221. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the United Arab Republic Ambassador (Kamel) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Rountree), Department of State, Washington, October 8, 19581
SUBJECT
- US–UAR Relations (with specific topics as noted)
Significance of Arab Petroleum Conference. Dr. Kamel referred to the prospective Arab League oil conference in Cairo and said that he had understood that the Department might be somewhat concerned at the objectives and outcome of this meeting. For this reason he had personally written Cairo to express the hope that the conference would not prove inimical to US interests in the area. He had now been instructed to inform the Department officially with respect to this conference that: (a) the UAR harbors no anti-Western intentions with respect to Western interests in Arab oil; (b) the question of inviting presidents of international oil companies to the Cairo meeting was now under study; and (c) there was in any event nothing to prevent these oil officials from attending the exposition as private visitors. Mr. Rountree expressed appreciation for the Ambassador’s interest in this question and said that he welcomed these assurances from the UAR Government.
US–UAR Relations and US Attitude Toward Arab Nationalism. Dr. Kamel said that he would like to refer to reports he had heard that certain Middle Eastern countries (he later indicated that these were the non-Arab members of the Baghdad Pact) were attempting to induce the US to abandon its efforts to normalize relations with the UAR. It had even been said that this pressure had led the NSC to defer consideration of a proposed new policy toward the Arab countries. Dr. Kamel said that he had not reported this information to his government pending clarification from the Department.
Mr. Rountree replied that he was unable to guess what might be the origin of such stories. The NSC periodically reviewed US policies throughout the world but no review with respect to the US policy toward the UAR had been either delayed, postponed or otherwise influenced as the result of pressure from other countries. Indeed, the US wish to improve relations continued and we had taken certain steps as an earnest of this desire. No protests had been made to us by countries in the area concerning this policy. Ambassador Kamel [Page 482] thanked Mr. Rountree for this clear statement and said that he would report it to Cairo. He continued, however, that, in order to foster mutual confidence, the US should not only seek to improve its own relations with the UAR but should also convey to its “allies”, such as the Sudan, Libya and the UK, the suggestion that these countries avoid measures which would complicate their relations with the UAR. He understood that certain Western countries, not including the US, were seeking to cause trouble between the UAR and its neighbors. However much the US might wish it, the US could not be disassociated from any such Western efforts and we should therefore seek to dissuade our friends from such activities.
Western Military Assistance to Israel. In the same vein, Ambassador Kamel continued that Arabs would consider that the US had no influence on its partners if the UK and France were to continue extending arms assistance to Israel. If several months could elapse without any such arms shipments, calm would return to the area and our mutual efforts to improve US-Arab relations would prosper. Mr. Rountree replied that it was indeed in the general interest that the UAR enjoy good relations with its neighbors. The US was certainly not involved in any attempt to stimulate bad relations between these states and the UAR. With respect to Western military aid to Israel, the US had never been a major supplier and our attitude on this question remains as previously outlined to Dr. Kamel. It was, however, difficult to imagine a situation in which traditional Western suppliers of arms to Israel would suspend such shipments, even should the US so suggest, as long as substantial quantities of Soviet bloc arms were being received by the UAR and other Arab states. While any one-sided boycott of this type would be impractical, we had this general problem very much in mind. In response to Mr. Rountree’s observation that the Israeli situation now appeared relatively quiet, Dr. Kamel interjected that it was precisely for this reason that the Arabs questioned the need for additional Western arms to be furnished Israel. He emphasized that US-Arab relations could not develop as the UAR would like if the US assumed a friendly posture towards the Arabs but its allies assumed a contrary position. In this case, the Arabs would accuse the US of either duplicity or weakness. The homogeneous policy being carried on by the Soviet bloc with respect to the Arab countries was in favorable contrast, in Dr. Kamel’s opinion, to the divergent Near Eastern policies frequently followed by the Western allies.
UAR-Controlled Radio Propaganda. Reiterating that he had seen reports that certain groups, in addition to Zionist organizations, were working in the US to block the improvement of US–UAR relations, Dr. Kamel referred to the juxtaposition in the October 8 New York Times of an article from London, reporting a stepped-up anti-American campaign by UAR-controlled radio stations, and a report of Dr. Fawzi’s [Page 483] UNGA speech in which the Foreign Minister indicated that some curtailment of extreme broadcasts was taking place. Dr. Kamel said he had been particularly upset by the nasty references to President Eisenhower, quoted in the Times, which had apparently been made by the Jordan People’s Radio and asserted that he questioned whether the UAR Government knew anything about this station. Mr. Rountree replied that the Times article had also caused us concern. Although we had not observed any noticeable increase in the anti-American propaganda of the Cairo press or radio, we feared that the article might reflect a new UAR decision to resume a bitter anti-American campaign.
Ambassador Kamel took notes of Mr. Rountree’s statement that we understood the Jordan People’s Radio operated clandestinely from Syria and said that he would urgently request the UAR authorities to investigate this station. He said that he could assure Mr. Rountree categorically that the UAR Government had nothing to do with such broadcasts. He and his staff here had concluded only last night that the Egyptian press had in recent weeks been more moderate with respect to the West than at any previous period. He therefore wondered why the Times story had been filed from London at this particular time.
US Announcement Regarding Troop Withdrawal from Lebanon. Mr. Rountree informed Dr. Kamel that the US had just announced its decision to withdraw its forces from Lebanon and handed the Ambassador a copy of the Department’s press release.2 He expressed the hope that this announcement, coupled with the recent similar statement regarding British withdrawal from Jordan, would permit the full implementation of the Arab-sponsored UNGA resolution,3 notably with respect to relations between area states on such specific problems as freedom of land and air transit to and from Jordan. It was hoped that our announcement might be used by the Arab countries as a point of departure for their own efforts. Ambassador Kamel expressed appreciation for the announcement and commented that his government had been skeptical regarding US intentions to withdraw despite his reports from Washington. He observed that the announcement would serve to give the Cairo authorities increasing confidence in his opinions regarding US policy. Mr. Rountree emphasized that withdrawal had always been the US intention.
Dr. Kamel said that his press officer had informed him that Admiral Brown, retiring Sixth Fleet Commander, had said at a press conference on October 7 that he believed emphatically that trouble would [Page 484] recur in the Middle East after the Far Eastern crisis had subsided. The Ambassador asked what Admiral Brown might have had in mind. Mr. Rountree replied that he was unaware of any such press conference and that he could only assume that the Admiral was reflecting the widely held belief that the Soviets, when thwarted in one area, generally resume their probing operations somewhere else.
Iraq Situation. In response to a specific query from Dr. Kamel, Mr. Rountree said that the Department did not have too much information on the current situation in Iraq. Although we had promptly recognized the new government, while regretting the manner in which it had come to power, our attitude toward the new leaders in Baghdad had been widely misinterpreted throughout the Near East. While very severe limitations imposed several months ago on US official contacts had recently been somewhat modified, the Iraqis still appeared to be undecided as to what type of relationship they wish to have with the US. Actions taken by the Iraq Government against US officials would have been intolerable had it not been possible to explain them in part as the result of the inexperience of the country’s new leaders. Internally, we surmised that a contest was in progress between Iraqi groups favoring close relations with the UAR and those desiring to maintain Iraq’s separate entity.
Dr. Kamel observed that the UAR was not anxious to have Iraq join the federation and said that the Baghdad authorities had been so informed. Right now, difficulties stemming from Egypt’s union with Syria were sufficient for the UAR authorities. Mr. Rountree emphasized that it was obvious that the US was not trying to exercise any influence on the new Iraqi leaders. The decision as to what might be in the mutual interest of the UAR and Iraq would be a question for those two countries to decide. We understood, however, that the Communists were now backing Prime Minister Qassim in an effort to block union with the UAR. Some Egyptians had alleged that the US and USSR were both seeking to frustrate such a union but, as already stated, we were not opposed to such a development. Ambassador Kamel suggested that the US should publicize its interest in bringing the Arab countries together. Mr. Rountree replied that the US does not oppose Arab unity, had not opposed the formation of the UAR, and in fact considered that union of the Arab countries might have advantages from the US viewpoint.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.86B/10–858. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer on October 10 and approved by Rountree. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Cairo in telegram 989, October 8. (Ibid.)↩
- For text of this press release, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, p. 1058.↩
- For text of this resolution, dated August 21, see U.N. Doc. A/3905, p. 1.↩