Office of the Historian

212. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Arab Republic to the Department of State1

Cairo, July 3, 1958—2 p.m.

25. Ambassador-designate Kamel came in pay farewell call yesterday prior departure July 7 by plane and ship to US. Said postponement caused by necessity seeing President Nasser before departure which delayed because visit Nkrumah, etc. However, had seen Nasser June 26 for several hours following my interview with him same day (Embtel 3483)2 and following were main points discussed:

(1)
Nasser said sincerely wanted improved relations and desire Kamel do everything possible promote.
(2)
When Nasser lamented fact that he was misunderstood and misjudged in US, Kamel said he quite frankly told him major difficulty was Cairo press and radio (subject which I had also discussed but didn’t report because has become such standardized routine). Nasser replied merely acting defensively, mentioning Radio Amman and Baghdad and clandestine stations. Kamel observed, admitting this true, situation is that now in vicious circle where voices raised are constantly more strident. Necessary find some means attenuate and would be helpful if Cairo could take initiative regardless of who started (Kamel said he had pursued subject with considerable vigor subsequently with Ali Sabri and believed results would be seen in new radio set-up to be headed by Sabri which announced yesterday).
(3)
Nasser also said recognized American interests in ME and had no desire obstruct but trouble is that USG does not place confidence in him but does do so in such persons as Nuri, Chamoun and Hussein, who are, however, more interested in maintaining their personal positions than they are in responding to desires of people. This is reason why they so opposed to UAR and constantly attempt block any potential understanding between USG and UAR. Kamel said he shared Nasser’s views on this point and, although he could understand that we might desire maintain friendly relations with such leaders, he felt would be great mistake if we did not recognize that circumstances impel them speak from personal motives contrary natural trend events.
(4)
Nasser also spoke to Kamel re exaggerated attribution to him of leadership of so-called Nasserist movements in other Arab countries [1½ lines of source text not declassified], Kamel felt this valid observation and indicated that, if approached differently, Nasser would be receptive to using influence constructively in area.
(5)
Kamel said Nasser’s final injunction was try induce USG give him (Nasser) opportunity demonstrate his good intent “even for only six months.”

In taking leave Kamel said going to Washington with intention do best improve relations and hoped he would have opportunity for frank discussions which would serve that purpose.

Comment: Kamel is somewhat unprepossessing little man who doesn’t make particularly favorable first impression but I have found him intelligent, relatively objective and seemingly desirous be helpful. He is not as broad gauge perhaps as his predecessor and surely not as personally attractive but he has his points, including trained legal mind, and I believe will respond to considerate treatment. Fact that he had courage to make issue of press and radio with Nasser and Sabri is encouraging sign.

Hare
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.86B11/7–358. Confidential. Repeated to Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Khartoum, Tripoli, and London.↩
  2. Document 210.↩