254. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State 0

1082. While three governing SC resolutions on Congo1 provide suitable general framework foreign policy guidance, it is clear that SYG is left with wide discretion in actual operations while member states have considerable latitude in interpreting, as they choose, actions in Congo as supporting or violating such resolutions. Great majority of states seem to have supported faithfully UN actions in hope law and order will be restored and economy put back in shape without impairing independence of Congo. A highly active and vocal minority has, however, sought to influence UN action in service their several national interests, which coincide for the moment at least in Congo, making arguments on high principles of resolutions. The ensuing clamor seems to have obscured the issues as well as the facts for many member states not intimately concerned or informed.

Even most sympathetic observers know this country cannot govern itself in any intelligent fashion and that, left to its own devices and without outside aid, could not survive as a national entity. Certainly, modern economy bequeathed by Belgium would very quickly disintegrate entirely. The Belgians know this better than any others and their pre-independence plans did not envisage present situation. They have had shocking traumatic experience from which they will not soon recover. In spite of strong currents favoring other policies, Belgian policy seems to support general UN aims in Congo while hoping, through encouraging return of key technicians, to repair some of the damage done and keep the Congo above water. I do not believe Belgian policy involves, even remotely, effort reimpose colonial status [Page 563] on Congo as some critics claim. It does include, naturally, effort to conserve huge investment here. Very fact that investment here almost exclusively Belgian and monopolistic as well, colors attitude many nations and leaves Belgium open to attack on grounds economic, if not political, imperialism.

The Soviet bloc seeks entry, on almost any terms, into central Africa for well-known purposes. Nkrumah seeks expand personal leadership of African bloc by adding Congo. Sekou Toure has same objective with added ingredient of active disaffection for “colonialists” as result French policy there. Morocco governed more by payment due Ghana for support on Mauritania than by real persuasion on merits. UAR seems driven by general anti-western policy and desire preserve access to bloc aid by serving Soviet policy aims in area of little interest to UAR. All are united in support Lumumba: He has already proven useful tool to Soviets; he is Nkrumah’s boy who signed agreement and Sekou Toure who also signed, supports Lumumba in interests preserving and expanding “union” which he hopes dominate himself; UAR supports him more as favorite Russian concubine whom it suits them to protect and cultivate rather than as direct object their affections. These countries can and do have, therefore, a positive policy line which they have consistently followed and they have exploited every possible avenue which this chartless situation has offered to advance toward the goal of restoring Lumumba to power.

The majority of states, which want to help the Congo without consideration of what they can gain individually, seem to be groupable: (1) Those which understand and fear Soviet entry into Africa and will work against it and (2) those remote, only vaguely informed and not particularly interested in the problem. Group (1) needs the facts and discreet guidance. Group (2) must be persuaded re importance and urgency and educated.

Even assuming reasonable success in achieving interested and unselfish majority, there is no simple solution to the problem of what should be done about the Congo. Individual trusteeship is impossible; UN trusteeship untenable. UN aid, scrupulous and patient as it has been in staying out of internal affairs, has been attacked as interfering by practically every politician of every stripe. As a matter of fact the very nature of the problem is such that it is impossible for the UN to be here at all without affecting internal affairs. If it did literally nothing, its mass and inertia would have at least negative effect. Therefore question is and has been how can UN objectives be achieved with least harmful effect on internal affairs?

Idealistically, UN hopes for democratically approved, relatively stable government with which it can deal with some confidence and which has international respectability according to democratic standards. I do not, unfortunately, see such government emerging for very [Page 564] long time. Lumumba is best bet for strong central leadership but he is himself unstable and attitudes provincial leaders and people (who are really tribal and not even provincial) have so crystalized against him that any sort of unity would have to be enforced, internally or by external means. Internal force (by CNA) would restart civil war. External force (by UN) would compromise every principle of UN Charter and violate terms existing Congo resolutions. Department can judge whether new enabling resolution likely be voted SC or GA.

Lumumba might very well emerge with stamp of parliamentary approval but it would be compound of cupidity (bought votes), intimidation (not just in halls of parliament, which is least of our worries) and demagogic oratory, admitting to some votes from genuine supporters. We would be back to early August politically with even more dismal prospects for preserving unity of Congo.

Fact is Congo is years away from more than facade of democracy. I do not believe there is one single Congolese who has more than theoretical idea of even the most elementary principles of democracy. They obviously cannot practice something they do not understand. This does not insult the many well-intentioned Congolese but does discount their ability produce anything resembling democratic government until they have been taught. Furthermore, I do not believe democracy can be imposed upon any people overnight any more than it can be injected by hypodermic. Therefore I do not share UN enthusiasm for accelerated parliamentary solution in Congo. Fact is such solution would be simple decision to support Lumumba or not. There is no real positive alternative which would engage parliamentary attention.

If foregoing analysis accepted, then our policy should be definitely against restoration Lumumba as bad for Congo, bad for US and bad for UN. We continue believe that outlook for real leadership coming from moderate group is very dim indeed. I feel sure UN experience with ineptitude of commissioners and impotence of Kasavubu and Ileo government has not only disillusioned UN but that Mobutu, by impulsive acts and lack qualities leadership, has impelled Dayal to reject him. Mobutu’s troops, certainly undisciplined but no more so than formerly, are source friction and keep UN constantly under tension in view their capability to cause really serious clash with UN forces. Return of Belgian advisers, some of whom might have stupidly sought interpose themselves between UN and commissioners, have ruffled some sensitive UN feathers and raised bogey of return of Belgium to position of major influence under cover of commissioners. Apparent solution devised by Dayal is use double barreled shotgun, first barrel designed to reverse trend toward re-Belgianization and second, not yet fired, to disarm troops, especially those believed loyal to Mobutu. I would prefer rifle technique identifying Belgians [Page 565] who are at fault and urging Congolese as well as Belgians cure them or remove them. As for troops, UN could insist and I would support, that Mobutu crack down on discipline and punish offenders failing which stronger measures would have to be taken by UN.

If Dayal has any hopes for positive parliamentary action which would remove Lumumba from government, I have yet to hear them stated. I think he feels no solution is possible without Lumumba and that we might as well get present unpleasantness over with and let him back in. This, he reasons, will get unholy alliance off his neck, give UNOC acceptable government with which to work and even serve resolution on unity of Congo since Lumumba acknowledged centralist and unitarian. While semblance of logic might sell this line to the simple and uninformed, I am satisfied such policy will blow up in UN faces. It will, I believe, achieve exactly opposite ends from these apparently sought.

Embassy policy recommendations have been based on aforementioned analysis. We see no quick solution and have no favorite son. We believe we should encourage those who have generally good instincts while leaving our position flexible enough to be acceptable to any combination they may eventually produce and have blessed by parliament. Some combinations seem less impossible than others and we believe should be supported. We also firmly convinced necessity for parliamentary blessing but differ with UN on timing because we feel now would be too soon to ensure honest and threat-free vote. If CNA disarmed, that possibility will suffer serious setback. Furthermore, see no likelihood of Katanga Deputies returning with or without UN guarantee as long as they remain unconvinced that Lumumba can be beaten in Parliament and as long as they feel UN policy is pro-Lumumba and anti-Katanga.

We believe peaceful solution must be sought by convincing provincial leaders and parliamentarians opposing Lumumba that they must agree on a government which they will actively support and line up enough firmly pledged votes to have confidence in result when issue put before Parliament. In this country where clocks are toys this cannot be done overnight and morning isn’t here yet. If the time element is ignored and birth induced now, the UN will probably have an abortion on its plate.

Every time I look at this truly discouraging mess, I shudder over the painfully slow, frustrating and costly job ahead for the UN and US if the Congo is to really be helped. On the other hand we can’t let go of this bull’s tail.

Timberlake
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–260. Confidential. Repeated to Brussels and USUN.
  2. Of July 13, July 22, and August 9.