Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

230. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, December 23, 1958, 11:10 a.m.¹

Washington, December 23, 1958, 11:10 a.m.

OTHERS PRESENT

• Vice President Nixon
• Secretary Herter
• Secretary Rountree
• Major Eisenhower

Mr. Rountree stated that he had withheld some of the details of his conference with Nasser when he made his presentation in the National Security Council meeting² because of the sensitive nature of these details. He found the talk encouraging and brought out the following points:

(a) Nasser is showing a real concern over Communist penetration of the Middle East.

(b) The first forty-five minutes were devoted to a recitation of Nasser’s views of past errors of the U.S. in dealing with the nations of the Middle East, but also in this recitation, he gave recognition to things we had done in the past in an effort to help.

(c) Nasser had been extremely impressed with our promptness in responding to his request for P.L. 480 wheat. Apparently the project had been approved in principle by the Department of State within twenty-four hours of issuance of the request.

(d) Nasser desires to work with us on Iraq. He is much concerned over Communist influence with Qasim and stated that Qasim refuses to talk with him.

(e) Mr. Rountree believes we can work with Nasser on the Iraqi situation. He cited a suggestion by Ambassador Hare in Egypt that Mr. Rountree send a telegram to Nasser expressing appreciation for this constructive talk, giving some recount of his experiences in Iraq, and indicating that he had reported results of his talk off the record to the President.³

The President then asked whether Nasser had implied that in return for this cooperation he would exact a price in terms of action against Israel. Mr. Rountree admitted that Nasser had mentioned this several times as a serious problem but had always put it aside without recommended action.

The President voiced the opinion that if it were not for the existence of Israel we might be able to do some business with Nasser in that Nasser could oppose Communists better than can the U.S. in the three-cornered struggle of the Middle East. He stated that Israel would unquestionably be restive in a situation in which we rendered open support to Nasser, but felt that possibly something could be worked out if Nasser would agree that we would ignore the Israeli problem.

[1 paragraph (2½ lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Rountree then turned to the subject of a union of Iraq with the UAR, which he considers highly unlikely. It is his opinion that Nasser has problems enough in Syria without taking on another country to direct. He then pointed out that there are three major groups in Iraq; first, the Communists; second, the Nationalists who are pro-Qasim; and third, the Nationalists who favor union with the UAR. He feels that our main effort should be to bring the two Nationalist groups together. This might be possible if Nasser were to specify that a union between UAR and Iraq is out of the question. This would force a redirection of pro-UAR Nationalists in Iraq.

At this point Secretary Herter observed that Nasser has been more moderate than the other Arabs recently as regards Israel. (He and the President took passing note of the exception to this in the recent air battles between the UAR and Israel.) He considers that there is a healthy element in the fact of an Arab strong man of such stature that he does not need to compete with other Arab countries in baiting the Israelis.

The President admitted that Nasser has grown up a little.

This comprised the end of the meeting; however, as Secretary Herter and Mr. Rountree were leaving the room, Mr. Nixon asked what had been Nasser’s views on the possibility of conciliation with Bourguiba. To this Mr. Rountree replied that Nasser is completely convinced that we have placed Bourguiba in his present spot to scuttle the Arab league. Nasser could not be budged from his belief that we had told Bourguiba to join the Arab league so he could destroy it.

John S. D. Eisenhower

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Diary Series. Top Secret. Drafted by John Eisenhower.
2. Rountree’s presentation to the National Security Council on December 23 is scheduled for publication in the compilation on Iraq in volume XII.
3. At 8:54 p.m., December 23, the Department transmitted a telegram along these lines to Cairo. (Telegram 1858; Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/12–1558) On December 26, Hare reported that he had delivered the message to Nasser on the previous day. Nasser expressed his appreciation and added that he had been “astonished” by the signing of the P.L. 480 agreement. (Telegram 1900 from Cairo; ibid., 611.86B/12–2658)