244. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State1
854. Discussion of Suez transit question as reported Embassy telegram 8362 was only small portion of 2-hour session with Nasser which was in nature general review in order pick up threads since we had last talked prior my departure on leave. Main subjects covered were UAR-Soviet relations, area problems and US–UAR cooperation. This telegram covers introductory part of conversation and relations with USSR.
[Page 550]I began by saying had found that steps normalize US-UAR relations as well as stand of UAR on Communism, its efforts at reconciliation with its neighbors and emphasis on internal development had created good impression in both official and unofficial circles in US. In fact, I had been authorized deliver message to that effect from Secretary Herter who had also said wanted Nasser know that as far as Khrushchev visit concerned we approaching it without illusions which could promote false optimism but that we nevertheless hope some good may come of it and will do our best to that end. Department circular telegrams 128, 157 and 2333 were drawn on in elaborating latter and emphasis laid on fact that not our intention negotiate bilaterally regarding other free world countries without consulting them; this of course applied to Middle East as well as other areas. Did Nasser have any comments? If so, they would be appreciated.
Nasser said would welcome any moves that might relieve world tensions and dangers of war and therefore hoped Khrushchev visit would be successful. However, would be difficult matter because of fact that Soviets are so basically imbued with Communist doctrine and so intent on its world-wide propagation, however much they may talk of co-existence.
Nasser said he had drawn this conclusion from first-hand experience. At first he had taken Soviets at their word when they professed no intention to intervene in domestic affairs of others and UAR had attempted maintain relations based on good faith. Things had gone well for time but then difficulty had developed as result of Soviet support of Communist elements in Arab countries, especially in Iraq but also in other cases involving UAR directly and recently such as Soviet public criticism of arrest in Syria of Lebanese Communist Faragallah Hilu (whom Nasser said key man), of public recanting by 16 Syrian Communists and of current trial Egyptian Communists in Alexandria. (Where Nasser said Soviets seem under mistaken impression that failure publicize trials here is evidence of fear of public reaction.)
UAR difficulty with Soviets had really become serious last December when Nasser made his speeches attacking local Communists but it had seemed difficulty might be dispelled when Khrushchev wrote long letter proposing mutual restraint, although even here Khrushchev had been rather heavy-handed in criticizing Egyptian-Syrian Union and in apparently assuming it was UAR desire to take over Iraq. However, Nasser had interpreted letter as essentially friendly in intent and had agreed to cease public attacks but in so doing he had commented fully on points in Khrushchev letter to [Page 551] which he took exception in thought that Khrushchev might have publication in mind; in fact he had given matter full treatment by replying in 64 pages to Khrushchev’s 32 page missive.
Situation, however, had not remained stable owing continued Soviet intervention in various matters where local Communists concerned. UAR Ambassador in Moscow had been instructed on several occasions to protest, only to be asked what he expected; he should realize that Soviets are Communists and could not be disinterested in Communists elsewhere. As consequence, said Nasser, UAR-Soviet relations have been going up and down but trend is downward. And this not merely question of attitude; it has been reflected substantively, especially in matter arms where deliveries held up and prices being raised; situation with reference spare parts particularly acute and UAR looking for other sources such as Yugoslavia or local manufacture. Perfectly clear, Nasser said, that Soviets following policy of pressure although this not so far evident in economic field.
Nasser’s conclusion was that virtually impossible for non-Communist country to come to basic agreement with Soviets as long as they so dedicated to Communist principles and convinced Communism destined pervade world. Would seem, he said, there some inner impulse which drives them on whether they will it or not.
Comment: Nasser looked fit and relaxed; remarked jokingly he had so much enjoyed vacation with his family on beach at Alexandria that he was in no mood get back to work.
As regards contrast between Nasser’s present evaluation of Soviet motivation as compared with his attitude less than year ago, question might arise whether his comments especially flavored for American taste but that I doubt. Rather I would say his present attitude was typical evolution of his somewhat primitive but nevertheless keen mind which reaches conclusions more by trial and error than by abstract deduction. However, this does not mean, as we have said before, that Nasser’s disenchantment with Soviets can be expected to result in a complete policy reversal but it does mean that our side of the scales gradually going up as that of Soviets goes down and that something approaching balance is in process materialization. More troubles obviously lie ahead but trend of events would seem to be toward point where neutralism which has been largely policy of words in past will become more nearly one of fact in future. This may not be ideal situation but it is one with which we decided we could live in initial stage of policy determination re normalization of relations with the UAR. If we can press our advantage further at some future time, well and good; for the time being however would seem advisable not change target.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/9–1959. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Moscow.↩
- Telegram 836, September 18, reported that in a conversation that day Hare had stated that the Macomber letter was not unusual and that Nasser did not dwell on the issue. (Ibid., 986B.7301/9–1759) Hare and Nasser also discussed Iraq (telegram 855 from Cairo, September 19; ibid., 686B.00/9–1059) and economic assistance (telegram 872 from Cairo, September 20; ibid., 986B.7301/9–2059).↩
- Dated August 12, 20, and September 8, respectively, these telegrams summarized various aspects of the preparations for Khrushchev’s visit to the United States in September. (Ibid., 033.6111/8–1259, 033.6111/8–2059, and 033.6111/9–859)↩