229. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State1
1797. Following is account essential points covered in almost three-hour conversation of Rountree with Nasser last night.2 I accompanied [Page 506] Rountree. Nasser was alone and we were subsequently informed he planned it that way since he desired to speak in utmost confidence.
Rountree opened conversation by outlining general nature his mission, identifying areas of agreement and disagreement, attempting dispel misunderstanding re certain issues, and enunciating sincere desire improve relations without deluding ourselves re obstacles. Stressed what we seeking is distinguishable progress toward improved relations; not thinking in terms miracles.
First part of Nasser’s response was replay of familiar record beginning with great expectations of free officers re what might be expected from us, recognition of certain periods when interests seemed coincide but general pattern of gradual deterioration of relations leading up to conviction that US basically hostile to UAR and that our motives could only be viewed with suspicion. Nasser also wove into recital story of his struggle with Communists in Egypt, saying (for first time my knowledge) that he had at early stage his career been approached by Communists who desired use him in order infiltrate officer group. At that time he had studied “all the books on the subject” but decided communism was not for him for three reasons:
- First, because he cherished his religion;
- Second, because he was repelled by brutal methods;
- Third, because he did not desire see his people liberated from one form of bondage only to be subjected to another. Nasser also told of the critical point in his struggle with Naguib when Communists were demonstrating against him (Nasser) and seemed on verge of taking over Cairo. Had Naguib taken advantage of situation he could have disposed of him then and there but he had avoided crisis by convincing Naguib that if he liquidated Nasser he himself would be next on Communist list.
Two other interesting, although incidental sidelights were Nasser’s explanation of recognition of Communist China and raising by Khrushchev of US–UAR relations at time Nasser’s Moscow visit. Re first, Nasser said he had had reliable intelligence reports from his own sources to effect that, at NATO conference in Paris,3 British and French Foreign Ministers and Secretary Dulles had agreed to plan by which Israel would receive Mystere Fighters valued at $10,000,000. Rountree set Nasser somewhat aback here by observing he himself had attended conference in question and that “facts” recounted by Nasser were definitely erroneous. Rountree also took this as occasion [Page 507] comment on danger of being taken in by so-called intelligence reports, indicating that he assumed that certain powers unfriendly to US might be very adept at planting such false reports.
Re his Khrushchev talk, Nasser said that Khrushchev had referred to my talk with Nasser shortly before he went to Moscow4 and said he understood we had offered new assistance. Nasser said he told Khrushchev nature of message I delivered was to effect USG could understand reasons of UAR remain neutral. In so saying Nasser had emphasized he did not consider that friendly relations with USSR should necessitate unfriendly relations with other countries. Furthermore, as far as assistance went, negotiations were in progress for extension credits by West Germany.
Nasser also took occasion to point out that, despite what some might say, he had remained steadfast to certain basic principles from time new regime took over. Essentially there were three: independence, dignity and Arab nationalism. In discussing independence, he stressed that this only partly political since basic element is desire of people to live better in comparison living standards in more advanced countries; this meant emphasis on development (to be noted that this is note which Nasser has particularly sounded recently). Re Arab nationalism, he took pains point out that idea of unity does not necessarily connote political union. That might take place where there is unanimity of opinion of peoples concerned but not essential. What is essential is that there should be Arab solidarity.
Bringing this part of conversation to conclusion, Nasser said necessary realistically view situation in which UAR finds itself. On one side there is Soviet Union which has played its cards very well and has responded unhesitatingly in giving material assistance and political support. On other side is West and especially US with which relations have been troubled and lack confidence developed. He had attempted indicate reasons why this so but at same time he wanted make clear that he thought difficulties with US not only to be deplored but efforts should be made remedy.
Assuming that foregoing was not unsatisfactory conclusion of talk, Rountree so indicated together with expression appreciation for frank appraisal of relations which Nasser had given but latter, saying that there was still “one more point” which he wished discuss, specifically introduced question of Iraq, a question which has been touched on several times in course conversation but not developed. Abandoning easy and confident manner of serious presentation and assuming apparently sincere attitude of very troubled man wrestling with problem possibly too big for him, Nasser told of camaraderie between UAR and Iraq in early days after July 14 revolution and of approaches [Page 508] by Iraqis re union which Nasser said he had discouraged as being premature. However, relations had subsequently deteriorated and efforts reach understanding had been unsuccessful. He had sent Sarraj talk to Kassem but latter would not talk in anything but generalities. Subsequently, he had sought arrange meet with Kassem himself but latter had begged off. Meanwhile Communists had become active and nationalists subjected attack. Situation had further been complicated by rumors circulated re UAR plot assassinate Kassem and British had played Communist game by bringing this report to Kassem’s attention.
Situation very serious because, if Communists gain control in Iraq, they will then be able move into Syria and Jordan and eventually into Egypt with result that “all we have built up and are planning to build would fall to Communists”. This would be real irony but problem is what to do. Nasser said that he had learned through experience how deal with Communists as internal problem but how do so in another country was quite different matter. However, American experience had been more extensive. Did we have any ideas? And, incidentally, what was our policy regarding Iraq anyway? Was it true that we and British were encouraging conflict between Kassem and himself? Rountree replied, “As far as we concerned, answer was categoric ‘no’”. We were following matter with interest but it had been our feeling so far that it fell into category of Arab problem for which Arabs themselves could be expected find solution. As far as British concerned, he had no reason believe their attitude at variance from ours.
Becoming even more specific Nasser said that, although inter-Arab relationship involved, this transcended by Communist threat which makes Iraq situation “common problem”. Furthermore, he wished make clear that, when he had talked in past of being opposed to imperialism and spheres of influence, there was no distinction in his mind as to source. Problem so far had been from West but, if Soviets attempted assert position in Arab countries he would oppose just as vigorously as he had done hitherto in respect West.
Conversation closed on this unusually forthright note. This morning Mustapha Amin sent by Nasser to see Rountree and say he had tried be frank, perhaps to point indiscretion, but he had been impressed by Rountree’s objective approach and had done best reciprocate. Furthermore, this was new and decisive situation where maximum understanding necessary. As consequence he felt conversation had been very important but wished express hope it could be kept strictly confidential since he had gone very far. Amin asked if Rountree could indicate his own reaction to talk for information of Nasser who anxious know what effect his remarks had made.
Rountree said could say he had found conversation interesting, frank and helpful, and could give assurance it would be considered seriously not only as something of moment but of continuing significance. [Page 509] He was confident that degree to which we can identify areas of agreement should lead to more hopeful developments in future. As he had said before we not expecting miracles but do welcome every opportunity move forward in areas mutual interest.
This telegram cleared in draft by Secretary Rountree.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/12–1558. Top Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.↩
- Rountree visited the Middle East beginning December 8. In addition to the conversation with Nasser described here, he also talked with Fawzi, Ali, and Zulfiqar Sabri. Memoranda of these conversations are ibid., 110.15–RO/12–1358. A summary of the conversations was transmitted in telegram 1786 from Cairo, December 14. (Ibid., 611.86B/12–1458) Documentation on the trip is scheduled for publication in volume XII.↩
- The reference is presumably to the NATO Ministerial meeting, held at Paris December 16–18. Rountree did not attend.↩
- See Document 205.↩