Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Africa, Volume XIV

210. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations⁰

September 12, 1960, 8:29 p.m.

363. Re Congo. On basis of behind scenes consultations that you have reported telephonically to Dept, we have impression that there is danger that Council will begin to drift primarily because of variety and gradation of views among Africans, SC members and SYG. We agree with your assessment, as communicated to us telephonically, on need for US take steps at appropriate time to bring about crystallization of SC on desirable course of action.

Our objectives are three-fold: (a) To have Council take action which would help Kasavubu vis-à-vis Lumumba, or at least to avoid steps which could affect situation adversely in this regard; (b) To strengthen SYG’s mandate so that UN can take further vigorous steps in Congo; and (c) To focus on Soviet activities outside of framework with a view to mobilizing opinion against them and reinforcing existing SC resolutions this subject.

To this end, we believe you should press Slim to agree to or acquiesce in course of action number one contained Deptel [362]¹ on question of hearing of Congolese representative. We are strongly opposed to three nation committee proposal which would put Kasavubu and Lumumba representatives on equal basis. More important such committee apt to get bogged down in detailed legalities and in long-run likely to make watered-down compromise proposal rather than come out decisively in favor of seating and hearing Bomboko, which we favor. Danger thus that SC might fall behind actual developments in Congo. If Slim agreement or acquiescence not obtainable on first course of action, you authorized to fall back to other courses of action described Deptel 362 repeated Leopoldville 763.

We also understand from USUN that Africans now discussing res which from our point of view is not as satisfactory as res reported urtel 612.² We agree with you that Slim should be stiffened in this regard. We believe you should take line with Slim that draft contained urtel 612 is absolute minimum. While we accept res as it stands, you authorized at your discretion for tactical purposes with Slim, SYG and others to indicate we believe res needs to be strengthened. To this end, you can suggest any of following which you find helpful tactically: (1) res include specific recommendation that UN disarm Force Publique;(2) that specific reference be made to need for UN retention of airports and radio station; (3) that res, in addition to operative para 3, contains specific injunction against USSR, along lines of last operative para of short res USUN telephoned to Dept this morning, i.e. calling on states to refrain from sending personnel, supplies or equipment of military nature into Congo other than through UN; (4) res call on UN to take over courts and administration of justice in Congo; and (5) that phrase “while not being entitled to intervene or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict” be deleted from operative para 4 of Tunisian draft res. We realize attempt include some or all of foregoing would run serious risk Soviet veto, and consider key to avoiding this is Slim’s attitude, i.e. any res which Slim can support affirmatively will be very difficult for USSR to veto. Therefore, in last analysis, question of what traffic will bear depends in large degree on Tunisian position. It occurs to us one way to strengthen present UN mandate with Slim’s support and minimum risk Soviet veto would be to approve latest SYG report to SC.

We hope substantive res can be put forward at appropriate time so that SYG’s hand can be strengthened and Council can reaffirm clearly its decision to keep outside powers from intervening in Congo in a manner contrary to SC resolutions. In this connection, we believe idea presently being discussed in New York calling for establishment of a good offices committee should be strongly discouraged. While such a proposal might be desirable in future depending on developments, we believe there is no need for additional UN instrumentality at this time other than UN group under SYG operating on basis of SC resolutions. As long as developments on ground are progressing reasonably satisfactorily on basis of present UN instrumentality, there is no need to inject good offices committee which inevitably would seek to find some mid-point compromise between Lumumba, Kasavubu, and Tshombe. This would tend strengthen Lumumba rather than advance our objective of increasing UN control and consolidating Kasavubu’s position. We strongly prefer guidance for next steps on Congo question to remain in hands of SC exclusively, rather than resort to three or four member group which would treat the respective parties on basis of equality. We urge therefore you actively discourage this idea.

In addition foregoing substantive considerations, timing of SC meeting also important. If Kasavubu remains in lead in power struggle, then it might be advantageous delay next SC sessions for few days. Would appreciate your recommendations re timing based on results your consultations.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–1260. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Ferguson, and approved by Wilcox. Repeated to Léopoldville.
1. Document 209.
2. Dated September 8, telegram 612 reported a conversation with Wieschhoff and transmitted the text of a suggested draft resolution which Hammarskjöld had given to Slim. The draft resolution reaffirmed the Council’s request that all states should refrain from actions that might tend to impede the restoration of law and order and a peaceful solution to the Congo’s internal conflicts, and it reaffirmed that the U.N. force should act to restore and maintain law and order and protect civilian lives but should not intervene in internal conflicts. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–860)