Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa, Volume XIII

215. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, August 5, 1958¹

Washington, August 5, 1958

SUBJECT

• UAR Views Regarding Middle East Situation and US–UAR Relations

PARTICIPANTS

• H.E. Mustapha Kamel, UAR Ambassador-designate
• H. E. Amin Mouftah, Minister, UAR Embassy
• William M. Rountree, NEA
• Lampton Berry, NEA
• Stuart W. Rockwell, NE
• John Dorman, NE
• Wells Stabler, NE
• William D. Brewer, NE

Ambassador-designate Kamel paid his initial courtesy call on Assistant Secretary Rountree on August 5.² The Ambassador emphasized his intention to work in all sincerity to normalize and to promote US–UAR relations and stated that he had so informed the Secretary on July 30. Stressing that he was reflecting Arab public attitudes toward the US, Ambassador Kamel made the following points:

1. Arabs believe the US is dissatisfied with the growing Arab trend toward non-alignment. Ambassador Kamel asserted this had been the historic policy of Egyptian Governments since World War II and that the Egyptian people continued to hope that such a policy might protect them in the event of another war. In the event of Soviet aggression against the Arab states, however, the latter would immediately invoke the Arab League Collective Security Pact and would request Western assistance.

2. While the Western press often depicts Arab nationalism as destructive, this is not the case and Arab nationalism is not “made in Cairo.” If the US is able to cooperate wholeheartedly with the forces of Arab nationalism, these forces will safeguard all legitimate US interests.

3. Arabs regard the creation of the State of Israel as an act of aggression. Should the US desire a settlement of this problem it would be useful to ask Prime Minister Ben Gurion not to mount attacks against Arab frontiers (the Arabs would agree to a similar undertaking) and to abandon Israel’s policy of unlimited immigration. Should these two conditions find implicit acceptance, an atmosphere would be created in which work toward a future settlement might be possible.

4. Arabs are opposed to Communism by religion, culture and temperament. The Communist Party is outlawed throughout the UAR and Syrian pro-Communists have been brought under control as a result of this union. Egypt was obliged to purchase arms from Russia to solve and existing situation, since arms were not readily obtainable from the West. Since that time there have been the Suez landings, the failure of the West to buy Egyptian cotton and Western press attacks against Nasser. Throughout this period the Soviets have shown themselves sympathetic. They have purchased Egyptian cotton and have given Egypt wheat. Should US–UAR relations be normalized, however, the UAR would certainly return to its former clients.

5. Egypt desires only compensation for war damage sustained following which relations with the UK and France can be normalized.

6. Egyptian relations with the Hashemites have always been correct. Egypt asked only that the Hashemites cease poisoning Egyptian relations with the West and stop spending money to subvert Egyptian and pro-Egyptian regimes. Egypt did not interfere in Iraq’s internal affairs but the recent revolt came as no surprise in view of the repressive policies of the former government.

Ambassador Kamel continued that there was no purpose in emphasizing what is past, such as the putative role of Egyptian broadcasts, but that a new chapter should be opened. He believed that as the stronger country, the United States should take the lead in improving the atmosphere through showing publicly an improved attitude toward the UAR. According to the Ambassador, a possible area of US–UAR understanding exists which would include the following: (a) the UAR is ready to work with the US and cooperate with its Arab friends to oppose the spread of Communism; (b) the UAR (in which the Ambassador included Yemen) represents a large area which could be opened to US capital, exchanges of persons and other aspects of cultural cooperation; and (c) even in the military sphere the UAR would be prepared to cooperate within the limits of its non-alignment policy provided some facts were first clarified. In this connection, the announcement of the US program to normalize relations with the UAR had been widely hailed but its good effect dissipated by our intervention in Lebanon. The US should make clear that it does not support unpopular governments in the area, notably King Hussein. All the UAR desires is recognition by the US that (i) government by the people should prevail in the Arab countries; (ii) these countries should be free of foreign domination; and (iii) Arab nationalism does not run counter to Western interests. Efforts should also be made to remove the suspicion of some Arabs that normalization of relations with the UAR is a screen behind which the West is making plans to overthrow Nasser. The Arab fears that the US in its relations with the Arabs follows a divide and rule concept. Since Cairo is the gateway to all the Arab countries, US–UAR relations should be improved in order that US-Arab relations may prosper. Because the US is stronger, the US should take the first step. Additionally, we should abandon our concept of indirect aggression which is not recognized by most Arabs. The Iraqi revolt was neither the result of indirect aggression nor of propaganda by Cairo but an event which had to take place sooner or later. The Ambassador noted, however, that any US approach to the Arabs would have to follow withdrawal of American troops from Lebanon.

Mr. Rountree expressed appreciation for the Ambassador’s frank statement and explained the motivations and bases of US policy. It is our earnest hope that there can be a constructive approach to outstanding problems and we are willing to discuss them frankly and seek ways of improvement. However, Ambassador Kamel’s comments regarding Arab attitudes toward the US reflect a widespread misunderstanding of our objectives. We have felt it wise to adopt a policy of collective security but have never considered that other states had no right to follow another policy. As a former resident of Egypt, Mr. Rountree said that he was often disturbed by articles in the Cairo press, for example the spurious State Department document recently published in a Cairo paper. This was a crude forgery which represented neither Departmental policy nor the form and style of Departmental communications. The US has always welcomed legitimate Arab nationalism as evidenced by our prompt recognition of the UAR. UAR relations with Russia have never given us cause for concern that Egypt might become Communized. We have, however, been concerned that Soviet-Egyptian contacts might result in the injection of an alien force into the area which it might not be possible to contain, despite the wishes of the Arab Governments and peoples. There is, however, recognition of this danger by the Arab countries which should safeguard them against this threat to their security.

In conclusion, Ambassador Kamel expressed the hope that he might take up specific topics with Mr. Rountree in periodic meetings, if possible on a weekly basis. Mr. Rountree replied that such regular meetings would be welcome.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/8–558. Confidential. Drafted by Brewer on August 8 and approved by Rountree. A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Cairo in telegram 439, August 6. (Ibid., 880.86B/8–658)
2. Kamel presented his credentials on August 11. A memorandum of his conversation with President Eisenhower on that occasion is ibid., 601.86B11/8–1158.