Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

216. Telegram From the Embassy in Ethiopia to the Department of State¹

Addis Ababa, August 8, 1958—3 p.m.

165. Cairo for Hare from Murphy. After a curious day of waiting August 6 for Nasser to make up his mind we received word at 7:30 p.m. that he would receive Hare and me at Nasser’s residence at 9 p.m. Reasons for delay were explained in my message from Cairo² and related to Nasser perturbation when he was informed by somebody at 7 a.m. August 6 regarding Lodge’s procedural reference to July 18 US resolution on Lebanese complaint plus Secretary’s statement at Rio.³ We were informed by Mustapha Amin and Ali Sabri that Nasser’s immediate reaction was that he was to be made the whipping boy in what was essentially conflict between US and USSR. He was indignant and uneasy. Hare and I decided to sit out convinced that by evening realities would become apparent to Nasser. This proved to be the case.

At beginning of conversation Nasser was ill at ease and I thought uncomfortable because of his hasty morning reaction. There was a brief reference to “such things will happen” which we shrugged off as unimportant with a tactful suggestion we were happy our interpretation conveyed to him earlier proved correct. We also referred to constructive and friendly attitude toward ME problems manifest in President Eisenhower’s press conference yesterday.⁴ Hare read excerpts to which Nasser lent attentive and I think appreciative ear.

Conversation opened on rather heavy note when replying to our words of thanks for interrupting his vacation plans on our account Nasser stuffily said always glad to see anyone who came with understanding of dignity, equality, etc. He was even stuffier when he added that after Lodge’s reference to July 18 resolution he had asked himself whether any useful purpose would be served by talking to me in friendly fashion while USG was preparing to attack him in SC.

I said my visit to Cairo was simply another bit of evidence of desire of President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles to work cooperatively for solution of ME problems which will not only bring peace and stability but better living conditions and understanding of US purposes to the area. We welcomed his views and ideas. Nasser pointed out Hare’s past efforts to convince him regarding peace and stability which had, he said, become stock words.

I asked whether he was interested in my conversations in Lebanon and other points visited. He seemed eager to hear about them and visibly relaxed when he felt he was receiving confidential fill in. (Mustapha Amin later said Nasser had in mind confining to courtesy call but that our forthcoming approach changed his mind.)

[Here follow sections on Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq.]

Israel: Nasser touched lightly on Israel both in connection with immediate Jordan problem and generally. For him this continues core of US difficulties with Arab world.

Arab nationalism: During this phase of conversation we were able to inject references to President’s recent statement as well as Secretary’s re Arab nationalism. I asked him whether Arab nationalism in his thinking has definite geographical borders. He gave no clear cut answer but implied his attitude was reasonable and that he had no ambitions to preside over a sprawling empire. Hare made excellent point that most US difficulties with Egypt seemed to arise over issues relating to third persons and third countries. There is actually no conflict over matters which are strictly Egyptian or strictly American. Nasser heartily agreed. Nasser said he resented suspicions that he is fomenting indirect aggression and subversion. He denied it. I said well I had heard stories about his network of Egyptian Military Attachés throughout the area—explosives, arms, agitation—quite apart from radio incitation. It puzzled me. Is there any truth in the stories, I inquired. He said he had heard them all and could assure me that nothing of the sort is now happening. Some of his people had been eager beavers. He gave a lengthy description of The Ma at Tripoli who organized out of misguided zeal a one-man action against Libya. Nasser deplored it and said it was unauthorized. I also made gentle references to the Riyadh affair, former Damascus activities and Beirut as examples of stories that troubled us. He talked a lot about Riyadh as another unauthorized misguided case of individual overzealousness. This is not a new subject for him but it seemed apropos in light of his insistence UAR not pushing other states to join. I professed satisfaction over his assurances no plans exist for subversion other states in area.

Collective security: Nasser explained primary reason for Arab unity is collective security. Difficult for anyone of these small states to stand alone. Egypt small weak country. Its safety lay in Arab unity.

As he had previously questioned need of military alliances and “blocs” I pointed out US need for collective security and Secretary’s repeated explanation no country today can stand alone and bear burden expense modern warfare. Therefore we could understand need for Arab unity, would he understand our need of collective security in face of Soviet military threat. He said he thought he could.

Arms: Inevitably question Soviet arms arose. Nasser indulged his propensity for national self pity after “three centuries of Turkish and 75 years of British” domination. There was a review of our arms negotiations. He said we had calculated total Egyptian foreign exchange as $28,500,000 and agreed to sell that much. USSR took broader view. He had no choice. I gave this a light touch by saying I hoped he would not live to regret it. His action had done much to destroy our confidence. It seemed to me unprofitable to rake over the ashes of the arms deal. He is acutely aware of US point of view. (I am writing this while flying over Aswan which evokes memories of 1956.)

At this stage and elsewhere in conversation there were references by Nasser to what he considers Secretary’s personal antagonism. At one point I expressed opinion that if Secretary had not assumed position he did at time of Suez Nasser’s lot would have been quite different. He said he has publicly acknowledged it but this had been followed by the Secretary’s statements relating to Eisenhower Doctrine. Matter obviously designed to isolate Egypt. He feared Secretary just didn’t like him or trust him. Although his meeting with him in 1953 he thought had gone well. I believed I detected in these references to the Secretary a certain nostalgia, as well as a sense of insecurity on his part.

USSR: Stoutly maintaining his adherence to policy of neutrality, Nasser said nevertheless could not avoid contrasting attitudes of West and USSR. Not only has latter been responsive to UAR material needs but it has given assistance without strings and has also shown consideration for sensitivity UAR as smaller country by giving appearance at least of treating as equal and especially by consulting with it on continuing basis. Speaking without bitterness, Nasser suggested we would do well to take page out of Soviet book in this latter regard. Important thing is understand importance smaller countries attach to such things as equality and dignity.

Propaganda: Nobody with whom I have talked evinces more hypersensitivity to press and radio criticism than Nasser. He asserted he avidly reads American press and radio monitoring. It apparently acts on him like a daily dose of adrenalin. He had just read critical article in US News and World Report and his blood pressure was still high. As he was getting angry I tried to get this on a less serious note by suggesting that the time for him to worry would be when the press stopped talking about him. He complained about two black radio stations on Cyprus, one in France, Radio Beirut which he said is inspired by the US and VOA broadcasts. He said the three black radio stations are especially scurrilous attacking his personal life. He said you may say nobody listens to them “but I listen to them”.

[Here follow sections on Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, the Maghreb, and UAR relations with the British.]

Concluding part conversation was devoted to US–UAR relations and prospects improving. Nasser said persistent difficulty is know what we really want in area. We constantly talk of “peace and stability” with which he agreed in principle but what do we really mean? I believe I refuted this implication with an outline of what we had done in the several countries and the constant understanding we had manifested. I said we did not want Soviet domination.

Nasser then went on point out there had never been any real difficulty with Egypt per se but that sources of friction had been certain area policies of USG which ran contrary to Egyptian interests. To be specific, i.e., US relations had been promising until we sponsored Baghdad Pact which put across basic policy of area collective defense which Egypt deemed essential if Arab countries were to play international role based on dignity and equality. In this context, Nasser regarded any pact, base agreement or similar arrangement of Arab country with outside power as form of subservience. However, events of fall of 1956 had brought about improvement in relations for several months but which had been brought to end by Eisenhower Doctrine which Egypt regarded as designed isolate it. This was not just local deduction but conclusion which was unanimous in American press. I reviewed the Eisenhower Doctrine and ridiculed the suggestion it was designed to isolate Egypt. I pointed to the USSR as the element of danger.

Finally Nasser said realized press not controlled in US but that did not change fact that cumulative effect of adverse criticism of UAR and himself can not but have serious effect. In this connection, Nasser said he had perhaps unfortunate habit of reading American publications in extenso and again said he was especially steamed up by several articles in last issue US News and World Report.

However, in final survey of situation Nasser noted that causes for US–UAR conflict might be in process reaction as result Iraqi revolution, prospective solution of Lebanese situation and hope for improvement UAR-Saudi relations, although Israeli problem of course remains and corruption in Jordan could have unpredictable consequences.

I came away also convinced effective US military intervention in Lebanon may exercise excellent effect on Nasser’s outlook and attitude.

Bliss

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/8–958. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Cairo. Murphy arrived in Lebanon on July 17 and remained until early August. On his way back to Washington, he stopped for conversations in Jordan, Israel, Iraq, Cairo, and Addis Ababa. For his own account of the background to and meeting with Nasser, see Diplomat Among Warriers, pp. 498–506.
2. Telegram 427 from Cairo, August 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 110.13–MU/8–658)
3. For text of Lodge’s statement and the draft resolution of July 18, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 990–991. For text of Dulles’ address at Rio de Janeiro on August 6, see Department of State Bulletin, August 25, 1958, pp. 304–309.
4. For the transcript of President Eisenhower’s press conference on August 6, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1958, pp. 587–597.