Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

239. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

October 11, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Situation in the Congo

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Wigny, Belgian Foreign Minister
• Mr. Jean de Bassompierre, Counselor, Belgian Embassy
• The Acting Secretary (Mr. Dillon)
• Mr. C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr., AF
• Mr. William L. Blue, WE

After an exchange of pleasantries, Mr. Wigny began his presentation by stating he wanted to see Mr. Dillon as he felt the situation in the Congo had changed somewhat since he had seen Mr. Herter.¹ He said that he believed we were living in fateful days and that the major question now was who was to be the strong man in the Congo. He added that there were two candidates, Lumumba and Bomboko, the former supported by the Communists. He then commented that he had the impression the Communists were united and had decided what their strategy should be whereas the Western camp was undecided and seemed to be waiting to see who would win. He added he did not feel that there was any question but that Lumumba had been dismissed legally. On the other hand it was true that a new government would have to receive the approval of Parliament. He said that both houses of Parliament were inexperienced and Lumumba, who was a sorcerer, was able to turn them upside down. Mr. Dillon asked him at this point if Lumumba could be kept away from the Parliament when it met. This prompted Mr. Wigny to refer to the warrant of arrest for Lumumba which the U.N. forces had refused to recognize on grounds of parliamentary immunity. Mr. Wigny said this was an untenable position as, in trying to usurp power, Lumumba had put himself outside the law.

Mr. Wigny then indicated that the second point he wanted to bring up was the Katanga situation. He expressed concern over the criticism of the Belgian role in the Katanga. He said his Government wants to recreate the unity of the Congo as much as anyone else. He cited as evidence of this Mr. Tshombe’s statement that the Belgians were opposed to independence for the Katanga. He also cited support of talks between Kasavubu and Tshombe and indicated that if these talks could take place, Lumumba’s position would be weakened. Going on to a discussion of Belgian officers and technicians in the Katanga he said that they had remained in the Katanga because Tshombe wanted them and because order prevails. He added that certain of the Belgians wanted Belgian army officers to remain but that he had insisted that they leave. He was therefore all the more indignant about criticism of the Belgians on this score. As for these allegations he said that one of these officers was a Frenchman, one was unknown to the Belgians and one was a Belgian officer discharged in 1949.

He went on to mention the officers of Belgian nationality in the Force Publique in the Katanga. He said that they were Congolese officers. Indeed they could not even be integrated into the Belgian army without being subject to an examination. In response to a question from Mr. Dillon, he explained that there were some 200 officers and non-commissioned officers in the Force Publique in the Katanga. He said if these officers were pulled out chaos would reign in the Katanga. At this point Mr. Dillon interjected a remark that after all the Ghanaian army has British officers.

Mr. Wigny then went on to the third point on the state of the private sector in the Congo. He said that if the proper authorities are supported by the U.N. and by technicians then order could be restored and the economy could recover. He added that Belgian technicians could not remain however without receiving some Belgian francs as a part of their salaries.

Mr. Wigny then concluded by returning to his original point. He said that the duel between Lumumba supported by the Communists, Moroccans, Guineans and Ghanaians and the other candidates supported by everyone else had begun. He added that if the latter had a chance he was sure the future would be brighter. He called on the U.S. to press the U.N. to give them a chance.

Mr. Dillon opened his remarks by stating he was pleased the U.S. was able to work more closely with the Belgians recently than in the past on some occasions. He then referred to Mr. Lumumba and said he would not be as shy as Mr. Wigny had been in referring to him. He added that if he is not a Communist, he is a tool of the Communists and therefore hopeless. He stated that as the Belgians knew the U.S. had recognized Kasavubu as chief of state and tried to persuade him to pick someone effective as prime minister. It was obvious to him that neither Kasavubu nor Ileo nor Mobutu, for that matter, was strong enough, but perhaps Bomboko was the man. Mr. Dillon continued that we had also urged the U.N. to deal with the government of Kasavubu as the legal government. He indicated that we agreed that it would be helpful to clear up the situation by having Parliament get rid of Lumumba, but that there was no point in having such a meeting if Lumumba could not be taken care of.

Mr. Dillon expressed the hope that there would not be a clash between the U.N. forces and the Congo forces trying to arrest Lumumba. He wondered if Lumumba could not be arrested when he goes out on one of his tours of the city. Mr. Dillon reiterated the desire of the US to be of all possible help. He said an Ambassador had been trying to shore up Kasavubu and urging him not to deal with Lumumba.

Mr. Dillon then turned to the question of the Katanga and said that we understood the Belgian position on the Katanga. He said, as Mr. Wigny understood, the US believed that the Katanga should stay within the Congolese state if for no other reason than to keep the economy viable. He also stated our interest in getting Kasavubu and Tshombe together. Mr. Dillon added that the US was receptive to any ideas which might be developed on the isolation of Mr. Lumumba, the more rapidly, the better. He even asked if it might not be better if Lumumba would go to Ghana for example. Mr. Ferguson at this point spoke up to say that if he left for Ghana he might be back in Stanleyville tomorrow. In a further discussion of Lumumba Mr. Dillon said he understood the reaction to Lumumba as he had heard him talk here in Washington and he was very persuasive.

Mr. Wigny stressed again the fateful days ahead and urged that we use our influence with Mr. Hammarskjold in coping with the Congo problem. Mr. Dillon stated he thought Mr. Hammarskjold had done a good job in the Congo. Mr. Wigny quickly agreed but said other powers were exerting pressure on Mr. Hammarskjold and that counter-pressure should also come from our side.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–1160. Confidential. Drafted by Blue.
1. On September 26; see Document 231.