Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

418. Telegram From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State¹

Tunis, February 16, 1960—5 p.m.

1178. 1. I believe time has arrived for us do some major stock taking of our economic policy toward Tunisia.

2. Bourguiba has reached critical juncture in his thinking. His major political objectives of decolonialization (with the exceptions of Bizerte and French owned farmlands) have been attained. He has succeeded in “cutting the apron strings”, but in doing so he has also tightened French purse strings re Tunisia; and he is now actively searching for other sources of help meet heavy demands of economic-social problems. Such problems are now top priority. And in this complex [context?] Bourguiba feels himself obliged stress the social, if he is to get on with building nation in modern sense. [1½ lines of source text not declassified]

3. His first step is put everyone to work, including hard core 100,000–150,000 of total of 350,000 chronically under and unemployed, who know only state of inactivity and accept it as natural. Plan, at an annual cost of about 20 million dollars, is place unemployed on relief projects which, while in our economy would be given low production rating, have proved in Tunisia be not only socially stabilizing factor, but actually cheap and efficient way of getting work done. These projects will contribute to the economy: Roads, water and erosion control, land recovery and improvement, and possibly housing. At the same time massive effort is gaining momentum eliminate illiteracy.

4. GOT meanwhile will not abandon productive enterprises that will become earners in few years and country team will continue push for them actively; but Bourguiba avers they cannot now provide jobs to absorb fully both mass of existing non workers plus annual increment to labor pool of some 20,000. In this judgment country team must in all honesty concur. Presumably at some time in future Bourguiba envisages a Tunisia in which increased agricultural production and limited industrialization will absorb labor surplus.

5. That identifies problem and objectives: Work, education and higher standards of living. How does GOT envisage financing them? In usual routine, GOT officials increase their requests to US to finance projects from extrabudgetary sources. Bourguiba philosophy, however, is revealed in his speech of January 25 to the AAPC (Embtel 1034).² It is, he declared, humanitarian duty “have” states to help “have nots”. That help must be regarded as permanent; it cannot proceed intermittently nor be offered from some vague charitable intentions. It ends only when no longer “a minority in the world lives in comfort and wealth and a majority is disinherited”. Bourguiba tells the wealthy and powerful states that in doing their humanitarian duty they are not to be moved by political opportunism and strategic consideration (which makes it nice for recipients). Thus, when judgment day comes for Africans of the AAPC, they will have to testify in Bourguiba’s favor for launching, on theme of piety, demand for massive aid to fledging nations of continent.

6. In this philosophy we discern strains of both frustration and opportunism of his own. There is frustration because he feels his open espousal of Western cause and his postures and gestures of sympathy have not earned their just rewards. He may be entertaining doubts about validity of moderation as political tenet. He has rejected (partly for his own purposes) eastern Arab leadership without acquiring countervailing support and recognition at least not in sufficient measure. Elsewhere he claims to see churlishness and factiousness rewarded, while his own uprightness is taken for granted. There may be opportunism in tenacity with which Bourguiba has seized upon rhetorical observation by President Eisenhower December 17³ to effect that since US cannot do everywhere everything that we would like to do, perhaps Tunisia could be made model for rest of Africa. “This would be a magnificent idea”, interpreter records Bourguiba to have said, to no one’s surprise. And Bourguiba will not forget offer of direct channel of correspondence made him. Ladgham referred to it when new dimensions of Tunisian social program were presented to us January 9 (Embtel 950).⁴

7. USOM has now acted upon instructions received in response to our reports on request for work relief assistance (Icato 547, Toica 591).⁵ Whatever points however Tunisians may find practicable to adopt, US will not have been responsive to their appeals to us. Even so I doubt that Bourguiba will turn or cut back his program beyond some light trim. How then will he manage? Turn east?

8. It is not in budgetary subsidies of foreign exchange relief that Soviet ruble can be used; rather Soviet resources are best applied through easy equipment credits, technicians for self-liquidating productive projects and acceptance of otherwise unmarketable commodities against industrial deliveries. Therefore, if GOT, while sticking to expanded work relief program, as Bourguiba has proclaimed (Embtel 1126),⁶ starts accepting aid “from wherever it can get it”, we can only see it diverting large sums from its investment budget, to which we now contribute at least 60 percent, with Soviets perhaps filling in lacuna so created. (It is difficult to be precise on this since Tunisians have never let us see development budget.) Soviets take the high roads; we take the low. Or at least every cutback GOT may make in work relief will be attributed to our heart [garble].

9. Am therefore led ask what are our real political objectives in this country, are they valid, and what price do we set upon their attainment? Is it in our interest make Tunisia model of Africa? Would necessary efforts to this end assure permanence of friendly, stable expanding economy in Tunisia? Would such a Tunisia lead to ultimate formation of friendly Maghrebian association? What would impact be on our relations with France? And even assuming answers to all these questions were favorable would we succeed in excluding Soviet influence?

10. To these questions we venture some tentative answers.

A. Practically alone among emerging African countries, Tunisia has strong, stable but popularly based government; dedicated elite, basic infra-structure, including educational facilities capable of expansion which give it potential of being one of most successful of new countries. Added to this is general friendliness towards West and Chief of State with moderate leaning and international standing.

B. We do not propose Tunisia become so closely associated with US that in Afro-Asian eyes it is regarded as another Vietnam, Korea or Thailand. Bourguiba’s moderate policies have already isolated him from Near Eastern Arabs and to certain extent from Maghrebian brothers. Our best bet would be work tactfully and unostentatiously in helping Bourguiba acquire standing and influence especially among states south of Sahara. This will require aid in excess of present level.

C. In practical terms we propose:

(1) Review sympathetically Bourguiba’s request for help in expanding work relief. Even relatively modest contribution, such as $4 million increase in FY 1960 aid level, would indicate US not unresponsive to very real problems he faces.

(2) Raise special assistance to $30 million fiscal year 1961 aid level which justified now more than ever (Toica 520).⁷ If this not possible for budgetary reasons, strongly urge figure sufficiently in excess of final fiscal year 1960 amount to represent practical demonstration United States interest Tunisia.

(3) Give sympathetic, expeditious treatment DLF applications with particular attention to possibility financing local currency well as foreign exchange components.

(4) Encourage Western European interest, investment and assistance to Tunisia and receptiveness to Tunisian overtures towards trade affiliation with West such as Tunisian approach to EEC (Embassy airgram 260).⁷ Care must however be taken that such overtures do not evoke body [bogy?] of neo-colonialism.

11. Even if all these steps are followed we would still anticipate Tunisian acceptance of some Soviet bloc aid if proffered but above program will, we believe, reduce opportunities for massive bloc aid. It is probable that in Bourguiba’s position he needs some tangible showing that he is not lackey of the West. Token bloc aid will serve this purpose and we are not convinced that this would be against the United States national interest if Tunisia is to have influence with newly independent African states.

12. Would repeat therefore that we are shortly to face major decisions—not simply because of issues coming to head in this minuscule part of new galaxy of countries, but because of broad implications Tunisian questions will have. I should hope that not only researchers and planners, but also those burdened by responsibilities of decision, are directing their thinking toward these emerging issues before we are hurried into improvisations.

McKillop

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.5–MSP/2–1660. Confidential.
2. Dated January 25. (Ibid., 770.00/1–2560)
3. See Document 415.
4. See footnotes 2 and 4, Document 416.
5. Neither found.
6. Telegram 1126, February 5, summarized Bourguiba’s February 5 speech to Tunisian Government leaders and national organizations. (Department of State, Central Files, 872.06/2–560)
7. Not found.
7. Not found.