387. Editorial Note
At 5:30 p.m. on April 2, Ambassador Jones called on Foreign Minister Mokaddem at the Foreign Minister’s request. Mokaddem gave him a communication from President Bourguiba and asked that it be sent promptly to Secretary Dulles. The message explained Tunisia’s refusal to accede to French demands for controls at the Algerian-Tunisian [Page 841] border and noted Bourguiba remained convinced the United States would continue its efforts to resolve problems in North Africa. (Telegram 1284 from Tunis; Department of State, Central Files, 651.72/4–258)
Dulles showed Bourguiba’s message to President Eisenhower the following morning. Eisenhower “indicated a good deal of sympathy with Bourguiba’s position and much concern about the French attitude. He said that indeed the state of France causes him almost more worry than any other problem in the world today. He saw no solution to the North African problem except a political settlement which would give Algeria a chance for independence, and on the basis of which friendly relations could be continued with Tunisia and Morocco. He indicated that he thought we should accept considerable risks as far as France’s role in NATO was concerned in an effort to try to get France to take such a position.”
In response to a question from the President, Dulles stated Murphy felt a letter from Eisenhower to the French Government should be addressed to Prime Minister Gaillard. Dulles thought Murphy should determine the timing of such a letter. (Memorandum of conversation with the President; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, Meetings With the President)
That afternoon, Dulles cabled Murphy the text of a response to Bourguiba, instructing him to deliver it if he thought it would be useful. The letter declared Dulles had given Bourguiba’s message his “most careful attention,” thanked him for his cooperation with the good offices mission, and assured him of Dulles’ “continuing desire to work together with you to solve the many serious problems which are of such concern to us both.” (Telegram 791 to Tunis; Department of State, Central Files, 651.72/4–358) Murphy advised the Department on April 4 that the message had arrived in time for his talk with Bourguiba, who “had received it with evident pleasure and it was obviously helpful.” (Telegram 1297 from Tunis; ibid., 651.72/4–458)
On April 10, the Department sent Murphy, who had returned to Paris, the text of a letter from Eisenhower to Gaillard. The letter observed: “France faces the question of whether or not it is consistent with France’s own vital interests to accept the practical limits which seemed to be imposed upon the Tunisian government by sentimental and even emotional ties, as well as geographical factors, which inescapably lead the people of Tunisia to sympathize with the aspirations of the Moslem nationalist elements in Algeria. May it not be that to take these practical factors into account is not only consistent with French interests, but indeed a way to promote them?”
[Page 842]Failure to achieve even a limited relationship with Tunisia would probably lead to violence, whereas overcoming the immediate crisis could provide “an opportunity to deal constructively with the larger aspects of the problem.” (Telegram 3782 to Paris; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File)
The Department instructed Murphy to arrange for the letter’s delivery, noting the British preferred that Ambassador Houghton deliver it. (Telegram 3783 to Paris, April 10; Department of State, Central Files, 651.51S/4–1058) Murphy reported on April 11 that he and Houghton had given the message to Gaillard at 12:15 Paris time. Foreign Minister Pineau had been with him. (Telgram 4668 from Paris; ibid., 651.51S/4–1158) They had read the letter with “no detectable resentment but sort of grave preoccupations.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation, April 11, 10:22 a.m.; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations) Dulles reported this to the President at 10:30 a.m. (Memorandum of conversation with the President; Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199)
At the April 14 National Security Council meeting, Allen Dulles stated: “the news from this area was somewhat more encouraging as a result of the acceptance by the French Government of the recommendations of the US–UK Good Offices team. The big question now was whether the Gaillard regime would be able to weather the storm which it will encounter in the Chamber of Deputies next Tuesday. There was a distinct possibility Gaillard and his government would survive, because his opponents do not want to overthrow Gaillard at least until after the Easter recess. It was nevertheless a gamble. Mr. Dulles added that the President’s message to Gaillard had apparently been decisive in inducing the Paris government to agree to the Good Offices recommendations. The matter was of particular importance because at the moment the Algerian rebels (FLN) have been planning to set up a government-in-exile located probably in Cairo. Bourguiba was strongly opposed to such a move, and it was possible that the rise in his prestige attendant upon the acceptance of the Good Offices recommendations would be sufficient to prevent it. Nevertheless, some such government-in-exile was likely to be formed over the next few months.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records) Documentation on the French decision to accept the good offices proposals is in Department of State, Central File 651.72.
At his April 15 press conference, Secretary Dulles spoke of this development in the good offices mission and of French fears that the United States wished to usurp France’s position in North Africa. For the transcript, see Department of State Bulletin, May 5, 1958, page 719, or American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pages 1091–1092.