306. Editorial Note
At Secretary Herter’s December 7 Staff Meeting, Assistant Secretary Wilcox reported that discussion of Algeria in the First Committee of the U.N. General Assembly was “continuing and there may be a vote on a resolution tonight or tomorrow. We will have to send instructions for a possible paragraph-by-paragraph vote. There is a possibility of a vote to adjourn debate.” In response to Assistant Secretary Satterthwaite’s “appeal against a negative vote on the Afro-Asian resolution,” Herter said “we can not avoid choosing sides on this issue. We have made clear that we would prefer not to have a resolution but we are opposed to having the PAG designated as the only representatives to speak for the Algerians.” (Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75) For text of the draft resolution [Page 683] submitted December 2 to the First Committee by several Afro-Asian nations, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, page 1104.
On the afternoon of December 7, the Department of State sent Lodge instructions to abstain on the first six preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution and to vote against its last two preambular paragraphs, the operative paragraph, and the resolution as a whole. Lodge was to vote for any proposal to adjourn consideration of the item, and to ask the British or French to encourage the Norwegians, Canadians, or “other selected” delegation to make such a motion. “In making this suggestion to UK and/or French,” the message specified, “you should emphasize that we cannot be identified with such initiative, but we would vote affirmatively should motion be made.” In doing so, however, the U.S. Delegation “should not appear be exerting pressure on others to support US position.” Herter initialed these instructions personally. (Gadel 171; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/12–559)
Lodge voted accordingly, but the First Committee decided to recommend that the General Assembly adopt the draft resolution. For a record of these proceedings, see U.N. Doc. A/4339. The General Assembly began deliberations on Algeria at its 4 p.m. meeting on December 10. At that time, the sponsors of the draft resolution announced that they wished to defer consideration of it in favor of a new text to be submitted the following day. For a record of these proceedings, see U.N. Doc. A/PV.852. For text of the new draft, submitted by Pakistan on December 11, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, page 1105.
At 12:10 p.m. December 11, Herter received a telephone call from Ambassador Houghton in Paris, who informed him the Embassy was disturbed by information “indicating we would abstain on the Algerian resolution. Secretary said we would vote for the resolution. Houghton said he thought our position was that we thought no resolution should be passed. Secy said when they write something as innocuous as this resolution we would be in a difficult position to refuse to vote for it. Secy then read proposed resolution which Houghton agreed was innocuous but said the French will still be unhappy. Secy said we have bent over backwards to cooperate on this; they don’t defend themselves but get mad if we don’t vote against the resolution. Houghton said he agreed, but felt he should put on record the fact that French will nonetheless be unhappy.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations)
Lodge telephoned Herter at 5:55 p.m. He observed that “if they put in the self-determination clause it would be hard to vote against it. Everyone wants to know what we are going to do but Lodge did not [Page 684] think we should disclose this. He hoped the Sec would not pass on to Alphand our intentions. Lodge said the case for abstention looked strong. They would not be surprised if we abstained. Amb Lodge said he wanted the Secretary’s thinking in case the unexpected comes up. The Sec said he was sitting with about 12 State Department people having a go round on this very question. The thinking varied considerably on geographic lines.” After further discussion, Herter agreed to call Lodge with a decision. (Ibid.)
Following a telephone conversation with Wilcox, who also felt the United States should not reveal its position before the vote, Herter called Lodge “and said the decision was for abstention. A wire was on its way. In explaining the abstention the Sec said it would be well if L could just say a word on both sides it would be very helpful. There is a perfectly good case to be made either way.” (Ibid.)
The telegram instructing Lodge to abstain and transmitting a suggested text for the U.S. explanation of its vote was sent to the Mission at the United Nations at 10:57 p.m. (Telegram 563 to USUN; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/12–1059)
The General Assembly resumed its deliberations on Algeria at its 11 a.m. meeting Saturday, December 12, voting on the Pakistani draft resolution at its 3 p.m. meeting that day. The United States abstained on the resolution, which failed to gain a two-thirds majority and was therefore not adopted. For text of Lodge’s explanation of the U.S. vote, which followed the draft sent by the Department of State, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pages 1105–1106. For a record of these proceedings, see U.N. Docs. A/PV.855–856.
At Herter’s December 14 Staff Meeting, “there was some discussion of the events of Saturday and Alphand’s unhappiness at our unwillingness to tell him in advance of our position. It was generally agreed that this had been the correct procedure and that the Algerian item had come out about as well as could be expected.” (Department of State, Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)
Prime Minister Debré raised the issue with Eisenhower on December 21. Stating that he wished to “speak very frankly,” Debré observed:
“Every Frenchman was anxious that the Algerians would choose the closest possible association with France when they had a chance to express their choice under General De Gaulle’s offer. Those who had been fighting or living in Algeria for many years, both civilian and military, felt very strongly about this as was natural. The rebellion no longer had any hope of military victory but they did hope for outside political support which would enable them to achieve their aims. To the French, General De Gaulle’s offer of September 16 had seemed fair and equitable. Hence while political circles might understand the reason the US abstained in the UN, French public opinion was unable to understand why the US had not voted with France. He did not wish to [Page 685] reopen this matter and did not expect any answer from the President. He merely hoped that when matters of this type came up consideration would be given to all aspects of the question.
“The President said that he had discussed General De Gaulle’s proposal with him before it was made, and after the announcement thereof he had warmly supported it. Ambassador Lodge had spoken most eloquently in favor of this offer and we had fully supported the General’s offer. However, we too had political difficulties and a long tradition of anti-colonialism, and there were many in the US who thought that instead of supporting General De Gaulle we should be carrying the flag of the Algerian rebellion. So considering all these factors we had abstained. We had fought hard in support of the French offer but apparently unless we supported the French 100%, gave them a blank check so to speak, we were regarded as almost being enemies. Mr. Debré said he did not want to reopen the question but merely wished to tell the President the reaction of many people in France.” (US/MC/19; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/12–2159)
Eisenhower and Herter were in Paris to attend the Heads of Government Meeting, December 19–21.