Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

282. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State⁰

New York, December 14, 1960, 4 a.m.

1747. Congo.

1. Ormsby-Gore (UK) and I saw SYG this am to make presentation re Congo along lines mytels 1635¹ and 1716² as authorized and modified Deptels 1106³ and 1126.⁴ Ormsby-Gore made main presentation, as suggested by Dept, and I made supporting statement. Copy joint paper from which we talked pouched Dept (UNP-Cargo).⁵SYG’s comments and observations set out below.

2. SYG encouraged US continue to try bring about reorganization of Congolese Govt. He was somewhat pessimistic about results, especially because of failure Kasavubu to capitalize on his seating in UN when he returned to Congo by establishing his supremacy over Mobutu at that time. He thought it would be helpful for governmental change to be brought about before he goes to Congo if possible.

(I told him Timberlake had already made efforts on these lines with Kasavubu, Mobutu and others but that we found developments came about slowly in Congo.)

3. Approach has already been made by SYG to Abboud (Sudan)⁶ for services Adeel as deputy to Dayal, and he expects agreement. Admits frictions have developed between Dayal and Congolese and says he can see evidence of Dayal’s attitude toward them in his telegrams. He expects that in due course Dayal will leave and Abdeel will take over as top UN rep in Congo. He did not indicate when this might happen though we had impression it would not be for month or two. SYG made point that at present time Dayal served useful political purpose in keeping Indian support for UN action in Congo. He believes Dayal has sent direct reports to Nehru which help account for more moderate position India is taking in comparison with certain other Afro-Asians.

4. On replacement for Von Horn SYG said he had already made approach to Ireland to obtain services of General McKeown. He said Pakistanis (who have 500 in Congo) had stated they would not serve under command of Indian general and that Indians would not serve under Pakistani general. UK informed SYG there was no one they knew of from Malaya who was qualified. We did not raise name of Gen Bull in light SYG’s statement about McKeown. SYG said his soundings with couple of Africans showed Ireland was acceptable source for commanding officer.

5. On withdrawal of troops SYG said much of present talk was political blackmail to see how far they could push diplomatic situation in GA.⁷ Fawzi (UAR) in recent talk with SYG noted that UAR had also said in September they were withdrawing troops but that UAR had not been embarrassed at not carrying this out. SYG indicated he would be glad to be rid of Guinean troops. He said he would not ask us to fly them out if sea transportation were available. Moroccan withdrawal would be more serious problem, but he showed no concern that it might happen immediately and seemed regard King’s declaration as hedged. He said he had already made initial sounding about increased troops from Nigeria but that PriMin Balewa had replied he could not make more available now. SYG uncertain whether this meant it would be politically difficult for Nigeria to increase its continent while other Africans taking theirs out or whether they could not actually be spared. He suggested we (especially UK) might discuss question with Nigerians. He also thought Senegalese troops might be brought back. He said his experience with Latin Americans in UNEF had not been good and that for political reasons he preferred not go outside Africa if he could avoid it. He wants to keep UN troop strength at about 20,000.

6. On talking to Belgians about their civilians in Congo, SYG showed some annoyance and also lack of real desire to talk at this point. While in his customary fashion of delayed responses he may change mind later, today he said he could only discuss problem of Belgians on one of two bases: (a) that Belgian Govt had nothing to do with Belgians in Congo, in which case he could discuss problem only with Congolese, or (b) that Belgian Govt did accept responsibility, in which case discussion would have to be under context of emergency GA res on Congo (which SYG has previously interpreted as meaning technical assistance should be extended only through UN). He was not concerned with greater portion of Belgians in Congo, such as teachers, doctors, etc. but only with two to three hundred Belgians in key positions. He said there were three to five Belgians in key positions in each ministry of govt and that they were ones who were causing problem. He said he did not accuse Belgian Govt because had no evidence that govt was in fact doing this (although he obviously certain it and they probably are). But he thought govt could exert considerable influence in right direction if it wished. He referred specifically to activities of Wendelen⁸ (without mentioning his name) in regard to recent Kasavubu communications to UN as example influences on Kasavubu and Bomboko to detriment UN effort. He also reverted to frequently cited ICAO case where Belgians were brought in to take over control towers of airports although ICAO had already hired people for job. Our impression is that he would like to establish in principle that all key Belgian officials in group of 200 or 300 he mentioned should be replaced by UN officials but that in practice this would either take considerable period of time or would never be completed.

7. He agreed he had to go to Congo, especially as he still intended to go to South Africa in January. His conversations with Slim and others revealed concern on their part that SA situation was potentially serious at moment as Congo and that he should give that first priority. They apparently expect there will be renewed outbreaks in SA result developments elsewhere in continent and that even if visit by SYG can do almost nothing, it would be valuable demonstration of UN interest. In any case SYG will visit Congo either on way down or way back.⁹

8. Re current political position of UN as institution, he said he was worried that current development, where everyone was attacking SYG and Secretariat, might do permanent damage to UN. He is therefore planning to make vigorous statement in SC, through which he clearly intends displace some of this blame. He gave only elliptical indication of what he would say but we gathered speech will not be too helpful to us in current political situation. For one thing he plans point out he has constantly taken politically more advanced position than GA or SC on Belgians (possibly including both question of Belgians in Katanga and Belgian civilians in Congo) and on “legality” (on which he did not elaborate). On other hand, he also plans to issue stern warning to those threatening withdraw their troops about consequences for world peace and security if, through such actions, they help bring about collapse of UN action in Congo.

9. As part of his defense against attacks on UN executive machinery he also favors establishment in Congo of small political unit (possibly Nigeria, Ethiopia and Malaya, who are officers of Conciliation Commission) composed of reps of states who would share responsibility for decisions there. He believes, however, that this unit must have some kind of legislative backing, presumably through GA res. (UKDel raised doubts about such development on grounds it first step toward establishing political direction of Secretariat along lines Russians have in mind.) SYG said he was especially interested because he thought that in practice UN would probably have to step beyond its technical mandate again in future occasions in Congo. Presence such group would protect UN in doing so. On other hand his desire have GA establish such unit contrasted to opinion he expressed earlier in conversation SC would be unable take any action on Congo and that there might be sufficient negative sentiment in GA to prevent issue being taken up there at all, especially since officers of Conciliation Commission were on verge departing for Congo. (Wachuku not expected arrive there until next Tuesday¹⁰ after spending day and half in London and three in Lagos.)

10. We thought attitude SYG generally helpful with exception continued indication his disinclination talk to Belgians without preconditions and his continued attitude toward Congolese that they are “cocky” and incapable of running country and that UN must in effect take over. Believe we should proceed with Belgians along lines suggested by UK and reported USUN and continue press Kasavubu and Mobutu to reorganize govt along lines Timberlake has already started. I cannot lay too much stress on importance reconstitution of govt in Leopoldville which will pull Ileo govt, Commissioners, and especially Mobuto into one “legal” institution under authority of Kasavubu. This step even on paper will immeasurably improve Congolese position in world opinion, especially with countries like Tunisia, Nigeria, Ethiopia and Malaya which form backbone of UN force, and will be political move which will enable SYG to cooperate more openly with moderates and help development and functioning Congolese Army.

Wadsworth

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1460. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.
1. Document 277.
2. Dated December 10, telegram 1716 from USUN transmitted British suggestions for the proposed joint démarche to Hammarskjöld. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1060)
3. Document 279.
4. Telegram 1126 to USUN, December 12, instructed Wadsworth to make the démarche to Hammarskjöld, since neither Herter nor Dillon was available, and it authorized him to put forward the British suggestion that the Secretary-General should make another visit to the Congo. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–1060)
5. Not found.
6. Sudanese Prime Minister Ibrahim Abboud.
7. Between December 7 and 12, Ceylon, Guinea, Indonesia, Morocco, the UAR, and Yugoslavia had announced their intention to withdraw their troops from the U.N. force in the Congo.
8. André Wendelen. Telegram 1671 from USUN, December 7, described him as a Belgian Foreign Ministry official who had been advising Bomboko; it complained that his advice was harmful and urged the Department to take this up with the Belgians. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–760)
9. Hammarskjöld arrived in Léopoldville on January 3, 1961, for a 3-day visit during which he conferred with Dayal and met with Kasavubu.
10. December 20.