Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

283. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State⁰

Léopoldville, December 14, 1960, 9 p.m.

1389. Following conversation reported my telegram 1388 to Department,¹ I stayed behind at my request with view to airing, if I could, differences which appear to have arisen between Dayal and myself and his views on US policy. I did this with prior knowledge of the information contained in my telegram 1384.² In following discussion, which lasted approximately an hour and a half, I told him that I wanted, if possible, to discuss any and all matters in which he felt there was some question regarding US policy, the activities of the Embassy and myself in particular. I told him I was prepared to answer any questions that I could and informed him of our own views and actions.

He then proceeded to give me for ten minutes or more his concept of the job which he has undertaken, emphasizing that he did not ask for it and accepted it only because of his feeling of duty to help the UN effort. He pointed out his own long record of service to his own government and to international bodies and said that he had only the best interests of the UN at heart. He added that he was terribly worried over the present situation in Congo, said that the Stanleyville mess was serious and believed that certain governments would now support the rump government announced by Gizenga.

I told him that I had never questioned his principles and that I felt sure he was doing what he could to ensure a successful UN effort. I added that that was also the policy of the US and of the Embassy. I said that no action taken or statement made by any responsible American official from the President on down had violated our policy of complete support for a UN effort in the Congo and that I had from the beginning felt that there was no acceptable alternative to a UN effort here which I had sincerely and clearly followed as the record shows.

Dayal said that the ANC is completely out of hand and committing aggressions daily against the UN. He cited the most recent invasion of the Kitona base,³ stealing of UN vehicles and the arrest of UN personnel.

I said that we deplored such acts as much as he did. I followed this up by saying that it has been alleged in certain quarters that Kasavubu and Mobutu are in US hands and assured him that this was not the case. He said that the US had supported Kasavubu and had placed him “above the constitution”. I told him we had supported the seating of Kasavubu delegation since they represented the Chief of State and that that position was one which had been so far unchallenged by any government. I added that Kasavubu’s position is no different than it was prior to seating of his delegation so far as we are concerned.

He said that he had hoped that the conciliation commission might have come earlier before Lumumba’s arrest and that he had felt that it might bring Lumumba and Kasavubu together so that civil war might be avoided. He felt that we are practically in a civil war.

I said that our policy had been and continues to be to encourage local leaders to agree upon a form of government and a Cabinet which they could all support. I said we further hoped for the earliest possible Parliamentary blessing of any new government so formed. I said that I had called on Kasavubu twice to urge this proposal and had also spoken to Mobutu in the same regard.

He then raised the problem of Belgian interference and said that the Commissioners are living [garble] Belgian mistresses “all of whom are spies” and that the Belgian advisers of the Commissioners and of Mobutu are urging them to hamper UN activities and that Belgian policy is obviously to get the UN out of the Congo. He said, frankly more by implication than direct accusation, that US policy was in league with the Belgians.

I said that our relations with Belgians had reached an all time low just before our statement in connection with the SYG proposal to have all Belgians removed from the Congo. I added that it was scarcely credible that American policy was designed or could be interpreted to be in league with such dark Belgian designs. I said on the contrary our feelings had been that some means must be found to eliminate foreign advisers, Belgian or otherwise, who were obstructing the performance of legitimate UN functions but that we frankly did not feel all Belgians could be so categorized. I added that I had suggested the possibility of forming a committee of cooperation in Leopoldville which would include representatives of Belgian Government, UN and Congolese Government and asked whether he thought such a commission might be useful.

He said emphatically he did not believe it could perform any useful function until the principle had been decided and accepted by the Belgian Government. He identified the principle as the one enunciated in the SC resolution which called for the channeling of all aid through the UN.

I remarked that we had followed such policy and had not departed from it except in minor case such as establishment English-language training center which had been fully coordinated with UN and had their blessing before it was inaugurated. I said that Belgian case seemed to me slightly different from others in view of the history of Belgian administration and their very large investments here.

He still affirms that Belgium must accept this principle or UN effort would fail.

Dayal then said he had been reassured during his recent visit to New York in conversations he had with Dean Rusk,⁴ Chester Bowles,⁵ Averell Harriman⁶ and John D. Rockefeller.⁷ He said they were all satisfied regarding the aims and objectives of the UN in the Congo and in his stewardship. He said he had been assured that the new administration would take firm position especially with regard to the problem presented by Belgium and Belgian technicians.

The entire conversation was in low key. I took my departure after he told me that he was extremely discouraged over situation which had developed and that he saw no solution under present circumstances. He said matter is now “out of my hands”.

After I returned to the office I learned from Stewart Alsop⁸ that he had been given same line yesterday afternoon as Dayal [garble] Hofmann. Irving Levine of NBC also told me that he was seeing Dayal at the latter’s request later this afternoon.

Timberlake

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1460. Secret; Limit Distribution. Also sent to USUN and repeated to London, Brussels, and Paris.
1. Dated December 14, telegram 1388 reported a meeting of Timberlake and several European representatives with Dayal concerning the situation in Orientale Province, where tension was high after Gizenga’s December 12 proclamation of the Free Republic of the Congo, with Stanleyville as its capital. U.N. forces in the province were being regrouped because of the withdrawal of some U.N. contingents. (Ibid.) Telegram 1378 from Léopoldville, December 13, reported a meeting with Dayal that day at which Timberlake and British and French representatives stressed the disastrous effect that would result if Europeans were evacuated from Orientale, but Dayal said he had no troops available to reinforce the U.N. forces there. (Ibid., 770G.00/12–1360)
2. Dated December 14, telegram 1384 reported that New York Times correspondent Paul Hofmann had told an Embassy officer that Dayal had summoned him for a talk in which he bitterly attacked U.S. policy, charging that the Congo was on the verge of civil war because of U.S. support of Mobutu. (Ibid., 770G.00/12–1360)
3. On December 13, ANC forces, accompanied by some Commissioners, occupied Kitona.
4. President of the Rockefeller Foundation.
5. Democratic Congressman from Connecticut.
6. Former Governor of New York.
7. Presumably John D. Rockefeller III, chairman of the board of trustees of the Rockefeller Foundation and vice chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations.
8. American journalist.