Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

238. Telegram From the Embassy in the Congo to the Department of State⁰

Leopoldville, October 11, 1960, 1 p.m.

949. Saw Dayal four p.m. yesterday to review present situation. Said understood warrant for arrest Lumumba had been issued but that service had not been permitted. Asked whether previously understood UN policy that legitimate warrant arrest would be honored still obtained, pointing out Bunche, Cordier and he himself had assured me in past such was case. Dayal said no change in policy. I said I understood Bomboko had seen him 1300 yesterday but the warrant of arrest, which he presented, was disputed and I wished to know Dayal’s position.

Latter said he had not seen warrant but had referred it to legal section UNOC which informed him warrant not valid. I said understood warrant signed by Attorney General who was so far as I knew, competent authority. Dayal said his understanding was warrant signed by Commissaire [and] UNOC considered it invalid.

Dayal said he felt arrest of Lumumba was not proper solution but “trick” and believed this was bad answer to present problem Congo. Said recent debate UNGA had won by narrow margin through support Afro-Asian group and that arrest Lumumba now would explode issue again in UNGA. Believed Afro-Asian group would object such solution and would at least be badly split. He believed eventual solution Congo depended on united support Afro-Asian group and asked me exercise influence with Bomboko desist from effort arrest Lumumba in interest of obtaining “peaceful” solution. I asked him whether this in support reconciliation. Dayal said he hoped democratic solution could be obtained.

I said experience those here during first days indicated Lumumba was unstable, had incited disorder, and had no solution to Congo problem short of domination as illustrated by attacks on Katanga and Kasai. I said return Lumumba to government would exacerbate divisive elements in Congo and that attitude Tshombe, Kalonji and other regional leaders was clear and unalterably opposed to Lumumba. Added that UNOC problems would be multiplied if Lumumba returns since he quite capable of reasserting leadership even though admitted to new government in capacity other than Prime Minister.

Dayal repeated request that I use influence toward “peaceful settlement” with Bomboko.

Immediately following I attended meeting diplomatic mission chiefs convoked by Bomboko which included following: British, French, Dutch, Israeli, Indian (Rahman), Huber (German Chargé) together with Nussbaumer (Commissaire for Interior) and Cardose (Commissaire for Education). Bomboko made following exposé: He personally has nothing against Lumumba. However Lumumba has demonstrated that he is dangerous to peace in Congo. Bomboko had documentary proof distribution weapons and money (twelve distributors were caught yesterday morning at Lumumba’s old house and nineteen were apprehended in Coquilhatville); he toured city day before yesterday, made speeches, and his gendarmes fired guns in air in effort demonstrate presumed power. Bomboko said had evidence Lumumba had invited terrorists from Ghana, Guinea, Cameroun, and Egypt into Congo. Has documentary evidence (from Moumie) together with photos to prove.

Bomboko made impassioned argument that Lumumba would tear Congo apart, which he had almost succeeded in doing and regional leaders unalterably opposed to him, but that he and Kasavubu, together with Mobutu, were trying to hold Congo together. If Lumumba returned, even they would declare independence, which would involve Equateur and Bakongo.

Bomboko, with every evidence sincerity, said Lumumba would be judged fairly and legally and would be permitted to bring in foreign lawyers if he chose to defend himself. He assured Ambassadors present no physical violence would be done to him. Nussbaumer said that last Thursday¹ he went three times to Dayal with warrant of arrest. First time Dayal told him warrant was not legal, second time there was difficulty with Ghanaian troops guarding Lumumba which Dayal said he would remove, and third time asked why he insisted on arrest when everything could be arranged. Nussbaumer saw Dayal yesterday morning for fourth time with warrant of arrest (the one which I personally saw) and he was left with impression warrant could not be served.

During meeting I asked Bomboko whether any other solution possible, to which he replied “no.” I asked whether he saw any possibility of parliamentary solution, to which he replied this impossible while Lumumba still potentially able regain power since parliamentarians fear him with good reason because of arrests, brutalities, and intimidations Stanleyville, plus fact last parliamentary session saw

Lumumba’s troops ringing Parliament. I asked him whether Katanga and Kasai Representatives and Senators were present Leopoldville or likely appear in possible parliamentary session. He replied “no.”

Comment: I asked such questions in view presence Rahman who I knew would be reporting immediately to Dayal. End comment.

I said earlier information yesterday indicated that Congolese troops might be contemplating literal assault on Lumumba’s house in effort enforce arrest and that in my considered opinion this would be serious error which would greatly influence attitude other nations toward Congo since it would be direct defiance UN. Suggested present position GOC good and should be maintained. In any case no good end would be served by “shooting way in.” Other Ambassadors agreed. Added that in my opinion it would be better to withdraw troops encircling Lumumba’s house and rely upon service of warrant by small group to avoid appearance of exertion force.

Should point out that prior to conversation with Dayaland Diplomatic Corps session with Bomboko, we had word (confirmed) that CNA had mounted some 300 troops around Lumumba’s house and were prepared to move in with force. I had already sent word to Mobutu and Bomboko that this would be serious mistake.²

Following the session with Bomboko, British, French, Dutch Ambassadors and I had short meeting reviewing situation. We had assured Bomboko we would inform our governments and asked him take no direct action pending results such reports. Consensus opinion is that our governments should consider carefully impact which arrest Lumumba might have on UN, particularly Afro-Asian group, but that in our opinion UN would be in difficult position if it assumed prerogative of deciding legality of warrant of arrest which apparently issued by competent authority (Attorney General Rom was appointed by Lumumba government shortly after independence). This would be assumption furthermore of police powers which not so far asserted by UN.

While recognizing admitted complications which this will inevitably introduce into UNGA, or at least SYG, deliberations, it seems to me that there is enough evidence against Lumumba to warrant reasonable investigation by Congolese of his activities during time he was Prime Minister. This seems basic right government of any country. In view assurance Bomboko, which I respect, that no physical violence will be done to Lumumba, I fail to see any reasonable argument for the continued refusal UN to permit service of arrest warrant which appears to be entirely legal Hope Department and USUN will make this point clear to SYG. Continued refusal by UNOC to allow such service would seem to me, in long run, to be indefensible unless UN prepared assume responsibility for administration justice and police powers in Congo.³

Later Bomboko gave press conference during which he stated 1500 local today deadline for service of arrest warrant.

Timberlake

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–1160. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to USUN and repeated to Brussels.
1. October 6.
2. Telegram 952 from Léopoldville, October 11, reported that Bomboko had telephoned Timberlake after Dayal refused to permit the service of the arrest warrant and stated that he intended to order Lumumba’s seizure by force. Timberlake told him this would be the “gravest of blunders” and advised issuing a statement that the government had decided against the use of force to avoid spilling blood. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–1160)
3. Timberlake commented in telegram 950 from Léopoldville, October 11, that Dayal was seeking a solution “which might be viable in civilized environment but not in Congo” and that Dayal would not go along with direct action to break the impasse without specific instructions from the Secretary-General. (Ibid.)