Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

274. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State⁰

New York, December 2, 1960.

1592. Congo.

1. SYG asked to see us this am on Congo so we had opportunity to discuss points contained Deptel 1016¹ with him.

2. SYG began discussion by reading several telegrams he had received from Dayal regarding recently expressed anti-UN attitudes by Mobutu, Ileo and others. Main point seemed to be emphasize to us difficulties he felt he had in dealing with Congolese. He stressed anti-UN attitude had increased since seating Kasavubu in New York although it might logically have been expected move in other direction. (He seemed give no recognition to effect of conflict over Welbeck on UN–Congo relations.)

3. He said Congolese [1 line of source text not declassified] were easily depressed and easily excitable. Recent successes had made them “cocky”. For example, he referred to Kasavubu’s statement here that time was coming when UN should start remove its military units. SYG said neither Kasavubu nor his supporters nor any Congolese by themselves could as of now run Congo without UN support and he hoped we would bring this home to them. He also cited Bomboko statement to Dayal that “Congo at war with UN”. When Dayal objected, Bomboko reportedly said “at least ANC is”.

4. Barco replied what SYG said about Congolese probably true. They were inexperienced and no doubt excitable. This was framework in which we had to learn to work. Our own reactions to such situation should not be emotional but carefully thought out. Perhaps Congolese did need be handled with firmness but they must also be treated with sympathy. Care must be taken as specific problems arose not rebuff them.

5. SYG agreed to this as way to handle specific cases, but he noted there also was question of general attitude. This was harder to define but essentially UN must keep them “chastened”. At another point he used expression “pushed down”. Barco reiterated we thought they should be treated with sympathy and must not be given feeling they being blocked whenever they tried do something. (SYG came to this same point in various ways, his main emphasis being on “chastening”. Telegrams he read from Dayal showed further evidence this element UN attitude, frequently using word “rebuked” in connection his talks with Congolese.)

6. We then discussed Orientale situation along general lines but not details of Deptel 1016. SYG said he had about all units he could spare in Stanleyville. (Wieschhoff later said he thought units in Orientale Province had been regrouped and mainly in Stanleyville.)SYG also said he sending more civilian personnel, and had asked Iyassu return.² (Wieschhoff repeated what previously told us: Main UN civilian in Stanleyville was Brzac, a Czech, but “good” one. We do not know whether he anti-Communist Czech or not. SYG had also asked Dayal send Swiss legal man named Berthu (?)³ and others with him.) He agreed with our grave concern about situation there and that it presented unusual difficulties because some African governments would recognize Lumumba as legal government Congo and seek support him as such. In all he thought as many as twenty states might recognize such government. Lumumba would be able get supplies and military equipment and possibly even some planes. He could not develop military positions to point where he could threaten Leopoldville area, although he might become threat to Kivu and upper Katanga. Mobutu might well seek send force Stanleyville to gain control, but unlikely he could handle logistics. SYG estimated Lumumba could command 3,000 man force in Stanleyville and that Mobutu could not match this even if he could get there. SYG said if fighting type situation broke out between Mobutu and Lumumba forces over Orientale, he would have raise it here but would take it not to SC or GA but to Advisory Committee. He was not sure what instructions he should give ONUC forces in Stanleyville. Best thing UN could do in area, he thought, would be “interposition” of UNOC to prevent conflict. Barco said we hoped UN could take steps maintain general security in area itself before Lumumba took over. But whatever UN did it must not appear be acting frustrate Mobutu. SYG said UN action should be step taken equally in both directions. Barco replied this was not enough that it should give appearance of UN restoring situation favorably from point of view of Kasavubu and must not appear as UN action frustrating Kasavubu as other UN steps had seemed be. Further discussion revealed continued difference view on this, with SYG continuing think in terms “interposition”, which we think will appear as effort prevent Kasavubu and Mobutu from establishing their authority.

7. In further discussion SYG said regardless unhelpful attitude Ethiopian Delegation to UN, Emperor clearly did not want Soviets in Africa and he thought he could count on present Sudanese Government resist efforts turn Orientale into pro-Soviet base. He did not rule out possibility Soviets might seek change situations in these countries, however, through civil disturbances. He was encouraged by fact number Afro-Asians now regarded as serious possibility Soviets might attempt turn Congo into another Korea, although they had not taken possibility seriously when he had raised it in summer. Barco said we agreed but warned SYG we had information indicating some important people in area seemed welcome such development.

8. Barco also told SYG Timberlake been instructed talk to Kasavubu about reestablishing active government with which would be possible work more effectively. (Deptel 1510 to Leopoldville)⁴SYG obviously regarded this as good thing but did not follow up conversation very extensively.

9. We also raised financial crisis in Congo in light information in Leopoldville 1311 to Department.⁵ Before we had chance say UN and Dayal specifically being unhelpful, however, SYG said from cable this morning he understood problem had already been overcome. He also said UN people were taking strong line against numerous trips being taken by Congolese to Paris and Brussels, which were heavy drag on Congolese foreign exchange position.

10. Referring to escape Lumumba and apparently abortive meeting between Kasavubu and Tshombe in Brazzaville,⁶SYG said he assumed Kasavubu would now send him message he unable establish proper arrangements at this time for Conciliation Commission would accept this but it would not go down without certain definite loss in Kasavubu’s international position, as some favorable representatives in Advisory Committee would regard this as at least partially bad faith. SYG said he coming rather strongly to view that under present circumstances Kasavubu could himself use Conciliation Commission both to his own personal advantage in Congo against Lumumba and Tshombe and to his benefit in good will at UN as well. Instead asking Commission not come, Kasavubu should send message saying he been unable make preparations he had intended for reasons which they would all understand, that he doubtful whether there any value in Commission coming, but he would be glad receive them if they wanted come on their own responsibility. Barco then referred to “suggestion” which had been made here that Kasavubu might not invite full Commission but only its officers. Officers are from Nigeria, Malaya and Ethiopia. Political complexion this group should therefore be quite acceptable from Kasavubu point view, even if Ethiopia doubtful. SYG immediately reacted favorably to this possibility.

11. SYG also now fears we may have another Congo debate before Christmas recess. Menon arriving from India over week-end and SYG understands he has “Congo brief” with him and this will mean India will press for debate.

12. Conversation with SYG most cordial and constructive one we had with him for some time. We not at all satisfied however he yet pursuing right line in number of ways. His attitude of keeping Congolese “chastened” seems to us be totally wrong psychological approach, for example, and Dayal’s pursuit such attitude in Leopoldville clearly causes sharp Congolese reactions. We tried convey to him our belief this wrong approach but are not sure to what extent we got across. In terms practical UN action he also continues to follow legalistic approach and to think in terms of steps which almost certain appear be deliberate UN rebuffs to Kasavubu and Mobutu. His idea of “interposition” in Stanleyville, for example, is most likely develop as UN action preventing Mobutu from establishing control in province by force. Idea of UN preventing conflict there by itself seeking establish control before Lumumba does, with results that UN action will appear be directed against Lumumba rather than against Kasavubu, did not seem strike responsive chord.

13. Recommendation: We think Department should give serious consideration urging Kasavubu invite officers Conciliation Commission to Congo to talk to him. We inclined agree with SYG Kasavubu could utilize this to his own advantage vis-à-vis Lumumba and Tshombe in Congo and that would cause favorable response here. If UN Mission visiting Leopoldville at request Kasavubu at time Lumumba likely be purporting establish central government in Stanleyville could in itself be valuable to Kasavubu as recognition his position. UK Delegation has also recommended to London UK urge Kasavubu invite officers for similar reasons. UKDel also speculated Menon’s “brief” on Congo may be effort get GA discussion that UN disband CNA. They think departure officers CC might help prevent such debate. If Department concurs, message should go promptly to Leopoldville, as UK understands Kasavubu intends reply on December 3.

Wadsworth

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–260. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Repeated to Léopoldville, Paris, London, and Brussels. The time of transmission is not indicated; the telegram was received at 3:01 a.m.
1. Document 272.
2. Ethiopian Major General Iyassu Mengesha.
3. As on the source text.
4. Document 271.
5. Telegram 1311 from Léopoldville, November 30, reported that the unexpected U.N. decision not to provide financial help to enable the Congo to surmount its December 1 budget crisis might result in the collapse of the government. (Department of State, Central Files, 343.170G/11–3060)
6. On December 1.