213. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State1
279. Haikal asked come see me again yesterday afternoon, presumably on instructions Nasser as on previous call 2 days before (Embassy telegram 243).2 His attitude was one of old friend wanting talk over situation and he said reason for asking see me was attempt foresee where we go from here and especially to ask what US policy in area actually is.
I replied that, taking policy question first, it remained exactly same, i.e., that we only interested in maintaining peace and stability in ME, in development of area free from subversion by international [Page 462] communism, and in assuring normal access to resources and facilities of area on mutually agreeable basis. Specifically, we did not oppose Arab nationalism provided attainment of objectives was by appropriate means; we did not oppose Arab Union provided it effected by common consent; we believed test defense against menace of Communist power bloc was by collective defense but failure agree need not hinder normal relations. We still desired improved relations with UAR and our present action in Lebanon is for announced purpose of assuring independence and integrity of that country and had no ulterior motive. In fact, had given notice of our position in this regard in earlier stages of discussion reference improved relations, when we had pointed out that 2 major foreseeable obstacles to such improvement could be overly close relationship between UAR and USSR and UAR hostile activity against area governments friendly USG. All this had been laid cards-up on the table long ago and our present actions conform exactly to what we said. By same token, however, and in spite present degeneration in situation, I saw now reason why better relations might not be eventually attainable if present difficulties could be solved. That would depend largely on UAR showing ability understand our position better than it had in past. It was all very well to talk reasonably in private, as we were doing and as I had done many times with President Nasser, but UAR voice which world hears is that of Ahmed Said (most violent of local radio commentators). To repeat and summarize, problem was not one of conflict of basic interests but rather of means being used to achieve ends to which we were not opposed in principle.
Although Haikal maintained that main difficulty was our failure understand verities of present nationalist transition, his rebuttal was less spirited than usual and it was plain that point which he wished to make (and for which he had probably been sent) was that, difficult as things are, opportunity for constructive discussion may be greater than might appear on surface, and in this connection he particularly invited attention to passages in Nasser speech of night before in which he had said bore grudge against no one and wanted be friends of all. Haikal said Nasser had USG particularly in mind in that connection. I said had noted this passage and commended it but I had also noted other passages which were apparently intended impute imperialist motives to US, which was sheer nonsense and had cumulatively noxious effect.
Haikal responded that what we should try understand is that UAR is conscious of its weakness vis-à-vis great powers and that propaganda to which Arab masses receptive is about its only available device. If objectives of Arab nationalism could be achieved and position of strength established, situation would be entirely changed and Ahmed Said would speak with polished restraint of Selwyn Lloyd. But, until that time, propaganda would remain an indispensable device. [Page 463] Returning to theme of future relations, Haikal expressed feeling that ME problems were of type which should be settled by direct discussion with ME countries rather than in some big power conference. I replied not our idea but Soviets.
In course conversation, Haikal made plea for understanding new regime in Iraq which sincerely desired good relations with West. He also said that, much as he deplored early excesses, they should be viewed in light brutality of repression 1949 revolt. He believed Iraqi authorities would be most responsive to any indications of our willingness understand their motives and cooperate with them.
Comment: Although Haikal’s approach might be interested merely as cynical attempt to soften us up in order to give time to consolidate major gain made in Iraq in preparation for further exploitation elsewhere, e.g., Jordan, and although this may have in fact been in Nasser’s mind in sending Haikal to see us, I feel we should also consider possibility that Nasser may well feel that ME situation is getting out of hand as it promises become subject of great powers discussion and that this prospect may be accompanied by healthy fear as result American and British military intervention and by unresolved doubts reference our intentions.
Furthermore, it would seem possible that, with Iraq now apparently in firm Arab nationalist control, major objective achieved which Nasser would not wish prejudice by becoming embroiled over lesser issues, at least for time being. This could be especially true of Lebanon; Jordan more dubious.
In circumstances and particularly while presence our military forces Lebanon and Turkey remains as symbol our firm intent, it would seem possible, if we so desire, to profit by opportunity to approach Nasser from position of greater strength than has been case in past or than may be case in future when our present somewhat militant posture may be relaxed. (Meanwhile believe advisable not be too bland in assurances reference our intentions. For tactical reasons probably just as well keep Nasser on anxious seat for time being.)
This comment is made in ignorance of possible action which may be taken reference Khrushchev’s suggestion to enlarge proposed ME conference,3 which if accepted, would, of course, change whole picture without, however, entirely invalidating some of suggestions made.
[Page 464]In this connection, recall Embassy telegrams 176 and 2484 reference possible Murphy visit.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 780.00/7–2458. Confidential. Repeated to London, Moscow, Rome for McSweeney, Beirut, Ankara, Tehran, Baghdad, Damascus, Amman, Tel Aviv, and Jidda.↩
- Telegram 243, July 21, transmitted Haikal’s view of his and Nasser’s trip to Moscow. (Ibid., 780.00/7–2158)↩
- It is not clear whether Hare was referring to Khrushchev’s letter of July 21 or 23; for texts, see Department of State Bulletin, August 11, 1958, pp. 231–235.↩
- Telegrams 176 and 248, July 18 and 22, respectively, both speculated on a visit to Cairo by Murphy. (Department of State, Central Files, 783A.00/7–1858 and 780.00/7–2258)↩