Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

255. Telegram From the Department of State of the Mission at the United Nations⁰

November 4, 1960, 8:21 p.m.

842. Following is guidance for USUN re UN Report on Congo.¹ Based on preliminary study of SYG report, Department believes there are two possible ways for US to react.

• First, for US to make sharp attack on report seeking to diminish its credibility. We believe this not feasible for following principal reason: while Dayal obviously prejudiced and has used intemperate and overdrawn language, all-out attack on report would represent break with SYG and UN which would play fully into hands of USSR and pro-Lumumbaists.
• Second, for US to accommodate itself to report by putting as good face on it as possible, emphasizing points supporting our own approach to Congo problem and taking constructive line in noting shortcomings of report. We believe this approach is only feasible way to deal with UN report which obviously puts US in difficult position, primarily because of its strong attack on Belgian activities in Congo. There are elements in report which provide basis for US to take this approach. The emphasis given to Chief of State and Parliament as two institutions through which peaceful solution can be developed; the continued expressed intention of UN bring about stability, order and peaceful political evolution in Congo.

Most difficult aspect of report relates question Belgian technicians. For guidance this aspect see transcript Dept statement Nov 4² transmitted Wireless Files.

We believe there is advantage, pending more concrete indications of how Soviets and pro-Lumumba Africans intend to play this, for US adopt wait and see approach at outset of debate. Since UN report does emphasize Kasavubu position as legal chief of state, we hope it will prove possible to get clear-cut decision seat his representative. While Soviets will undoubtedly seek to make Belgians main scapegoat for situation in Congo, from US point of view, if we have adequate support, credentials question is politically sound issue for us to press. Would help reduce focus on Belgians and, if successfully carried forward, would make significant contribution to achievement our political objectives in Congo.

Point should also be noted that report on Congo is by UN Special Representative Dayal and not by SYG. While we know of no basis for suggesting split between SYG and Dayal, there will probably be advantage in discussion this issue to treat report as Dayal’s.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–460. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Cargo and Sisco; cleared by Penfield, Coote, Blue, and U.N. Adviser in the Bureau of European Affairs William T. Nunley; and approved by Bohlen. Repeated to Brussels and Léopoldville.
1. Reference is to Dayal’s second progress report to Hammarskjöld, November 2. (U.N. doc. A/4557)
2. It stated that the Department had every confidence in Belgium’s good faith in its desire to be of assistance in the Congo and that it therefore could not accept the implication to the contrary in the report. (New York Times, November 5, 1960)