Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

235. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State¹

Cairo, April 1, 1959—6 p.m.

2875. Paris for USRO, Rome for Lister. On several occasions during past year (Embtels 2028, February 10, 1958; 2746, April 16; 893, September 20; 1011, October 2)² I undertook comment on area developments with special reference to position UAR in respect of Syria, Soviet Union and Iraq. In so doing, it was suggested that, as far as Syrian-Egyptian union concerned, there were prospective pluses and minuses but that on balance foreseeable immediate consequences were on plus side, bearing especially in mind pre-existent danger of extreme leftist take-over, and that experience might also have sobering influence on Nasser. Re Soviets, extensive inroads in both regions of UAR were stressed but at same time it was pointed out that currently common objective of Soviets and Arab nationalists was not inherently lasting and that some reasonable development of Arab nationalism might well turn out to be stabilizing factor in area. Re Iraq, comment was confined to opining July 14, 1958 might well mark zenith of Nasser’s ascendancy and to suggesting that, due quick-silver-like nature of situation, policy of “alert inactivity” would seem be in order. Re American policy in general, observation was made that, for various reasons many of which beyond our control, our past efforts had failed produce desired results and that it would be preferable adopt more pragmatic approach of concentration on realizable projects in anticipation at least partial attainment our ultimate objectives by process of accretion as contrasted with overly-ambitious efforts to blueprint unrealistic master plans. Re policy in respect USSR in UAR and Near East, it was recommended our approach should take form of “competing without competing”, i.e., to be most active in fields where our capability greater than Soviet and avoid head-on conflict in areas where Soviets at advantage. Re Nasser, account was taken of fact that we simply were tuned to different wave-lengths but that we might find certain areas of agreement and that, relatively speaking, Nasser with all his asperities might prove preferable to others who could be expected take over in event his overthrow.

Now, taking retrospective glance at developments in area in past year, it might be described as period of somewhat accelerated normalization, on understanding that normality is relative to time and circumstance and that it is always necessary distinguish between short and long term. Within this concept, Lebanon with its somewhat more middle-of-road government following period of civil war, Syria with its whirlwind marriage with Egypt following its leftist scare, Saudi Arabia with Faisal playing more important role following an internal shakeup, Sudan with its coup d’etat, and Iraq with its revolution were all normal developments in sense that, without regard their merits or demerits, they were in accord current trends; only Jordan, itself an anomaly, reminded outwardly unaffected but thanks largely to outside support and Israel, as usual, remained in sullen isolation.

To certain extent this trend toward normality might be seen, and correctly so, as detrimental to the position of the West and favorable to Arab nationalism championed by Nasser but it would be mistake accept this without qualification for two reasons. In first place it has long been in nature of things in this area that certain vestiges of Western domination or influence had to be eradicated before any real hope could be entertained for developing new relationships better adapted to all situations and exigencies. Naturally this is irksome process to us when, despite our best efforts, we are castigated on charges of guilt by association and patience is further strained when much of hue and cry is directed to no longer existing servitudes in much same way that, according medical theory of “phantom limb”, certain persons continue have illusion of suffering pain from previously amputated members. But it was always inevitable that, much as we would like to have had it otherwise, this is type of situation which had to get worse before it could get better although converse not necessarily true that mere getting worse guarantee of better things to come.

In second place, while not wishing in any way minimize troubles that Nasser has caused and is still capable of fomenting, it is submitted that distinction should always be drawn between Nasser in phases of anticipation as contrasted with realization. In anticipation he is like man who comes into restaurant and boisterously orders everything on menu but who, when served, eats with moderation. This is pattern of revolution in Egypt, of union with Syria and, to extent it has any significance, of new relationship with Yemen, not to mention discretion he has shown thus far re new regimes in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Sudan. This does not mean that meekly throwing offerings to Nasser is indicated way of keeping him quiet but it does mean that exaggerated ideas can be created regarding practical consequences of his aims or actions.

This brings us to question of Nasser and Iraq, which is piece de resistance on political bill of fare these days. Of course, there no question but that Nasser welcomed July 14 revolution and that he looked to it as being important step toward greater Arab union of some kind with himself as leading might but very much to be doubted that, with his troubles in Syria so much to fore, he ever had any serious thought of actually imposing his will on unwilling Iraqi people. However, there was big difference between this and situation where Iraqis, or at least Kassem, decided play lone game and thus not only thwart such personal ambition as Nasser may have had but also violate dogma to which Nasser dedicated for reasons going beyond merely personal, i.e., concept of indivisibility of Arab policy in international context. In saying this I realize there are many who think of Nasser as mere Johnny-come-lately opportunist and he himself repeatedly contributes to that impression when he says: “I never act; I just react”. However, this is only one side of Nasser’s complex nature; other he is person with certain fixed ideas or principles which permit him with equal truthfulness to say, as he often does: “I have always had same ideas. Read my speeches from beginning and you will see I am still saying same things”. In sum, Nasser is opportunist but with principles, if not especially apparent scruples.

But this only serves partly explain degree to which Nasser has become so wrought up, at least for time being. Other and transcending reason is undisguised Soviet support of Communists and Kassem in Iraq. In past Nasser has consistently maintained he opposed Communism in principle because it atheistic and subversive, saying he could not condone first and would not condone second (Embtel 2307).³ However, he always maintained that distinction should be drawn between Soviet policy per se and Communist movement and gave Soviets credit for being too smart to interfere internally in Arab countries. In fact he has on several past occasions and with ostensibly friendly intent, gone so far as suggest USG might take leaf from Soviet book in dealing with Arabs. However, he has always maintained that, if Soviets deviated from policy of non-interference, he would attack them as vigorously as he had West for alleged imperialism. To many this was regarded as mere rhetorical exercise since it was maintained Nasser had become so enmeshed with Soviets that he would not have courage stand up to them, but, now that Soviets have done what he had predicted they would not do, Nasser has been as good as his word and has even gone much further than in his past attacks on West in sense that he has personally assumed responsibility for spearheading campaign whereas attacks on West were largely delegated to others, especially press and radio. Case where Nasser now riding ahead of hounds rather than urging them on from rear. Furthermore, present campaign both wider and deeper than before as evidenced by marshalling Moslem and Christian clergy, cooperatives, students, et cetera, in fray. In fact, to give devil his due, must be recognized that Nasser has dealt body blows to both Communists and Soviets recently which West, with all its psychological warfare potential, could not equal and fact that motivation may have been complex and different from our own does not detract from further fact that we have received unexpected assistance in unmasking designs of Soviet-inspired Communism.

However, all this should be kept in perspective. While I agree with prevailing opinion here, even in anti-regime circles, that wounds have been inflicted which will inevitably leave scars (just as in our own relations with UAR) and even possible that Soviets may actually be changing policy line re this area, seems possible, even probable, that Soviet bear may adopt big dog attitude and work back toward situation which will make possible continued UAR-Soviet cooperation, once Nasser has blown himself out. Also should be understood that difficulty with Soviets will not necessarily have effect of basically changing UAR attitude toward West. To be expected, of course, that Nasser will be taking few looks over his shoulder to see how we are reacting and we already have had feelers suggesting appropriate time unloosen our purse-strings but there is no doubt that prevailing mood is maintain position non-alignment. In fact, I would venture purely personal view that, despite vulnerability of position in which Nasser finds himself, there is probably enough of “dead-end kid” in him somewhat to relish idea of having told off both West and East regardless of consequences.

Following are suggestions drawn from foregoing:

1) To extent that past evaluations of Arab nationalist movement have tended stress undesirable tendency toward extremism, we now have case where impetuousness of movement can be diverted to useful purpose. Same comment also applies Nasser himself. In other words extremism can on occasion have usefulness which benign approach normally advocated by us could not have and must now be admitted that Arab contention that Arab nationalism best defense against Communism has certain validity. As old Persian proverb goes, “it takes Mazanderan dog to catch Mazanderan jackal”.

2) Fact that we can never expect to develop policy synchronized to extent and frequency of Nasser’s oscillations does not mean that there are not points at which far more modulated policy curves can intersect his and fact that synchronization cannot be complete should not inhibit us from doing what is practicable.

3) Fact that UAR pendulum may be swinging back somewhat from far-left position should not lead us to set up new standard of judgment. Initial, if pardonable, mistake which we made in evaluating regime here was to judge its position according unrealistic ideal of full cooperation with West whereas true guide should always have been maintenance true neutrality. There is always danger that as pendulum moves toward us we may subconsciously move point of judgment with it.

4) More realistic and less obvious policy which we have been following in Near East during last year or so has been dividends and should be maintained, on understanding, however, that it is not a passive policy but on contrary policy of assiduously pursuing what is attainable and seeking build up to cumulative position by accumulative approach.

5) Due Nasser’s complex motivations it is obviously impossible cooperate on basis identity of interest. Preferable policy in circumstances would be “cooperate without commitment”, which is what being done on modest scale now and is consonant with objective of seeking more normal relations.

6) Although Nasser, of course, interested in bringing Iraq back into fold of which he is shepherd, I agree entirely with Consulate General Damascus that Syria is his more immediate concern. To lose out in Iraq would be discomfiting; to do so in Syria would be disastrous. Hence, any assistance we might be able lend in Syria could be especially significant to Nasser as well as have possible attractions to us since anomalous that this literally key region is only one in Near East where we are not active in some way. This is matter which now under discussion between Embassy and Consulate General Damascus with view submission recommendations to Department.

7) As far as Iraq itself concerned it has obviously been advisable remain aloof from Kassem–Nasser squabble on ground situation in Iraq so difficult evaluate and best general policy in any event to stay out of Arab disputes. However, both these considerations may have decreasing validity as problem becomes less inter-Arab and more UAR-Arab nationalist versus Soviet-supported Communists and also as facts of situation in Iraq seem increasingly indicate Kassem reaching point of no return (Baghdad’s 2758).⁴ In light such revised judgment we may possibly find hitherto sound policy of aloofness should be reconsidered, even to point of actively supporting Nasser with all his complexes and faults if alternative is not only Communist-controlled Iraq but exploitation of such situation for further Soviet penetration of Near East. Perhaps necessity such decision not yet upon us but might be advisable be giving it precautionary thought.

8) Regarding Egypt itself we are fortunately in position of having year ago initiated policy of normalization relations and respectable progress has been made not only in building up record of actions speaking louder than words but also of gradually creating feeling of greater confidence that we sincere in seeking normalize relations and that we would not take advantage of Nasser in event he should find himself in trouble as result standing up to Communists or Soviets. In fact, difficult believe Nasser would have taken his present stand unless he had been reasonably confident in this respect. In circumstances unnecessary indulge in frantic realignment of our policy; all necessary do is maintain same general line while opening or closing throttle in accordance circumstances. Related to present situation, believe this clearly time for opening throttle somewhat as in fact we have done in re certain recent decisions and are considering in respect others. In doing so, we need not and should not go to excess and in particular it would obviously be unrealistic give blanket assurance that we would automatically pick up where Soviets might decide leave off. However, it would nevertheless seem highly desirable take prompt action in some area which would have greatest impact as related present situation. Assistance on cotton would, of course, be master stroke but, recognizing difficulty acting quickly in this field if in fact possible do anything important at all, it is believed that some significant action in respect Syria would be helpful, as would also sizeable assistance in PL 480 field. All these are items which have recently been brought to attention Department either on Embassy or UAR initiative and which presumably under consideration.

9) Regarding neighboring countries, would seem this might be time when, with his other preoccupations, Nasser would be more than usually amenable to little fence-mending. In this context Chehab meeting with Nasser would seem moderately encouraging whereas King Hussein’s public position in US would seem regrettably inept.⁵

10) Similarly, anti-Communist campaign has given minorities here such as copts opportunity to rally around and get in on nationalist act. Importance of this should not be exaggerated but may serve temporarily attenuate anti-minority trend.

11) As regards treatment by US publicity media, believe essentially impartial line followed so far has been correct and that worst thing we could do, other than follow line of “I told you so” would be come out with thumping endorsement of Nasser which would provide ammunition for charges that Nasser mere “imperialist stooge”. However, fact that Nasser actually attacking our number one enemy as distinct from mere feuding between Nasser and Kassem would seem indicate desirability putting greater emphasis on former while maintaining ostensibly dead-pan approach.

12) Question public official position in form press conferences, public statements, et cetera, falls within general scope preceding paragraph but obviously more delicate and line followed thus far of keeping comment to minimum believed wise. However, might be advisable reconsider if present trend toward sharper delineation of conflict should continue. But not believed this point yet reached and therefore preferable substantive endorsement should at this time be by non-official sources, e.g., by inspired editorials (Embassy telegram 2775).⁶ We also intrigued by possibility something might be done by prominent Catholic figure as mentioned Beirut’s 3881 and 3912.⁷

13) Believe we should also consider possibility of confidential message to Nasser from high American official source, presumably President. Of course, Nasser puts up bold front in maintaining he wants fight battle alone but believe reassuring word from President at this time would buck him up no end. Such message would not need go very far; something along first paragraph Embassy telegram 2824⁸ confined entirely to stand against Soviet inspired Communism might be sufficient as to content and could be oral in form, reserving for possible future consideration some more formal communication.

14) Naturally desirable that whatever we do should be coordinated to extent possible with friendly governments but, in view special interests or fixed ideas which naturally govern thinking of others, do not feel we should be unduly inhibited by failure receive unanimous endorsement of line which after careful considerations we may decide best follow.

Although I realize I have grossly transgressed rule of brevity in this message, foregoing does not pretend be anything more than random thoughts which come to mind in connection recent developments. There are many points not covered and some only partially so. As consequence I realize other missions in area will doubtless have other ideas and/or criticisms.⁹

Hare

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 686B.00/4–159. Secret. Repeated to London, Rome, Paris, Moscow, Ankara, Tel Aviv, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Benghazi, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, and Tripoli.
2. Telegrams 2028 and 2746 are printed as Documents 194 and 203. Telegram 893 is in Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/9–2058. Telegram 1011 is ibid., 780.00/10–258.
3. Telegram 2307, February 6, reported on Hare’s conversation with Nasser on February 5, which was mainly concerned with the Soviet Union and Communism. (Ibid., 611.86B/2–659)
4. Telegram 2758, March 26, reported on the situation in Iraq. (Ibid., 787.00/3–2659)
5. Chehab and Nasser met on March 25; King Hussein visited the United States March 17–April 17.
6. Telegram 2775, March 25, noted that the relations between Iraq and the UAR seemed too fluid at that stage to initiate a new U.S. policy. (Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/3–2559)
7. Telegram 3881, March 24, has not been found. Telegram 3912, March 25, reported on a conversation with Cardinal Agaganian who was in Beirut for Easter. (Ibid., 686B.87/3–2559)
8. Telegram 2824, March 28, reported that UAR anti-Communist activities were not related to U.S.–UAR relations, but were part of longstanding principles. (Ibid., 611.86B/3–2859)
9. On April 8, the Embassy in Beirut reported that it found this analysis “an excellent and lucid exposition” and supported the idea of a high-level message to Nasser. (Telegram 4082; ibid., 686B.00/4–859) Other comments on this telegram are ibid., 686B.00.