417. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- Your Appointment with Tunisian Ambassador Slim, February 11, 11:30 A.M.
Ambassador Slim has been recalled to Tunis for consultations. It is probable that President Bourguiba intends to review with him and with Tunisia’s Ambassadors to other NATO countries the best means of proceeding towards the resolution of Franco-Tunisian problems of which the most important is that of Bizerte. The Ambassador wishes to inform President Bourguiba of current U.S. thinking with regard to Bizerte and to discuss North African matters generally especially in light of recent Algerian developments. Mr. Porter of AFN will accompany Ambassador Slim.
[Page 888]Bizerte
Discussion
On January 25 Bourguiba declared that in the absence of an agreement prior to February 8, certain unspecified measures would be taken to bring about the evacuation of French forces from Bizerte. His decision was probably motivated by an assessment of French policy towards Algeria which led him to believe that there would be no progress towards a solution in the foreseeable future, by his irritation over the French refusal to negotiate their “rights” in Bizerte, and by a desire to justify himself in the eyes of African nationalists meeting in Tunis for the Second All Africa Peoples Conference.2
Recent events in Algiers, and especially de Gaulle’s strong action against opponents of self-determination for Algeria3 appear to have caused Bourguiba to reassess the desirability of forcing the Bizerte issue at this time. In a speech on February 8 (Tab A)4 he concluded that it was “inopportune to start the battle of Bizerte today.” Instead, discussions would be continued in the hope of reaching a negotiated settlement. However, Bourguiba specifically reserved the right to use force but only after exhausting all opportunities for an amicable solution.
Bourguiba’s decision may cause him considerable loss of prestige in African nationalist circles and such an abrupt reversal of position is not likely to increase his popularity within Tunisia itself. He undoubtedly feels the need of moral support from countries such as the United States and probably hopes that we will ease his burden by exerting pressure on France to conclude a satisfactory accord.
Recommendation
I recommend that you express to Ambassador Slim our admiration that Bourguiba has once again shown great political courage and willingness to be guided by the highest concepts of national interest. You may wish to say that we share his apparent belief that so long as de Gaulle continues to demonstrate that he is moving rapidly toward implementation of the principle of Algerian self-determination, nothing should be done with regard to collateral issues which might divert him from this task. We do not, of course, consider that the collapse of the insurgent movement in Algiers has removed all obstacles to progress [Page 889] towards a real solution. However, de Gaulle’s reaction to the challenge of the insurgents is heartening evidence that he is both willing and able to enforce obedience to his Algerian policy. We are, therefore, more encouraged with regard to prospects for an Algerian settlement on terms which should help to ease tensions in the area as a whole.
As far as Bizerte, itself, is concerned, you may wish to say that the United States is naturally not in a position to comment on the merits of the dispute. However, we believe that differences of this nature between our friends can certainly be solved through the process of negotiation. You may also wish to suggest to the Ambassador that perhaps a formal agreement on Bizerte will come more easily as a sequel to resolution of the Algerian question. If this is so, Tunisia may feel that it can continue to deal with Bizerte through diplomatic channels so long as real progress towards self-determination in Algeria remains apparent.
Other Subjects
Discussion
Ambassador Slim may wish to be informed as to the status of current matters in Tunisian-U.S. relations, particularly in the economic field. In particular, he may ask whether we have additional information as to the prospects of U.S. financing of the Oued Nebana project (a large dam to which the Tunisians have long attached great importance).
Recommendation
You may wish to reply that we are awaiting the engineers’ report on the sufficiency of water, which is expected shortly by the Development Loan Fund.5
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 772.56351/2–960. Confidential. Drafted by Chase, concurred in by Cameron and Smith, sent to Herter through S/S, and initialed by Satterthwaite and Herter.↩
- These developments were reported to the White House in a January 29 memorandum from McElhiney to Goodpaster, which bears a handwritten notation that the President read it. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, International Series)↩
- Presumably reference is to de Gaulle’s January 29 address on Algerian policy. For text, see Major Addresses, Statements, and Press Conferences of General Charles de Gaulle, May 19, 1958–January 31, 1964, pp. 71–74.↩
- Not attached to the source text; a copy is in Department of State, Central Files, 772.56531/2–960.↩
- A prevoius draft of this paragraph
reads:
“You may wish to reply that we understand that latest information with regard to water availability for the Oued Nebana is encouraging and that we expect to be talking with the Tunisians on this subject in the very near future.” (Attached to the source text)
A memorandum of Herter’s conversation with Slim, which focused on Bizerte and proceeded along the lines outlined, is in Department of State, Central Files, 772.56311/2–1160. Its substance was sent to Tunis in telegram 1043, February 11. (Ibid.) Conversations with French, U.K., and Tunisian officials about Bizerte continued through mid-March. On March 15, the issue was raised at the Political Advisers’ meeting in Paris. Documentation on these conversations and preparations for the Paris meeting is ibid., 772.56351 and 772.56311.
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