305. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations1
Gadel 159. Re Algeria (Delga 561).2
- 1.
- Department appreciates receipt your further views (Delga 561) which we find helpful. In particular, we wish endorse fully your para 7 in which you express intention to continue make clear that US thinks [Page 681] “it is mistake and dangerous to have debate and/or resolution”. For time being we believe this best tactic to pursue, though we share doubts which you have expressed all along that in absence of French-Algerian contacts, we will be able avoid resolution, even though this is our preference.
- 2.
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We also inclined agree with you that alternatives 1 through 3 of Gadel 1503 are remote possibilities at present time, although Slim apparently had something close to alternative 3 in mind in his comment to you on Nov 24 (para 5 Delga 519). See also Tunis 769 rpted USUN 28.4 Clearly, as you say, if talks were to get started between French and Algerians, we would have to look at whole situation again.5
- 3.
- Department requests you take following steps:
- (a)
- US make statement in Political Committee debate at stage you deem appropriate in which US would state its position. Purpose of this statement would be: (1) put us again clearly on record, by recalling President’s statement of September 17 and Secretary’s statement of September 22, in support of DeGaulle plan; (2) to try influence Political Committee to avoid resolution; (3) to satisfy French that we have taken those steps which we deem feasible in trying avoid resolution; and (4) provide basis for vote other than negative on any resolution which may nevertheless be presented which in our judgment is moderate (such as those contained paras 4 and 5 of Gadel 150). Text of suggested statement is transmitted in subsequent tel.6
- (b)
- You would inform UK in first instance and French subsequently our intention make speech and would make following additional points to them: (1) US has sought to help French by avoiding [Page 682] debate. This has not eventuated even though we have tried to persuade UAR, Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians; (2) we are in corridors continuing to tell other dels that we believe resolution ought to be avoided. We will continue do this as long as feasible; (3) we will make statement in Committee in which we will again support DeGaulle proposals and which is intended try to influence other dels to avoid resolution; (4) however, should our efforts fail, and resolution is nevertheless presented, we would vote against any resolution which in our judgment would prejudice future solution. At same time, French should understand that this does not necessarily mean negative vote on any or all resolutions. They should realize that if resolution is in our judgment reasonable and moderate US cannot vote against it, though final decision will depend on specific text; and (5) should French-Algerian contacts be established in next few days, we would reassess tactical situation at GA.
We believe foregoing might influence GA consideration of Algerian question in constructive way so that support for DeGaulle program will not be weakened and would not result in moderate Algerian leadership losing ground to extremists. It would clearly help establish record vis-à-vis French and thereby avoid some of bitter criticisms of past. At same time it would permit us exercise reasonable judgment re voting position on any resolution which might as Dixon has observed “be absolutely unexceptionable from any normal UN viewpoint.”7
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/11–3059. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Sisco; cleared by Calhoun, McBride, Wallner, Satterthwaite, and Kohler; and initialed by Herter. Repeated to Paris and Tunis.↩
- Delga 561, November 30, evaluated U.S. chances to influence U.N. debate on Algeria. (Ibid.) It was sent in response to Gadel 150, November 28, which stated the Department of State wished to influence the debate so it would not undermine support for De Gaulle’s program or the position of moderate Algerian leaders. Gadel 150 also requested Lodge’s assessment of several possible General Assembly actions, some of which are outlined here. (Ibid., 751S.00/11–2959)↩
- Alternatives 1–3 were: (1) adjournment of general debate through either a motion from the floor or by the Chairman of the Political Committee; (2) conclusion of debate with a statement by the Chairman of the Political Committee; and (3) adoption of a procedural resolution stating the General Assembly would not consider the question further or would postpone consideration of it.↩
- Paragraph 5 of Delga 519 reported Slim felt a resolution commending the start of talks would have been acceptable, and that he would have moved to adjourn debate had such talks been in progress. (Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/11–2459) Telegram 769 from Tunis, November 28, reported the PAG might limit discussion of Algeria to 2 or 3 days in the Political Committee, which the Committee Chairman would summarize as in favor of De Gaulle’s program and negotiation. (Ibid., 751S.00/11–2859)↩
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At this point in the source text, the following paragraph was deleted before transmission:
“3. Re your comment in para 5, you appear make assumption that US has decided against any or all resolutions that may be presented. This is not necessarily case; no such decision has been taken; and our final voting position will be determined in light of specific text. We would of course vote against any resolution which in our judgment would seriously prejudice prospects for a future solution.”
↩ - Paragraph 4 of Gadel 150 suggested a resolution advocating that “in a spirit of cooperation, a peaceful, democratic just solution will be found through appropriate means.” Paragraph 5 submitted a text for a resolution endorsing De Gaulle’s plan and referring to self-determination. The suggested text for Lodge’s Political Committee statement was sent in Gadel 157, December 1. (Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/12–159)↩
- For text of Lodge’s December 2 statement before the First Committee, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 1102–1104.↩