219. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State1
803. Had hour and half with Nasser yesterday at my request in order confirm previously passed information re arms sale to Israel and also find out what had motivated his blast on Formosa in September 3 speech.
He was in relaxed and very friendly mood, beginning conversation by saying he had felt very run-down physically during past month and had been under care several army doctors who found he had been overworking and also needed certain changes in diet supplemented by vitamins, et cetera, but trouble had not only been physical; he had also reached point where he was completely fed up with monotony of seeing same people and dealing with same problems. However, as result medical attention and spending some time at seaside with his family, he was now getting back in stride. He was also wearing sizeable bandage on his right arm as result, he said, of slipping in bath tub on September 4 and suffering nasty gash from piece of metal work. Doctor had to take number of stitches but fortunately nerves had not been affected and arm was now mending rapidly.
Getting down to business, I then explained Israeli arms transaction as authorized by Department, emphasizing that not only were facts as reported by Al-Ahram completely wrong but erroneous impression given of basic US policy. Furthermore I could not help but have suspicions regarding origin of report. Conceivably it could have resulted from misunderstanding somewhere along line but I was frankly inclined suspect it was deliberate plant by ill-intentioned source.
Nasser listened attentively and expressed appreciation. Said, however, that, although he now convinced his information US sales was wrong, he was under impression that there is very sizeable program of arms supply to Israel cleared through British-French-American committee, i.e., that these countries have integrated program. I replied that, although there might have been some such clearing house some years ago in connection with tripartite declaration 1950,2 I felt certain such not now case and this borne out by my instructions which [Page 479] indicated certain knowledge of supply of UK arms to Israel but specifically said we had no details re arms Israel obtaining from other sources.
Re motivation his September 3 speech, Nasser indicated that, aside from reported arms deal with Israel, he had very much in mind reports being received of Baghdad trials which, inter alia, had seemed give clear and voluminous evidence of American involvement. He said that he had formerly been inclined heavily discount such reports when they had been passed on to him by Sirraj but that evidence now being produced cast matter in different light. I said had only seen accounts in local press and that much of testimony had seemed follow classic line of political trials where witnesses more interested in ingratiating themselves with court then in telling truth. Nasser admitted this factor to be considered but said he had been particularly impressed by documentary evidence.
I then asked Nasser what under heaven he had in mind when he criticized US so violently on Formosa issue. “Don’t you know why”, he asked. I said hadn’t vaguest idea; that reason my question. Nasser then said that he had merely been reacting to certain strong attacks which had been made against him by Syngman Rhee and Chinese Nationalists at time Baghdad revolution. I said I informed re such attacks but that, in any event, fact which concerned me was violent criticism of US Government even if he had felt justified in mentioning matter in some way, there could be no justification for.
Bitter language used. Should be realized that this is matter of most grave concern to us and one where we in no mood brook gratitude to United States criticism. Furthermore, was unfortunate that this should have happened just at time when, as result patient endeavor both sides, we had been able take certain tangible steps toward improved relations which I enumerated in accord Department telegrams 736 and 740.3
Nasser took all this in good part and, although characteristically not admitting error, stressed Suez Canal dredging contract to American group as step which was intended indicate UAR good will. Said final decision in matter had been his and was made in light of efforts improve relations. He said also appreciated steps which I had mentioned as contributing same objective.
[Here follows brief discussion of Iraq, Communism, Jordan, Lebanon, the Sudan, world tensions, Dulles’ press conference on September 9, and a film about the USS Nautilus.]
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/9–1158. Secret; Noforn. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Jidda, Khartoum, Tripoli, Tunis, Rabat, Tel Aviv, and London.↩
- For text, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. V, pp. 167–168.↩
- Regarding telegram 736, see footnote 1, supra. Telegram 740, September 6, reported that Kamel had been informed of the positive decision to make the dredge Essayons available. (Department of State, Central Files, 986B.7301/9–658)↩