243. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State1
797. In manner which suggested prior consultation with Nasser, Embassy officer was requested call September 11 at office of Haikal who said Nasser very upset by Macomber letter2 (see recent press telegrams) and had for three days been mulling over matter in effort decide whether instruct Kaissouni, now en route Washington, refrain altogether from discussing IBRD loan for canal since Nasser interpreted letter as indication that Department yielding to Zionist/Israeli pressure.
Embassy officer, who had conferred with me prior meeting, explained it standard procedure for Department to reply to inquiries by members Congress and incorrect interpret letter as something unusual or as yielding to pressure. As matter of fact substance Department’s reply simply restatement of our established position of freedom of transit which I had explained to Nasser some months ago with warning that it might have to be re-enunciated if current difficulties re transit Israeli goods become matter public discussion.
Haikal appeared somewhat impressed by this explanation (although difficult understand how he could find anything new in it) but then, referring to strong local press reaction on matter, including his own article “Israel will never pass” (Embtel 757 and despatch 180)3 [Page 548] said UAR compelled answer in this fashion or risk being discredited in eyes other Arabs. US must understand that on Israeli issue margin of tolerance for any Arab state very narrow. UAR had ignored statements by Congressmen protesting loan and articles similar nature in major American papers (sic)4 but could not afford ignore statement by an Assistant Secretary which connoted to Arab readers official US support for Israel’s position and also carried suggestion that loan, if forthcoming, conditional on acceding to Israeli demands.
Re loan it well Haikal said UAR not pressing matter: Canal is functioning well and revenues satisfactory; project for which loan sought of more immediate concern to shipping interests than UAR. Actually, after years of disappointment with USG, the UAR is pleased with improvement relations in 1959 and would not wish loan question jeopardize. In fact UAR consciously following policy of seeking avoid embarrass USG in matters related Israel and he gave as examples of this policy the scuttling by UAR delegation of proposed establishment Palestine liberation army at Casablanca conference5 and decision refrain from forcibly unloading Inge Toft despite fact that, after brief world press flurry, exercising of legitimate right do so would have eliminated source great annoyance. All this led up to Haikal saying that, if UAR request for loan created embarrassing and difficult problem for Department, UAR prepared (here he assured Embassy officer he speaking with Nasser’s approval) to withdraw application for loan. Embassy officer replied he not in position respond to suggestion of this type. As far as he knew loan process was proceeding normally but, if UAR authorities felt otherwise and wished discuss, matter should be pursued at higher level.
Later in day Embassy officer saw another reliable source and queried him re Nasser attitude. Source said Nasser irritated both by statements Congressmen and Macomber letter but, to his knowledge, had not mentioned possible dropping application for loan.
In connection foregoing, see Embassy telegram 7716 re different impressions given Rucinski of IBRD by Fawzi and El Emary.
Embassy impression is that strong press reaction was in fact standard procedure but that it has been given additional stimulation by articles such as those by Haikal himself. Question is why. Does it merely mean that occasion seized to show UAR always ready dish it out to West as well as East when it feels its interests or prestige affected, or may it be that matter has conjured up specter, especially in Nasser’s mind, of situation reminiscent of our renunciation of assistance [Page 549] on High Dam? Latter may not be entirely without pertinence especially as would fall in behavioristic pattern of Nasser and those around him; however, Embassy has impression that so far at least head of steam generated is of manageable proportions but this does not rule out possibility of pressure mounting to explosive proportions if public discussion, especially of official character, is further intensified. In other words, it seems possible that, having blown off steam through press, UAR may well be disposed to take it easy re timing of negotiations as indicated by Fawzi to Rucinski but, should political atmosphere become more highly charged, it is entirely possible that this attitude might be jettisoned for one of stronger reaction, including rejection Canal loan. In that event fact that so doing would be contrary UAR interests would not necessarily be restraining influence since precedents are abundant where, in cases of publicly aired dispute, national interest has been subordinated to national dignity.
Foreseeing matter may be pursued with us by Nasser or other UAR officials, Embassy would appreciate any guidance which might appropriately be used.
Would also appreciate receiving full text Macomber letter.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 986B.7301/9–1359. Confidential.↩
- Not found, but the letter from Macomber, June 30, was a response to Congressional letters to President Eisenhower on the transit question. According to telegram 975 to Cairo, September 17, it dealt solely with the transit issue. (Ibid.)↩
- Telegram 757, September 10, transmitted a summary of the Cairo press for that day. (Ibid., 986B.61/9–1059) Despatch 180 has not been found.↩
- As on the source text.↩
- The Arab League Conference, which began September 1.↩
- Dated September 10, telegram 771 transmitted a letter from Rucinski to Black summarizing the former’s conversation with Fawzi on that day. (Department of State, Central Files, 986B.7301/9–1059)↩