386. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting, Department of State, Washington, April 2, 1958, 3:30 p.m.1
A meeting was held in the Secretary’s office at 3:30 p.m. on April 2, 1958 to discuss the subject of Franco-Tunisian relations and the Good Offices mission. Present were: The Secretary, Mr. Rountree, Mr. Becker, Mr. Holmes, Mr. Palmer, Mr. Jandrey and Mr. Porter.
Mr. Rountree opened the discussion by referring to the French demand for the establishment of a border commission. He noted that Bourguiba has stated that he would accept such a commission if all [Page 839] French troops were withdrawn from Tunisia, including Bizerte, but that otherwise he could not accept this frontier control. Mr. Rountree said the problem was whether we should press Bourguiba to accept such frontier control. He indicated that NEA thought it would be politically impossible for Bourguiba to accept such a commission without complete evacuation of French troops. If Bourguiba attempted to do so, he would probably fall. His fall would result in the fall of Libya and would jeopardize the entire Western position in North Africa.
The Secretary remarked that Tunisia was, in a sense, attempting to equate its unneutrality, which was a unique and anomalous position. They, on the one hand, countenanced rebel border traffic, and, on the other hand, accepted French bases in Tunisia.
The Secretary remarked that the discussion could be divided into two parts, a legal and a practical. He thought the French could make a good public relations case that their settlement proposals were designed to establish a correct neutral position for Tunisia. The Secretary thought there would be a good deal of sympathy in this country for the French position. If, however, the Secretary added, Bourguiba cannot accept such frontier control, then there is no point in arguing the legal aspects.
Some discussion then ensued concerning the legal position of the French in Bizerte. Mr. Becker indicated that he thought the French had an arguable position but that the Tunisian legal position was stronger. Subsequently during the meeting, he showed the Secretary a memorandum on the legal aspects of the French right to be in Bizerte.2
There was also some discussion concerning what would happen if the Tunisian complaint was brought back again to the Security Council. The Secretary considered the present membership of the Security Council and then expressed the opinion that neither side could get seven affirmative votes on the Franco-Tunisian issue.
There was some discussion during the meeting concerning the possible fall of the French Government and damage to our entire position in Europe and in NATO if the French were pressed too hard. There was also some discussion concerning the Gaillard suggestion for a Western Mediterranean Pact3 and the North African political efforts toward Maghrebian union.
Mr. Rountree said that he did not believe we could press Bourguiba any further. He queried whether we could go back and press the French further on this subject. Mr. Becker observed that, if Bourguiba falls, it is almost certain that North Africa would change its [Page 840] alignment. He noted that, if we exert more pressure on the French, it is less certain that they would leave NATO. Under these circumstances he thought our answer was to put more pressure on the French.
The Secretary asked if we knew what Mr. Murphy’s thinking was. Mr. Rountree indicated that we had not heard from Mr. Murphy since receipt of the latest telegram on the subject from Tunis. (I believe this was a two-section telegram reporting a discussion that Ambassador Jones had with Ladgham—probably Tunis 1272.)4 The Secretary said that presumably Mr. Murphy would let us know if he thought we could be helpful in terms of a Presidential message or some such measure.
Mr. Rountree then quoted instructions sent to Mr. Murphy on March 15 concerning the method for terminating the Good Offices effort if it became necessary to do so.5
The Secretary said that he thought, from what Mr. Rountree had said, that it was futile to try to put any more pressure on Bourguiba. However, he said that he did not think this thing should blow up without at least trying a letter from the President to Gaillard or Coty. Mr. Jandrey asked whether it would do any good to call Mr. Murphy and inquire what we could usefully do at this end. At this point the Secretary put in a call to Mr. Murphy in Paris and the meeting broke up.6
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.72/4–258. Secret. Drafted by Herman T. Skofield.↩
- Presumably reference is to a March 14 memorandum from Becker to Herter regarding “Legal Position of French Forces in Tunisia.” This memorandum was also sent on March 14 to the President, who initialed it. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)↩
- See Document 270.↩
- Telegram 1272, April 1, reported that Ladgham had responded vehemently to the suggestion that Murphy and Beeley return to Tunis to discuss border controls. It also noted that Bourguiba would probably also be opposed to such a meeting. (Department of State, Central Files, 651.72/4–158)↩
- Sent in telegram 727 to Tunis. (Ibid., 651.72/3–1558)↩
- Dulles spoke with Murphy at 4:57 p.m. Murphy stated he was going to Tunis the following morning and suggested Eisenhower wait until he returned to Paris before sending a letter to the French Government. Gaillard would be the proper person to receive the letter. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations)↩