Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

264. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State⁰

New York, November 16, 1960, 2 p.m.

1414. Subject: Congo.

1. Dept requested urgently circularize field to obtain commitments to vote against expected motion to postpone GA decision on credentials of Kasavubu del when issue comes up this week. This is separate and more difficult vote than direct vote on credentials which was subject previous Depcirtel.¹ Question urgent because issue likely arise Friday am. Request tels go to fol countries to support our efforts here:

Austria, Bolivia, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Iceland, Iran, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaya, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Sudan, Somalia, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay.²

2. We believe fol line of argument best meets arguments others putting forward:

(a) US has given and will continue give firm support to UN efforts in Congo, to steps which will help preserve territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Congo. We believe one such step is to help strengthen its legal institutions.

(b) Kasavubu as Chief of State is one of only two remaining legal institutions in Congo. He was recognized as such in recent UNOC report by Dayal.³ He was invited to speak as Chief of State to GA without challenge by anyone.

(c) Kasavubu specifically asked in his speech as Chief of State that del appointed by him, which he is heading, be seated promptly.

(d) Credentials Comte has approved credentials Kasavubu del by 6 (US, NZ, Costa Rica, Haiti, Philippines, Spain)-1 (USSR) with Morocco and UAR not voting.

(e) Issue now likely to come before GA this week. We believe Kasavubu’s request to be seated must be supported. Otherwise UN will be undermining sole effective legal institution in Congo. (Parliament under present circumstances has been unable to meet.) If Kasavubu has to return Congo without such support, we feel further confusion and disintegration may set in to detriment UN long-range efforts.

(f) Key vote on Kasavubu del seating almost certain to be on motion to postpone consideration, based on argument issue should not be faced because conciliation commission going to Congo shortly. We feel delay Kasavubu del seating would not increase but decrease prospects successful UN efforts and would cast doubt on position Chief of State, which we feel crucial to avoid if UN effort in Congo to succeed.

(I) Kasavubu has publicly said he wants his del seated now. Postponement would be rebuff to uncontested office of Chief of State of Congo.

(II) Kasavubu has told members UN Congo Advisory Comte that if they expect to deal with him as Chief of State in Congo (as they do) they must give him same recognition here.

(III) Kasavubu has also indicated he would be willing to consider question of conciliation after his del has been given opportunity to express its own voice in UN but not before. FYI. Only after being seated Kasavubu with support French-speaking Africans will then take position any outside help should come only from African Chiefs of State who do not have troops in Congo. He has already so indicated in letter to Dayal for info UN Advisory Comte. End FYI.

(g) It is thus clear that postponement credentials issue would not improve but would detract from possibility successful efforts by UN and would also weaken one of two legal pillars in Congo.

3. While some African states—notably Ghana and Guinea—are vigorously opposed to taking up credentials question now because they oppose Kasavubu, and some others (Nigeria) prefer issue not be faced now because they want conciliation commission to go first, immediate seating Kasavubu has support majority African states, including Congo (Brazzaville), Cameroun, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Central African Republic, Madagascar, Chad, Dahomey, Niger, Gabon, Upper Volta, and possibly Togo. They will both speak and vote in favor immediate seating Kasavubu del and against any postponement motion. Congo (Brazzaville) and Cameroun feel strongly enough to have sent Chief of State and Foreign Minister to NY specifically for this debate.

4. Because of alliance Communist bloc with Ghana, Guinea and India on substance and with others on procedure who prefer not meet issue now, procedural vote may be close and we hope respective dels will be instructed vote against any (there are various possibilities, such as simple adjournment of mtg, adjournment of debate, or postponement until after conciliation commission goes to Congo) postponement of motion as well as to support seating Kasavubu del when issue comes to vote. Extremely important that dels vote no (not abstain) on these theoretically procedural votes. Postponement motion or motions will be in fact the most substantive issue before GA and vote on them will determine outcome. Some dels feel they can avoid appearance too close tie to West by abstaining on procedure while voting with US on substance. In this case procedural vote is key substantive vote. If we do not win it, we will not get to substance. Our calculation on procedural vote is very close and we need all possible votes to be sure of winning it. Once we defeat postponement we expect seating of Kasavubu del to follow as consequence (e.g., when postponement motions failed in Credentials Comte UAR and Morocco did not feel able to vote against Kasavubu del but avoided vote entirely. Some dels, furthermore, who may support postponement will vote for Kasavubu del when issue comes to that point.).

5. Missions will obviously have to vary approaches according to reactions on Kasavubu del received in response Depcirtel 665.

Wadsworth

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 320/11–1660. Confidential; Niact.
1. Circular telegram 665, November 7, instructed the recipient embassies to urge the importance of seating Kasavubu’s delegation to the General Assembly. (Ibid., 320/11–760)
2. Circular telegram 719, November 16, sent to the capitals of most of these countries and to Athens, Nicosia, and Tel Aviv, repeated the text of telegram 1414 and instructed the embassies to put forward their arguments as soon as possible. (Ibid.)
3. Dayal’s second progress report, dated November 2; see footnote 1, Document 255.