Office of the Historian

211. Memorandum of Conversation0

September 13, 1960.

SUBJECT

  • Congo

PARTICIPANTS

  • Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Under Secretary
  • Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Embassy
  • M. Claude Lebel, Minister, French Embassy
  • Mr. Hugh G. Appling, M
  • Mr. Robert H. McBride, WE

Ambassador Alphand referred to the statement which the Secretary had made to him that the Secretary-General could call on the five permanent members of the Security Council for assistance if he so desired. Ambassador Alphand said that the French assume this would not be done unless the Soviets had given unilateral assistance. He [Page 484] wondered if the Soviets continued their unilateral penetration of the Congo, whether the U.S. would feel free to act. He said it appeared that Soviet intervention was becoming more and more open.

Mr. Merchant said that we had not yet reached this point and that for the present we were giving fullest possible support to the Secretary-General. We were disturbed that Hammarskjold appeared to be losing some African support. We thought that the UAR might withdraw its forces from the UN command and according to ticker reports, Ghana might also take this step. Ambassador Alphand noted that the Africans in general had heretofore been reasonable and that the French were concerned that they now appeared to be changing their position. He thought the chaos existing in the Congo presented Hammarskjold with a most intricate problem.

Mr. Merchant said that it was our view that if Lumumba should disappear, all of the other Congolese leaders including Tshombe would be willing to enter into negotiations and re-write the Congolese constitution. If Lumumba should disappear the Force Publique could be retrained in some months into an effective national army. However, everything appeared hopeless so long as Lumumba was on the scene.

Ambassador Alphand said that the French felt it was important to keep in close touch with us on this subject, especially since the Soviet actions were becoming more and more overt, and we might want to act together in the Congo.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–1360. Confidential. Drafted by McBride.↩