectiveness.

Byroade

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 689.00/4–1459. Secret.
2. Henry A. Byroade was appointed Ambassador to Afghanistan on January 29; he presented his credentials to the Afghan Government on March 21.
2. Not printed. (Ibid., 682.89/2–259)
3. Not printed. (Ibid., 682.89/3–2559)
4. Dated March 22. (Ibid., 611.89/3–2259)
5. Dated April 5. (Ibid., 689.90D/4–559)
6. Dated March 30. (Ibid., 611.89/3–3059)
7. Not printed. (Ibid., 789.00/9–1658)
8. Ghulam Haider Adalat.