226. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State1
1435. [Here follows the beginning of the telegram.] Points covered were our general disposition toward UAR, our attitude toward Arab Union and Arab League, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Bakdash, Sudan, Tunis, Far East, Egyptian press and radio and situation re US–UAR relations.
I shall not attempt report substance this presentation, which in any event, based largely on Departmental material and in line recent discussion in Washington and New York with Ambassador Kamel and Foreign Minister Fawzi. I should perhaps report, however, that I did bear down rather hard in question our relations. I told Nasser [I] did not wish seem like old lady whose greatest pleasure was talk of her aches and pains; in fact I was heartily tired of perpetually talking about “our relations”. But this was not question of personal likes or dislikes but of serious business of international relations and I would be less than frank if I did not say that I had recently seemed to sense an intangible something in atmosphere which raised question whether, despite efforts made improve relations, we might not actually be heading in opposite direction. Thus I was used to violent reaction of Cairo press and radio but deliberate way in which apparently conscious effort recently made distort facts, malign motives and fabricate charges was strange phenomenon. Was it possible I was placing overly black interpretation situation or was there in fact some new element therein?
Nasser listened intently throughout presentation and it was obvious that device of quoting from thick sheaf of documents had effect. Following were his reactions in order in which he gave them.
[Here follow paragraphs 1–6.]
[Page 499]7. Relations with US: Nasser said he still felt basic problem in relations with US was lack assurance we would not take advantage difficulty in which he might find himself to stab him in back. In fact he sometimes felt he was mistrusted by US more than Communist because we regarded him as being opposed to our interests. He wasn’t asking anything of US except assurance he could feel secure and did not have deal with hostile USG.
I observed very difficult understand this point of view in light of our reiterated assurances, which I had just been authorized repeat to him, and also various steps we had taken improve relations. Furthermore, would be inconceivable that we, with our well-known attitude re Communism, would dream of taking advantage of possible Nasser difficulty with Communists in order attack him. It just did not make sense. It seemed to me Nasser was making serious mistake in continuing base his conclusions re our motives on unfriendly press articles (he had referred this repeatedly), chance remarks and alleged documentation re past events and situations, as contrasted with our actual policy which is based on realities of existing situation and which had been fully explained to him. To do so was to make white black and black white for no good reason. Was there anything he could suggest which would help clarify? Nasser said time would help and recalled how he had stressed improved relations with US as well as USSR on return from Moscow.
I said this wasn’t getting us very far and wished ask two questions. First was what was his candid opinion as to whether our relations improving, deteriorating or staying about the same. Nasser took long time to reply but finally said he had assumed we had been working against him in Arab League and Sudan but that, with Lebanese problem resolved, things now easing. However future obscure and important factor is not just what we do but what done by our British and French allies.
I then put second question which was what, supposing Nasser were in my place, he would write as conclusion to be deduced from our talk. Again Nasser took long time to think and then replied difficult reply to question as posed but there is basic trouble because USG appears see Israel as friendly and UAR as hostile. We treat Israel like Soviets treat UAR and he then gave long enumeration of aid given by US to Israel but making clear this not plea for aid to UAR.
After another pause, he then recalled he had once before suggested best thing would be to forget past and turn new page, and that is what he would again suggest. I said recalled but also remembered I had drawn blank when I had asked what we should write on new page. Did Nasser now have any suggestions? Another long pause and [Page 500] then Nasser replied better say nothing at all than something bad and better say something good than nothing. After that could see what might be written on other pages.
Here conversation ended except for Nasser’s remark on taking leave that he was glad we had met and he had found conversation “very useful”.
I have seen Nasser in his black and bouyant moods but this was one of his most baffling performances. On one hand he was obviously interested in various items information passed on to him, was forthcoming in furnishing information himself and seemed eager discuss problems but, on other hand, he was intent on perpetuating old suspicions and unjustifiably laying his troubles, especially re Communists, at our door. As consequence, depending on aspects of conversation chosen, conflicting conclusions might be drawn and would perhaps be justified because I had impression of talking with very confused frustrated and worried man. However, strongest impression I gained was that, despite much talk re Iraq and Nile Waters which clearly subjects much concern to him, his principal preoccupation was Israel and especially recent reports arms assistance to it by West coupled with speculation possible Israeli action in event something happens in Jordan since this raises nightmare of renewed great power intervention in area. This in turn raises question whether, faced with this problem, Nasser may have gone further in his dealings with Soviets than is now apparent. This may be, and I hope is, unduly alarmist speculation but somehow I cannot escape uncomfortable feeling that there is some new element in situation which bodes no good.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/11–758. Secret; Noforn Except as Authorized by Department. Repeated to Beirut, Amman, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Ankara, Khartoum, Tunis, London, Addis Ababa, Damascus, and Moscow.↩