Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula, Volume XII

204. Memorandum of Discussion at the 420th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, October 1, 1959.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2. Secretary of State Herter presided at the meeting.]

3. The Situation in Iraq (NSC 5820/1;¹ NSC Actions Nos. 2068, 2074, 2078 and 2100;²SNIE 36.2–4–59³)

Mr. Gray said the next item was a report by the Interdepartmental Group on Iraq, established by NSC Action No. 2068. At this point Mr. G. Lewis Jones and Mr. Armin Meyer of the Department of State joined the meeting.

Mr. Jones presented the report of the Interdepartmental Group. He said the Group had concluded that (1) dramatic action by the US in Iraq was not desirable; (2) restraint by the Arab countries is the best means of restraining Iraq; (3) Kassem should be encouraged through third parties to maintain an independent Iraq which would resist the Communist threat. The Group was keeping the situation in Iraq under close scrutiny and had agreed to meet again in ten or twelve days, shortly after the CENTO session.⁴ After the meeting of the Group, a telegram from Ambassador Jernegan (telegram of September 28, 1959)⁵ had been received. This telegram indicated that (1) the short-range prospect for internal stability in Iraq was worse, (2) the anti-Communist trend was slowing up, (3) US capabilities in Iraq are extremely limited and US intervention in the country would only make matters worse. The Ambassador believes contingency planning looking toward the protection of American lives and property is desirable; accordingly, the Washington Liaison Group had been asked to be on the alert for evacuation of Americans from Iraq.

Mr. Jones said there were numerous reports of a forthcoming attempt to assassinate Kassem.⁶ Such reports emanating from Cairo and Baghdad may, however, be Communist provocations. If major civil strife should occur in Iraq our best course might be to insure that Iraq’s neighbors did not undertake a rash interference in Iraq’s internal affairs. Contingency planning with some countries against the possibility of civil strife in Iraq might do more harm than good if Iraq became aware of the planning. However, the US should continue to consult the British as appropriate on all the factors in the Iraq situation. In conclusion, Mr. Jones reported that a recent telegram indicated that the Turkish Ambassador had recently seen Kassem and found him “calmly confident.” The Turkish Ambassador believed it unlikely that Kassem would willingly swing to Communism.⁷

Secretary Herter said the Turks appear to be optimistic about the situation in Iraq. Mr. Gray said he had the impression Nasser had not been as active recently in propaganda and subversive activities in Iraq, even though recent rumors continued to link Nasser with assassination plots. He asked Mr. Dulles to comment.

Mr. Dulles said that Radio Cairo continued to be anti-Kassem and that Nasser had resumed some radio attacks on Kassem. Also Nasser had been doing some contingency planning and had urged the assassination plotters not to move too fast. Nasser had inquired of the US [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] what our attitude would be in the event of a battle in Iraq among Kassem, the nationalists and the Communists. The UAR may be laying plans to intervene in the event chaos ensues in Iraq. Rumors were generally wrong, but it was possible an attempt would be made on Kassem’s life in the next two months. Mr. Dulles agreed with Mr. Jones as to contingency planning, but believed we should be giving thought as to what we might do in various possible situations. We should plan for measures to protect Western interests in the event of chaos in Iraq and our consultative lines with the British should be kept open.

Secretary Herter thought the question of Iraq would probably be discussed at the CENTO meeting. He noted that the Turks have been consistently optimistic about Iraq; while the British, who were formerly optimistic, are now downcast.

Mr. Gray asked whether the Department of Defense had sufficient guidance on the Iraq situation. Mr. Gates said it did, and added that planning under CINCEUR was in good shape.

Mr. Gray said he assumed the Interdepartmental Group would assess the situation in Iraq again after the CENTO meeting.

The National Security Council:⁸

a. Noted and discussed an oral report by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs on recent developments with respect to Iraq, the work of the interdepartmental group established pursuant to NSC Action No. 2068–b, and a recent evaluation by Ambassador Jernegan of the situation in Iraq.

b. Noted that the interdepartmental group established pursuant to NSC Action No. 2068–b would continue to keep the situation in Iraq under scrutiny, and would reappraise the situation following the forthcoming CENTO meeting and report the results thereof to the Council.

[Here follows agenda item 4.]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Boggs on October 2.
1. Document 51.
2. See footnotes 1 and 2, Document 194.
3. Document 202.
4. October 7–9; see Documents 76 and 77.
5. See footnote 6, Document 203.

6. On October 1, Goodpaster prepared a “Synopsis of Intelligence Items Reported to the President.” The first item, based on September 28 information, reads: “Baghdad seething with rumors that Qasim is about to order execution of additional prominent prisoners. A new coup, to start with the assassination of Qasim, is scheduled ‘within a week.’ Our Ambassador considers the situation hazardous and unstable. Nationalist reaction to the execution of Mosul conspirators is virulent and spontaneous.”

   A second item on Iraq, based on September 30 information, reads: “Nasser is counseling conspirators involved in plan for coup in Iraq within a week, including assassination of Qasim. Nasser is ready to send UAR troops to oppose any counter-move thereafter.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

7. Telegram 807 from Baghdad, September 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 787.00/9–3059)
8. Paragraphs a and b constitute NSC Action No. 2133, approved by the President on October 14. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)