Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

239. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, April 30, 1959, 2:30 p.m.¹

Washington, April 30, 1959, 2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Mustafa Amin, Editor-Publisher, Akhbar al-Yom
• William M. Rountree, NEA
• Parker T. Hart, NEA
• William D. Brewer, NE

Mr. Rountree welcomed Mr. Amin and noted the many favorable developments which had taken place since they had met in Cairo in December, 1958. He was pleased at the way the situation had developed and this pleasure was reflected at all levels in the US Government. There was great admiration for President Nasser’s forthright stand on the Communist issue and the US had extended a large measure of indirect support. Mr. Amin interjected that UAR had not sought public support. Mr. Rountree continued that it had been difficult for us to refrain from publicly supporting the UAR on this matter in view of our well-known opposition to Communism, but we had done so to avoid embarrassment to the UAR.

Mr. Amin indicated that the general assessment of the situation in Cairo did not accord with the sentiments which Mr. Rountree had expressed. President Nasser was concerned at the US position. There was a pressure group around him comprising aides who had worked on UAR-Soviet arrangements, who noted critically the gradual approach which the US was taking. Such a “drop by drop” policy had left a bad impression. President Nasser considered that the US did not trust him. As an example, when the UAR had sought approval for an anti-Communist declaration at the recent Beirut Arab League meeting, Libya, the Sudan and Saudi Arabia had not supported the UAR and Tunisia and Jordan had not even attended. President Nasser regards these countries as friends of the US and has assumed that they were given no advice by us regarding the attitude which they should take with respect to the meeting. Mr. Amin noted that he understood the UAR Ambassador here had been informed that we had regretted the inconclusive outcome of the meeting.

Mr. Rountree replied that it was only logical that we would warmly welcome the fullest possible Arab support of President Nasser and the UAR for the current anti-Communist program. There was absolutely no question of this. At the same time the attitude of certain Arab Governments with respect to the Arab League could not properly be attributed to us. We had had the same type of problem in the past, for example with respect to Premier Bourguiba of Tunisia. We had emphasized to the UAR Ambassador that, had our advice been sought by Tunisia with respect to its differences with the UAR, we would have counseled a different course from that the Tunisians had taken. The US had only limited means for advising friendly Arab countries with respect to purely Arab matters. The attitude of such countries as Libya and the Sudan was, therefore, not the result of any US action and President Nasser should not be misled on this point.

Mr. Amin noted that Iranian newspapers, including a semi-official paper, and also the Turks, notably Zorlu, were attacking the UAR and defending Qassim of Iraq. President Nasser cannot understand why these people do not regard opposition to the Communist Party in Iraq as helpful to Turkey and Iran. Perhaps the UK prefers a little Communism in Iraq to a lot of Nasserism. Mr. Rountree replied that he had been unaware that Iranian papers were taking this line. We understood that the Iranians thought that their relations with the UAR were much better. Similarly, we were not aware of any substantial differences with the British. However, there was a dilemma. The UK position in Iraq differs from that of the US in that the UK has been the traditional supplier of arms to Iraq. Initially the Qassim regime received Soviet arms. They did not discuss US arms aid since this would have required clarification of the Iraqi position with respect to our MDAP Agreement. Instead, they had asked the British to sell them arms. The UK no doubt found it very difficult to determine whether to sell arms to a country which might go Communist or to refuse to do so and thus provide that country with an excuse for obtaining more Communist arms. The fact that the British were considering this matter, therefore, did not reflect any lack of British concern regarding the seriousness of the Iraqi situation.

Mr. Amin emphasized that Nasser in the past has sought no aid from the US. However, there is now a hard currency crisis in the UAR. The Soviet technique had been to open a credit of 40 million rubles and then discuss detailed projects. In Nasser’s view, the US position was that we would discuss a whole range of projects and then decide what might be done. Nasser now hoped to obtain an assurance regarding what the US would do following which discussions of individual projects could take place. Mr. Rountree commented that President Nasser had correctly identified one of the problems in our Ex-Im Bank and DLF procedures, since these organizations operate on a project basis. Referring to Mr. Amin’s comment regarding our “drop by drop” approach, Mr. Rountree read a list of steps which we have taken, and are taking, to improve US–UAR relations and said that the total picture appeared fairly impressive. We thought both the UAR and the US were on the right track. We strongly supported the UAR anti-Communist campaign and would do so publicly were it not for UAR views regarding possible embarrassment which we respected. We were very sympathetic to the UAR economic requirements and would support these where we could. We understood that Minister of Economics Kaissouni was preparing a list of projects. Mr. Amin commented that he had the list and produced a list of 17 industrial projects for which US financial assistance was being sought.

Mr. Rountree said that we would certainly wish to examine the UAR list and see what could be done to help. There was a problem, however, in that we were between appropriations. Certainly some projects would, no doubt, qualify under the DLF or the Ex-Im Bank and he was optimistic that we ourselves could help. Mr. Rountree then repeated to Mr. Amin the recent statements which we had authorized Ambassador Hare to make to President Nasser.² He reiterated that, with respect to the UAR application for a loan for Suez Canal development, it was the US intention to lend appropriate support. Mr. Amin said that he had met IBRD President Black in New York on April 29.

Returning to the hard currency question, Mr. Amin emphasized that this dictated UAR policy with respect to Communism and the Soviet Union. President Nasser had thought that the USSR would withdraw or delay its assistance as the result of the UAR anti-Communist campaign. This campaign had, therefore, been initiated with the thought in mind that Egypt’s sterling balances in London would be reserved as a cushion to meet this contingency. However, Nasser was worried about the gap of days which would exist between the withdrawal of the sterling balances and the inception of Western aid. Were the Soviet Union suddenly to withdraw its help and the UAR was left with nothing, Egyptian public opinion would place all the blame on Nasser’s anti-Communist policy. This gap was, therefore, the most dangerous period in the life of the Nasser regime. Mr. Rountree expressed agreement and commented that President Nasser surely knows that there are considerable possibilities for the UAR of obtaining similar assistance from the West, for example West Germany.

Mr. Amin said he would illustrate how bad the situation might become for the UAR by relating the newsprint problem. It had been thought that the Soviet Union would delay or cease its newsprint deliveries. The US Embassy had, therefore, been alerted in January to the possibility that help would be needed to obtain newsprint from the West. Subsequently the Russians reduced newsprint deliveries from 10,000 tons per quarter to al-Akhbar to 1,200 tons. Amin had seen Ambassador Hare who had requested the Department’s assistance. The reply had been that recently released FY 55 US aid funds could be used for newsprint instead of locomotives as the UAR had originally planned. Since Nasser had sought additional assistance for newsprint, he had been disappointed at the US reaction. Mr. Rountree noted that there might be some misunderstanding. Mr. Hart said he had not seen any approach to Embassy Cairo regarding newsprint such as outlined by Amin. Mr. Brewer said that there had been several despatches reporting UAR concern regarding newsprint which it was indicated would begin to be short in March or April 1959. Mr. Amin emphasized that the UAR now needs $6 million with which to purchase newsprint immediately. His paper had been reduced from 16 to 12 pages; others from 12 to 8 pages and weeklies reduced 35% by Government order. These cuts were taken from the anti-Communist campaign itself. UAR publishers were now asking why Nasser had not provided newsprint for this campaign in advance from a Western source. Mr. Rountree said he would like to give further thought to the newsprint question.

Mr. Rountree raised the question of Mr. Amin’s calls on Mr. Henderson and Mr. Murphy on May 1.³ Mr. Amin replied that his instructions had been to come “privately” and that he therefore would not bring the UAR Ambassador with him. He emphasized that the UAR had considered carefully in advance the public effect of initiating the anti-Communist campaign. They had considered that the USSR might halt its aid. From the military standpoint, the UAR was ready for this with enough spare parts for five years and arrangements made for other supplies from neutrals. However, Nasser was concerned with respect to the industrialization program which the Russians apparently envisioned for Iraq. This would have an effect in Syria. The UAR, therefore, had to undertake industrialization projects in Syria more rapidly in order that a favorable comparison would be drawn. One could not plan that the Soviets would move slowly in Iraq as they had done in Syria. Mr. Rountree asked whether Amin’s list of 17 projects included any projects for Syria. Amin replied negatively and seemed uncertain what the projects envisioned for Syria were, Mr. Brewer said that textile plants and a pipeline had been among those mentioned. Mr. Amin agreed and said that TV stations were also needed. The Department of Commerce had announced a 1 million Egyptian pound project desired by the UAR and RCA had expressed willingness to the UAR to undertake this project. The US Government should appropriately encourage RCA. Mr. Rountree said that TV obviously had vast potentialities and we would be glad to do what we could in discussion with RCA.

Mr. Amin then turned to the situation in Iraq which he described as very bad. The Communists had practically taken over and even if Qasim wished to oppose the Communists he could not do so. The USSR had a complex of having lost Syria because of moving too slowly. Therefore, Nasser thought that they were working quickly in Iraq and considered that the time was ripe to “cash in”. Tibet and Iraq might in fact have been timed to coincide in order to force neutral nations to choose sides. Soviet policy envisioned a thrust to the Persian Gulf and India via Iraq and Tibet. Nehru is in a weak position with respect to Indian internal affairs but a successful anti-Communist campaign on the part of the UAR in the Near East would very much influence India. Syria for the present is safe from Communism but Iran is next on the list and then the Persian Gulf.

Mr. Amin described UAR relations with its neighbors as generally improving. Nasser considered that any change in Jordan would produce another Qasim and the UAR, therefore, wished King Hussein to remain on the throne. Nasser’s relations with King Saud were improving and the UAR hoped the incipient quarrel in the royal family would not serve to weaken the country. The UAR was not interfering and hoped royal Saudi differences would be composed. In the Sudan the British were working to sabotage US–Sudan relations. UAR–Lebanon relations were now very good and Egypt had convinced the Syrians to go along with Lebanese desires with respect to trade and transit questions. Amin indicated that Nasser believes the UK has influenced US policy with respect to Iraq. As a result the US may consider that Qasim is not a Communist and that UAR pressure is responsible for the current situation. This is false. Qasim is increasingly under Communist control and in any case was a Communist Party member before the July 1958 revolt. President Nasser was, nevertheless thinking of halting attacks against Qasim in order to demonstrate the fallacy of the British position.

Mr. Rountree expressed appreciation for the foregoing survey and said that there was very little with which he would take issue. Soviet objectives were clear and both the US and the UAR understood what they were. There was now more general recognition throughout the world as to real Soviet aims as a result of the Iraq and Tibet situations. We are concerned regarding the Iraqi situation and believe the UK is also. However, some believe Qasim is not a Communist and may seek to follow an independent neutral policy. The question, therefore, arose as to whether it might not be better to emphasize attacks against Communism rather than Qasim personally. We understood from Ambassador Hare that the UAR campaign was moving in this direction. While it might not work, we were not out of sympathy with this development. Regarding UAR relations with its neighbors, Mr. Rountree emphasized that all Arab regimes were equally concerned regarding the Communist danger and we thought their relations with the UAR had all improved. The Saudi economic situation was better. We sincerely hoped that good relations would be established between the Sudan and the UAR and a solution found for the Nile Waters problem. It was difficult to assist the Sudanese on their major hydro-electric projects without such an agreement. We had good relations with the Sudan Government and had no reason to suspect the existence of a British program to undermine Sudan–UAR relations. We believed it was in the general interest as well as that of the Arabs that no explosion should occur in Jordan. Amin expressed agreement. Mr. Rountree continued by expressing the hope that Jordan–UAR relations would gradually improve. King Hussein’s visit to the US had gone well except for two instances when he had made statements critical of the UAR which we had considered unwise. We had had no advance word and had been able to do nothing to prevent these remarks. Amin commented that they had not been given publicity in Cairo. Mr. Rountree replied that this reaction had been very wise.

In conclusion, Mr. Rountree emphasized that we hoped Mr. Amin would leave the US with the conviction that we were sincere in our efforts to improve US–UAR relations and earnestly desired to be helpful where we could with respect to the UAR’s economic problems. We were convinced that the continuation of an effective anti-Communist campaign was essential for the security of the Middle East but would not wish to embarrass the UAR by endorsing this campaign publicly. Without injecting ourselves directly, we hoped that relations could be improved among the various Arab states and very much supported indications we had seen that UAR relations were somewhat improving with Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunis and Libya. If these countries considered UAR policy within their borders as adverse to their interests then no real rapprochement was possible but it was to be hoped they would have no ground for such conclusion.

Mr. Amin mentioned his publication of the story on the Communist take-over in Hungary. His firm had done this using Russian newsprint and 150,000 copies had been sold in four days out of an initial printing of 300,000 copies. He had also published a four page supplement to a recent issue of his newspaper on Tibet. A book on Tibet had not been possible, however, due to the newsprint shortage. Ambassador Hare had commented that if the US had spent 1 billion pounds we would not have had as good an effect as the publication of these items. The UAR desired newsprint from the West on which the UAR would print, at UAR expense, what we would like to have them say regarding Communism. Newsprint was the first crisis which faced the UAR as the result of its anti-Communist campaign. Favorable US action on this matter would give Nasser hope for the future. Delay would convey a bad impression. Mr. Rountree said he would see what could be done.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/4–3059. Secret. Drafted by Brewer and approved by Rountree. In a briefing memorandum to Rountree, April 30, Rockwell noted that Amin was a confidant of President Nasser, who had been sent to the United States “to communicate Egyptian dissatisfaction at what is regarded as ineffective US support of the UAR in its current anti-Communist campaign and to seek assurances, including if possible commitments for aid on specific projects, that the US is not seeking to undermine Nasser or to withhold support from the UAR with respect to the Iraq situation.” (Ibid., 986B.62/4–3059)
2. See Document 236.
3. Memoranda of Amin’s conversations with Henderson, Murphy, and Dillon on May 1 are in Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/5–159 (the first two) and 886B.392/5–159. In these conversations, Amin made the same points which he had made to Rountree and received similar replies.