225. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Arab Republic1
1215. Rountree met with Fawzi evening October 24 prior latter’s return Cairo. Fawzi seemed appreciate fact visit to New York solely for this purpose. In general review situation, Fawzi expressed view situation in Middle East somewhat improved and seemed to feel there had been some improvement US/UAR relations although he recognized there were very difficult problems. He urged US understand that UAR recognized two essential points: 1) that economies of Arab states depended upon business with West; and 2) social systems in Arab states were incompatible with communism or domination by Soviet Union. As he put it, these were very strong cards in our hands and neither of us should be too concerned when other “bad cards” were played. There were nevertheless several matters which caused him particular concern. Western, and particularly US, support for French in Algeria and refusal recognize legitimate aspirations of Algerian people for independence were becoming even more serious obstacles in relations with Arab states. Unless some gesture should be made in near future [Page 496] consequences could be serious. He did not expect that ideal solution could be achieved in near future but expressed hope at least some progress could be made re Algeria and “we could work from there.”
In referring to UAR/Tunisian problems it was clear Fawzi gave credence to report US had encouraged Bourguiba’s actions in Arab League and in breaking relations with UAR. He related this and alleged US/UK/French actions in other area countries to UAR concern that Western allies stepping up program of encirclement UAR by unfriendly governments. This connection he mentioned encouragement of Khalil in Sudan toward unfriendly attitude vis-à-vis UAR, and reports of large-scale military assistance to Israel at time when Israel seemed be contemplating military action against West Bank of Jordan and Jerusalem. He discreetly mentioned US military mission to Jordan with implication this might be for purposes inimical to UAR interests.
On other hand Fawzi expressed pleasure that US and UK forces being withdrawn from Lebanon and Jordan and stated situation in Lebanon seemed much improved. He expressed hope that Jordan would remain quiet after UK withdrawal. He was also pleased at various actions US had taken in UAR such as renewal CARE and EARIS programs and leasing of Essayons.
For his part, Rountree restated US policies and attitudes toward UAR along lines previous communications with Embassy. He expressed regret that general tenor UAR propaganda including official statements such as Amer’s in Moscow on various international questions give impression UAR does not even try to follow neutral policy so often proclaimed by UAR officials. He reviewed measures which we had taken in effort improve relations with UAR and said unfortunately we did not feel that these had been matched by efforts on part of UAR. Perhaps this due in some part to effectiveness of our adversaries in convincing UAR officials that US actions were being taken against UAR legitimate interests. For example reports that US had encouraged Bourguiba to act as he did with respect to Arab League and UAR relations were totally without foundation. He said he could give Fawzi his solemn assurance that US had not suggested any such action by Bourguiba, yet he had no doubt that some UAR officials, and perhaps Fawzi, earnestly believed to the contrary. He expressed belief that DeGaulle would seek to make progress in Algeria and reviewed again reasons why US could not take more positive position with respect to Algerian independence. He explained purpose of our military mission to Jordan and when he mentioned mission would be there only for few weeks, Fawzi seemed reassured. Replying to Fawzi’s comments concerning a possible Israeli attempt to take West Bank in Jerusalem, he said US had no reason to believe Israeli were planning aggression. US attitude with respect to aggressive action on the part of any state in Near East had been made clear. It had not [Page 497] changed since Suez. Fawzi complained about US–UK and French supply of arms to Israel and stated this would inevitably result in Arab states’ obtaining additional arms from Soviet Union, using economic resources which they could ill afford. Arabs could not understand why US would not take leadership in dissuading countries from supplying arms to Israel. It was totally wrong in his view for Israel, a country of 2 million, to be permitted to match armaments of all Arab states. Rountree replied US had of course always been strongly opposed to arms race in area and was not itself contributing to such a race. Despite Cairo reports to contrary, US had not supplied and was not supplying substantial arms to Israel. It would be extremely difficult however to sell world opinion on idea that Israel should not be entitled to buy any armaments whatsoever from those countries willing to supply at a time when Arab states and particularly UAR were obtaining vast quantities. We would like nothing better than an end to arms race but it appeared unrealistic to think one side or the other could be only one deprived of arms purchase.
Surprisingly Fawzi referred to recent article in Time which reported clandestine radio broadcast allegedly from UAR which was insulting to President Eisenhower and then in return insulted President Nasser. He complained this not conducive to improved relations. Rountree agreed it not profitable to return insult for insult but thought Fawzi must recognize having been in the US for many years that USG did not control press. This was unlike situation in UAR where press and radio were controlled, and statements therefore had direct relation to Government. While Fawzi denied there existed in UAR clandestine radio which carried insulting comments concerning President Eisenhower, Rountree told him in all frankness that whether this were true or not we honestly believed it was true and that clandestine radio was located in Syria. We further believed rightly or wrongly that UAR Government could cause it to cease operation if it wished to do so and Rountree thought it would be very helpful move indeed if broadcasts of this kind should cease. Fawzi replied simply that “In such large area it is possible that some people do things that we don’t like, and we shall have to do the best we can.”
Rountree referred to Secretary’s conversation with Fawzi during Special UN Assembly in which they had discussed future of Jordan. He asked Fawzi if he had any further comment in that regard. Fawzi replied he had appreciated frank talk with Secretary and had found it most useful. He continued to hope that whatever changes must come about in Jordan could be achieved peacefully. There was no hurry. Certainly, UAR did not want to take over Jordan; for one reason it did not have financial resources to replace US subsidy. Rountree reiterated [Page 498] our hope that situation in Jordan would remain quiet and that any adjustments which might be necessary could be achieved in tranquil atmosphere.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/10–2858. Secret. Drafted, approved, and signed for Dulles by Rountree. Pouched to Damascus, Algiers, Baghdad, Amman, Beirut, Khartoum, Tunis, Rabat, Jidda, Paris, London, Tel Aviv, Tripoli, and Rome.↩